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Local Authorities are increasingly expected to meet UK 2050 net zero climate 
goals. However, they struggle to assemble investment for local energy and 
carbon saving projects. In this thesis I examine how valuation devices that 
local authorities use to support decision making, shape the development of 
energy projects. I first develop a conceptual model bridging economic 
sociology of valuation and programmes of governing. I then use this model to 
examine valuation practices in local energy across 40 local authority case 
studies. I demonstrate that the value of local energy initiatives is not pre-
determined, but is assembled through processes of ‘value-in-the-making’. 
 
Local authorities are required to follow formal processes at key junctures in 
project development. I analyse three such formal valuation processes 
through my conceptual model: Best Value, the business case model and 
public procurement. Although governments advise that all three valuation 
processes provide a balanced evaluation of local investment options, in 
practice this proves more difficult to achieve, at least for energy projects. I 
found that energy projects were subjected to diverse processes of 
economisation which marginalised social value and public goods. 
 
It was during the application of these formal valuation devices that the 
parameters of value shifted. Each device was customised to circumstances 
and susceptible to different interpretations by officers from across the council 
throughout project development. This sometimes opens up discrete spheres 
of influence. Thus, interpretative flexibility, negotiation and contestation 
ultimately shape the success, scale and scope of energy initiatives. I 
conclude that the current structures governing valuation practices in local 







Local Authorities are increasingly expected to meet UK 2050 net zero climate 
goals. However, with no direct powers and resources for local energy 
planning and investment, they struggle to assemble investment for local 
energy and carbon saving projects. In this thesis I examine how tools and 
procedures that local authorities use to support decision making, shape the 
development of energy projects. 
 
The theoretical approach used draws from economic sociology of valuation 
and programmes of governing. This perspective considers that value is not 
inherent, but is put together, or assembled, through a whole number of 
different ways of calculating and evaluating. Importantly, using this 
perspective draws attention to the idea that value is assembled through 
processes of ‘value-in-the-making’, i.e. it involves a variety of practices and 
activities. 
 
However, we have little evidence about how these processes unfold in local 
authority energy projects. I therefore applied this theoretical perspective to 
consider what happens to local energy when different tools and procedures 
are used across project development. I examined three formal processes 
across key junctures in project development: Best Value, the business case 
model and public procurement. I gathered and analysed data about how 
these formal tools were intended to be used; and using 40 local authority 
case studies, found out what actually happened during their application. 
 
Although governments advise that all three can provide a balanced 
evaluation of local investment options, in practice this proves more difficult to 
achieve, at least for energy projects. I found that energy projects were 
 iii 
subjected to diverse processes which prioritised cost saving and income 
generation, and marginalised energy and carbon saving and public goods. 
 
It was during the application of these formal tools and procedures that the 
parameters of value shifted. Each set of procedures was customised to 
circumstances and susceptible to different interpretations by officers from 
across the council throughout project development. This sometimes opens 
up discrete spheres of influence. Thus, how tools and procedures are 
interpreted, negotiated and contested ultimately shapes the success, scale 
and scope of energy initiatives. I conclude that the current organisation of 
assessing local investment options in local authority energy projects 
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Today there is no substantial UK municipal energy sector. There are pockets 
of activity, but in the absence of direct local government responsibilities or 
mandate for energy, municipal energy is small scale and ad hoc. However, 
as civic representative bodies, UK Local Authorities are likely to be an 
essential institutional actor for achieving net zero carbon targets by 2050 
(Bulkeley, Castán Broto, & Maassen, 2014; Scottish Government, 2018a; 
Tingey & Webb, 2020a; Webb, Tingey, & Hawkey, 2017). This thesis 
therefore aims to improve our understanding of how local authorities 
currently assemble value from local energy. 
 
Drawing on evidence from 40 local authority case studies, I analysed the 
influence of three different decision making tools and procedures used 
across different stages of energy project development. This has generated a 
rich account of the struggles local authorities encounter as they attempt to 
bring forward energy projects in an economic and political climate that 
constrains their systematic contribution to a clean energy society. 
 
This thesis challenges the assertion put forward by UK and devolved 
governments that current frameworks for assessing value in local authority 
energy projects can provide a balanced evaluation of local investment 
options. Findings demonstrate that carbon saving, social value and public 
goods of energy projects were continually eroded during their development. 
Energy projects are ultimately marginal to the local authority organisation, 
and susceptible to scaling back, delay or being abandoned. The organisation 
and governance of local authority energy thus largely disincentivises any 
significant municipal energy sector from emerging. Consequently, I conclude 
that the current governing of local authority energy fails to deliver on the local 
carbon saving and clean energy needed to meet climate protection goals. In 
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the remainder of this Introductory chapter, I explain the rationale and 
research questions of this study in more detail, and provide an overview of 
the thesis structure. 
1.1 Rationale for studying local governance of 
energy and valuation practices 
Local governance of energy has come to the fore in the context of ending 
societal dependence on fossil fuels and developing clean energy systems. 
Towns and cities are sites of considerable emissions, with transport, 
business and residential sectors together comprising two thirds of UK 
greenhouse gas emissions (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, 2020). The UK Climate Change Act (2008) and Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009 brought in legally binding targets for an 80% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. This legislation 
was extended in 2019 to a net zero target, by 2045 in Scotland, and 2050 in 
the rest of the UK1. The magnitude of these targets for economic and societal 
decarbonisation requires coordinated action across all scales and sectors 
(Committee on Climate Change (CCC), 2019; Unsworth, Valero, & Stern, 
2020; Watson, 2019). 
 
Climate policy developments have focused on the energy system. However, 
most progress to date has been on decarbonising British electricity supply 
through the implementation of renewables. Conversely, there has been very 
limited progress in energy efficiency, heat decarbonisation and transport 
(Eyre & Killip, 2019). These all have a ‘local’ dimension, where local 
authorities could play pivotal roles in the planning, development and 
implementation of clean, efficient, low energy infrastructure. 
 
                                            
1 The Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019, and the Climate Change 
(Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Act 2019. The target for Welsh emissions is a 95% reduction 
by 2050.  
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Analysis has illustrated how local authority scale energy and climate 
governance and investment can contribute toward emissions reduction 
targets. For example, analyses have calculated local authority carbon 
budgets and annual emissions reduction trajectories aligned to the 2015 
United Nations Paris Agreement (Kuriakose et al., 2018), and UK net zero 
carbon target (Kuriakose et al., 2019). For Manchester and West Midlands 
Combined Authority, this would involve a 13% average annual reduction in 
CO2 emissions respectively2; achieving this requires significant scaling up of 
investment at local scale. Complementing this, further studies have 
quantified potential carbon reduction at city scale (Sudmant et al., 2016). 
Estimates for the whole city of Edinburgh (Williamson et al., 2019) for 
example, indicate the city’s carbon emissions could be halved from cost-
effective investment in known energy efficiency and heat decarbonisation 
technologies. This suggests that there is considerable, but currently 
untapped, potential for a contribution to climate protection goals at local 
authority scale. 
 
Although UK local authorities have no direct responsibilities for energy, the 
issue cuts across multiple other local authority interests and responsibilities 
(Bulkeley, 2010; Royal Society of Edinburgh, 2019; Sugden et al., 2012). 
This includes urban regeneration, economic development, planning, housing, 
fuel poverty and welfare. Local authorities’ overall commitment to locality has 
long been recognised as crucial to their motivation and scope for 
involvement. From various local government groups and networks, such as 
UK100 (Billington, Abel Smith, & Ball, 2020; 2017), Climate Alliance et al. 
(2015), and APSE Energy (Association of Public Service Excellence) (e.g. 
Bramah, 2015) there are also calls for greater local authority roles in carbon 
                                            
2 Energy related emission only, excludes aviation, shipping and land use change. Analysis for 
Manchester was in line with the 2008 Climate Change Act and hence figures may change to align 
with a net zero trajectory. 
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abatement, and ‘re-municipalising’ energy. This suggests appetite among 
local authorities for more systematic engagement with energy. 
 
In keeping with this, academic interest in local authority contribution to 
transforming UK energy systems has been increasing over the last 30 years. 
Studies first emphasised ‘Local Agenda 21’ of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit as 
an early catalyst for local action (Collier & Löfstedt, 1997), and corresponding 
attempts to embed sustainable development in councils (Ball, 2005). Studies 
then catalogued the (few) ‘pioneering’ UK councils which developed energy 
and climate strategies, including Nottingham, Bristol and Kirklees, amongst a 
handful of others (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Shackley, Fleming, & Bulkeley, 
2002). Overall however the picture was one of limited action: Allman et al 
(2004) found that around 70% of English and Welsh local authorities did not 
have energy and climate strategies in place. The lack of a policy framework 
for local authority-led energy was noted (Fleming & Webber, 2004). Without 
clear responsibilities for energy and climate change, it was argued to be 
unlikely that local authorities would independently develop sufficient capacity 
for local energy programmes (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Bulkeley & Kern, 
2006). 
 
With no systematic progress on local energy, there has been new interest in 
understanding local authorities’ institutional capacities, and their limitations, 
to contribute to local energy systems (Tingey & Webb, 2020a; Tingey, 
Hawkey, & Webb, 2016). In the context of austerity budgets and (still) no 
clear policy framework for local energy, emphasis has been given to both the 
ongoing erosion of local authority capacities to intervene in energy systems 
(Dixon & Wilson, 2014; Morris et al., 2017), and the niche areas of innovation 
that occur despite this (Kuzemko & Britton, 2020). This includes how local 
authorities attempt to develop local energy strategies (Bale et al., 2012), 
urban energy coalitions for retrofitting (Hodson & Marvin, 2016), renewable 
energy, and low carbon heat provision (Ambrose, Eadson, & Pinder, 2016). 
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Understanding the value of local authority energy initiatives thus involves 
situating local energy governance within a complex landscape of interlocking 
actors, interests, formal and informal capacities. 
1.2 Research objective and focus 
Missing from analysis to date is consideration of the ways in which local 
authorities evaluate options for, and make decisions about, ownership, 
operation and financing of energy projects. As Chapter 2 sets out in more 
detail, local authority autonomy and agency is heavily constrained by central 
governments who set their overall funding, powers and responsibilities 
(Eckersley, 2018). Crucially, there is no clear statutory local energy mandate 
and associated set of resources. This means energy is a discretionary area 
of local service provision. Austerity budgets make it even more challenging to 
stretch limited resources to discretionary services like local energy, as 
council funding has fallen below the levels needed to meet local service 
demand (Harris, Hodge, & Phillips, 2019). How then, is the value of a local 
energy project assembled? 
 
Where local authorities make some commitment to energy and carbon 
management, they must make the case for how this contributes value to the 
council. Building a rationale for why the council should allocate resources, 
whether human or financial, to discretionary energy project development is 
hence a sphere of improvised activity needing creative thinking (Webb, 
2015). This context presents intriguing questions about how the value of local 
energy is assembled, which provide the focus of this thesis. 
 
In particular, this thesis investigation analysed the formal processes used in 
energy project development; these provided the lens through which to 
examine decision making about local energy planning and investment. I 
analysed three such formal processes that intend to provide a balanced 
evaluation of local investment options: the Best Value Framework, the 
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business case model, and public procurement. Chapter 6 explains these in 
detail. 
 
Using these to structure the investigation, my overall aim and objective was 
to better understand how formal procedures for assessing value in energy 
projects influence material developments. To explore this, I use a 
sociological perspective on practices of valuation (Muniesa, 2012) in the 
context of neo-liberal programmes of governing (Miller, 2008) to focus the 
analysis directly on the integral role of tools and procedures in project 
development. As Chapter 3 explains, this perspective conceives that the 
value of an energy project is assembled through practices of ‘value-making’. 
The application of formal valuation instruments or ‘devices’ are understood 
as attempts to standardise these valuation practices. In turn, formal 
processes are considered as one element of governmental attempts to exert 
political power and control in local authority decision making. The implication 
is that instead of treating project development processes as neutral or 
technocratic, this sociological perspective alerts the researcher to how value 
is mediated and negotiated through formal tools and procedures. 
 
However, how valuation instruments are actually used is poorly understood 
and lacks empirical evidence (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013). This thesis 
addresses this gap by analysing valuation practices within energy project 
development. Translating this perspective into research questions led to the 
following overarching research question: 
How is the value of local energy initiatives assembled? 
This research question asks how local authorities assemble value from local 
energy projects and proceed with project development, despite a governance 
context that fails to provide a clear route for consistent engagement with local 
energy. My focus is on how the three valuation frameworks selected 
structure the development of local energy. I thus consider them as 
constituent elements in valuation practices that shape energy projects. 
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Subsidiary research questions open up investigation into negotiating, 
contesting, interpreting and resisting these formal processes. These are 
explained in more detail in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4). 
 
The purpose of this investigation was therefore to contribute new knowledge 
about the struggles local authorities currently confront in value-making during 
energy project development. As Chapter 2 explores in more detail, current 
levels of local authority energy provision are not sufficient for the scale of 
decarbonisation needed to meet net zero carbon climate protection goals. 
Examining current practice provides a route to understanding limitations of 
the organisation and governance of local authority energy. Findings can 
inform what needs to change to enable a systematic local contribution to a 
UK net zero economy and society. 
1.3 Overview of Chapters 
This investigation into value-making in local energy unfolds as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides detail on local governance and energy in the UK, 
introducing: firstly, the marginal status of local authority energy provision in 
the UK; and secondly, central-local government institutional relationships. In 
the latter, I emphasise the marketisation of local public services and the use 
of specific evaluation methods in local government as one element of that. 
The chapter closes by clarifying the research scope of this thesis and my 
decision to focus on the influence of specific tools and procedures within 
project development. 
 
In Chapter 3, I introduce the conceptual framework and the rationale for 
specific research questions. I combine concepts from economic sociology of 
valuation and programmes of governing to allow me to conceptualise how 
formal instruments and tools shape the development of energy projects. This 
is used to consider the ways in which the value of local energy is the 
outcome of negotiated and contested valuation practices. 
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Chapter 4 details the multiple-case study approach developed to investigate 
local energy valuation practices. I explain how the methodology is informed 
by a lack of breadth in existing analyses of local authority energy. I then 
describe the multiple-case study design, discuss limitations of the chosen 
approach, and consider ethical implications associated with the study. 
 
Chapters 5–9 provide the main empirical section of the thesis. Chapter 5 
gives an overview of the local authority case studies. I analyse how energy 
was situated within each organisation, introduce the energy projects studied, 
and consider the likely areas of tension in energy project valuation practices. 
 
Chapter 6 then analyses the legislation and guidance relating to each 
valuation framework. This identified the perspective from central government 
and related agencies on how each tool should be applied. Discussion 
considers how local authorities might exert agency in interpreting the rules 
that attempt to govern and standardise local assessments of value. 
 
In Chapter 7 I focus on the Best Value Framework, analysing how energy 
projects become entangled with procedures for demonstrating public 
accountability and value for money. I consider how these govern the 
development, and formal valuations, of energy projects and the negotiation of 
value across different actors in the council. The procedures of the Best Value 
Framework are found to be excessively constraining, even though Best 
Value was introduced with the intention of giving more control in organising 
local services.  
	
Moving on to Chapter 8, I analyse how councils’ tussle with constructing and 
assessing the Business Case. This reveals considerable diversity in what 
constitutes the energy project business case. Overall, decision making was 
found to be largely oriented to relatively short-term financial value which 
impacted on capturing other forms of social value and public goods. Analysis 
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explores how local authorities attempted to break out of this mould and 
secure long-term investment in local energy that delivered carbon saving and 
social welfare. 
 
This leads into Chapter 9 where Public Procurement is the central focus. 
Analysis considers how negotiation of value was mediated through complex 
procurement rules and systems designed to promote economic efficiency 
across the public sector and wider EU single market. I develop and analyse a 
typology of the ‘intelligent buyer’ configured to navigate local energy 
procurement valuations. This reveals that attempts to adapt procurement 
processes to capture locally determined value were contingent on expertise, 
trust and resources. 
 
Chapter 10 draws together the conclusions derived from this multi-faceted 
analysis. I discuss insights into the struggles in assembling value in local 
authority energy. I reflect on the limited opportunities for incorporating carbon 
saving, social value and public goods of energy projects into evaluation of 
local investment options. In doing so, I outline what this empirical contribution 
implies for economic sociology of valuation. I also identify limitations, and 
suggest policy implications and further research arising from the 
investigation. The thesis closes with a discussion of the main contributions 
made to social studies of energy, including the importance of detailed 





2 UK Local Governance and Energy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Leading on from the importance of a local authority contribution to net zero 
carbon reduction goals, this chapter provides an overview of local 
governance and energy in the UK. My aim is to situate local authority energy 
within the context of central-local government institutional relationships. In 
doing this, I pay attention to neo-liberal governing of local public services 
over the past 40 years. One currently understudied aspect of this in local 
energy literature concerns the tools and decision making procedures aimed 
at improving public sector efficiency. I argue that a direct focus on the role of 
these devices in project development will enhance our understanding about 
local energy planning and investment. 
 
The rest of the Introduction provides a brief summary of the limited policy 
support for local authority-led energy at the time of data collection (2015-
2016). Section 2.2 provides an overview of evidence about the types of local 
authority energy projects and business structures taken forward in this 
context. Section 2.3 discuses local authorities’ institutional capacities and 
current frameworks shaping assessment of energy projects. Section 2.4 
outlines the research scope of this thesis and my decision to examine how 
the use of specific tools and procedures influences project development. 
 
The role of local authorities in energy policy has been inconsistent across 
policies spanning zero carbon homes, small scale renewables, energy 
efficiency and heat decarbonisation (Webb, Tingey, & Hawkey, 2017). 
Ending support for feed-in tariff subsidies in the mid 2010s, removed the key 
financial mechanism which local authorities and other actors had relied on to 
develop small scale renewable generation (Sullivan, Gouldson, & Webber, 
2013), such as solar PV on council buildings. Equally critical was the scaling 
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back, and then abandonment, of the UK government’s zero carbon homes 
policy in England (Lovell, 2016). This not only downgraded councils’ planning 
powers, but also cancelled the funding which local authorities would receive 
from developers to pay for low carbon projects. 
 
Analysis comparing heat decarbonisation and energy efficiency in England 
and Scotland concludes the UK government has proceeded on trajectory of 
ambiguity about local authority role(s) (Wade, Webb, & Tingey, forthcoming). 
From 2010, almost all support was withdrawn for energy efficiency policies 
by UK Government (Webb, 2018). This included reducing the eligibility of 
energy efficiency improvements funded through Energy Company Obligation 
(ECO) which paid for upgrades to social housing, and abandonment of the ill-
fated Green Deal policy (Mallaburn & Eyre, 2013; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). 
The latter included Pioneer Places (Marchand, Koh, & Morris, 2015) and 
Green Deal Communities (Ince & Marvin, 2019) funding streams. These paid 
for local authority area-based energy efficiency programmes such as solid 
wall insulation programmes, but also local ‘demonstrator’ homes and 
marketing costs to help sign-up households. 
 
Concerning heat policy, successive UK governments have been criticised for 
an intermittent approach to district heating development that undermines 
local capacities to deliver heat network infrastructure (Bolton & Foxon, 2015; 
Bush, Bale, & Taylor, 2016). This included curtailing the Community Energy 
Programme in 2006, the only significant UK public funding stream for local 
authority district energy development in the 2000s (Hawkey et al., 2016). The 
2013 Future of Heat policy was also criticised for its ambiguity over whether 
local authorities would develop district heating schemes, or simply facilitate 
other market actors. To some degree this was redressed via the creation of 
the Pioneer Cities heat network development programme for five English 
cities (Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield), and then 
the subsequent establishment of the Heat Networks Delivery Unit in 2013 
 14 
which provides funding and support for district heating planning (covering 
England and Wales) (Ambrose et al., 2016). However, the associated £320 
million Heat Network Investment Project, announced in 2014 was delayed 
and has struggled to allocate funding. 
  
The concurrent removal of UK government policy support across multiple 
areas of local energy has thus worked against articulating a clear and 
consistent policy position about the value of local energy, and about the role 
of local authorities in development of local energy systems. In addition, time 
limited funding opportunities are unlikely to be sufficient to develop a long-
term rationale in the council for investment in local energy. Consequently, 
alternative tools for justifying the value of committing resources to local 
energy are likely to be required. Before moving onto this, the next section 
considers what kind of energy projects emerge in this policy context. 
2.2 Local Authority Engagement with Energy 
In the absence of a long-term supportive policy framework for local authority 
energy, activity has been relatively small scale and piecemeal, yet 
nevertheless with pockets of innovation. Dixon and Wilson’s (2014, p. 676) 
survey of 54 UK local authorities’ development of low carbon plans 
concluded that “progress on low-carbon/climate change is still often relatively 
experimental and fragmented”. In addition, Bulkeley and Kern’s (2006, p. 
2254) case study research concluded that “even the most pioneering UK 
local authorities” had insufficient “capacity to act for climate protection.” 
Although analysis of local authority climate policy documents emphasise the 
potential for energy efficiency, energy saving, renewable energy, waste 
management and transport (Heidrich et al., 2013; 2016), there appears to be 
relatively few meaningful routes to implementation. 
 
At aggregate level, analysis mapping levels of engagement across energy 
strategy and project development illustrates these challenges (Tingey & 
Webb, 2020a; Webb, Tingey, & Hawkey, 2017). This analysis covered all UK 
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local authorities and identified laggards through to leaders in the 
development and delivery of local energy. Specific findings include: 
• The majority of UK local authorities were active to some extent, with 
82% (357) having local Energy and Carbon Plans and/or investments 
in energy projects. 
• Only a minority (13% or 55) appeared to have combined these into a 
programme of local energy provision (categorised as energy leaders, 
see Figure 2.1); nevertheless, this group covered about 25% of the 
UK population. 
• Energy plans were more common than projects; and the scale of 
projects was limited. 
• Three quarters of projects concerned heat and energy efficiency of 
(primarily domestic) buildings, including council-owned housing, and 
council corporate estates. Activity centred on Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP); and, heat networks; a range of building energy 
efficiency projects were also identified. 
• Scotland had the highest proportion of energy leaders, followed by 
England, Wales and finally Northern Ireland. 
• Within England’s local government structure where there is a mix of 
single and two-tier authorities (see Appendix I for summary), first the 
highest proportion of energy leaders were in the English single tier 
authorities: these are unitary, London and metropolitan district 
authorities. Second among the two-tier authorities, greater levels of 
activity were observed in the top tier county councils than in the lower 




Figure 2.1 UK local authority engagement in energy 
 




Most local authority activity therefore has related to energy management on 
the corporate estate and in social housing. This includes energy efficiency 
upgrades (Morris et al., 2017) as well as development of supply-side 
infrastructure including CHP, district heating and energy from waste (Bush et 
al., 2017; Hawkey et al., 2016). Furthermore, Rydin et al’s (2013) survey of 
urban energy identified that a third of initiatives were led by local authorities. 
These projects were grouped as being developed on an invest-to-save basis 
or drawing on subsidy schemes such as the feed-in tariff. Examples of the 
former were a biomass heating system in Barnsley Council headquarters and 
energy retrofit of a social housing estate in Brixton; whilst the latter is 
exemplified by solar PV projects in ‘low carbon zones’ such as that 
established by Greater London Authority. 
 
However, these projects have tended to be bespoke one-offs rather than 
systematic and sustained interventions across the local authority population. 
Indeed research emphasises the difficulty in establishing continuity of 
sustained engagement with energy even in those local authorities that have 
been identified as at the vanguard. For example, Shackley et al. (2002) 
showcased 14 local authorities that they identified were at the leading edge 
of low carbon activity in the early 2000s, but only nine still remained in the 
same position more than a decade later (Tingey, Hawkey, & Webb, 2016). 
 
Outside of this, notable activity includes greater positioning of low carbon 
development and climate strategy as integral to economic regeneration 
strategy, such an ‘Energy City’ Hull (Wurzel et al., 2019). Braunholtz-Speight 
et al. (2018) also raised the possibility for some collaboration with community 
energy groups. They noted this could include local authorities onward lending 
to groups and providing staff resources, but nevertheless warned that budget 
cuts were likely to prevent this from being a smooth process. 
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In the context of a lack of supportive public policy for local energy, the 
challenges councils face are relatively well rehearsed in the literature. This 
includes limited resources and budgets, and the disjointed efforts which 
result from initiatives arising from various services within councils (Bulkeley, 
2010). In the absence of any core legitimacy for local energy, projects have 
tended to rely on the perseverance of ‘wilful individuals’ in local authorities to 
make projects happen (Collier & Löfstedt, 1997; Webb, 2015). The role of 
local politicians and managers to act as a ‘senior champion’ is also cited as 
crucial to developing internal momentum and interdepartmental coordination 
(Roelich et al., 2018). 
 
However, such a reliance on individual officers and councillors has resulted 
in an inherent unevenness in how this plays out in different local authorities. 
Bulkeley and Kern’s (2006, p. 2251) analysis of three councils ‘pioneering’ 
action on energy and climate change (Kirklees, Leicester and Southampton) 
provides a reminder that this is the exception rather than the norm: “having 
staff resource dedicated to this task [is] a resource which is not available in 
the majority of local authorities.” Councils who created Sustainable 
Development Teams/Units also struggled to develop forward momentum, 
and with no core funding budget pressures led to these teams being cut back 
(Ball, 2005). Furthermore, Bale et al.’s (2012) study of Leeds City Council 
emphasised that officers often lacked technical knowledge to assess 
technology options, and found it difficult to secure long-term support from 
council leaders and senior management. This suggests that the value of 
energy may be interpreted differently, depending on factors such as staff 
knowledge of different project types and the degree of high level commitment 
within the organisation to develop a local programme of energy projects. 
Ownership models and business structures 
Local authorities adopt a variety of governance and ownership structures for 
local energy projects. Roelich et al.’s (2018, p. 735) study of five English 
cities for example concluded “that there was no blueprint for a municipal 
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energy company [MEC] but that cities were incrementally developing a series 
of smaller scale activities that helped them to engage in a low-risk way and to 
explore the most appropriate institutional form for a MEC.” With no single 
model, considerable experimentation and innovation spans leading projects 
‘in-house’, where the local authority directly owns and develops projects, 
through to numerous different types of independent businesses and 
outsourcing (Tingey, Webb, & van der Horst, in preparation; Webb et al., 
2017). In each model the local authority has different levels of control over 
development and the business (Berry & King, 2019), with most direct 
influence where there is municipal ownership. I now briefly summarise 
ownership models and contract structures for energy efficiency and low 
carbon heat, but description of the main business structures studied in this 
thesis is found in Chapter 5. 
 
Notably, energy upgrades to the corporate estate have increasingly used 
energy performance contracting (Polzin, Flotow, & Nolden, 2016). This is a 
contract with an energy services company that is used for combining onsite 
renewable energy technologies, such as solar PV and biomass boilers/CHP 
with upgrading lighting and energy management (Fennell, Ruyssevelt, & 
Smith, 2016). In the UK, the contract to public sector clients is structured to 
provide a ‘guaranteed’ level of energy saving, enabling capital costs to be 
recouped and often securing new income. To reduce procurement time and 
cost, local authorities commonly use a public procurement ‘framework 
agreement’ to appoint a contractor through a ‘mini-competition’ between pre-
approved suppliers. Contracts under the Re:fit procurement framework, 
which is available to local authorities across the UK, were relatively small 
scale. Analysis by Nolden and Sorrell (2016) found they had an average 
contract size of £1 million (range £150k – £6 million) with energy savings in 
the range of 15-20%, over a 5-7 year payback. 
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For local authority district energy projects, a range of different models have 
been identified (Hannon & Bolton, 2015). Hawkey, Webb and Winskel (2013) 
examined three case studies of different district energy business structures. 
Thameswey, a municipally owned district energy business in Woking that 
serves public, private and residential customers (and with subsidiaries in 
Milton Keynes). Birmingham District Energy Company, a private sector-led 
business established via a long-term concession contract to finance, own 
and operate the district energy business over 25 years with a core network of 
public sector customers (local authority, university, hospital). And, Aberdeen 
Heat and Power, an independent not-for-profit district heating companies that 
primarily serves council owned social housing residents but also a number of 
public buildings. In each business structure, public sector owned buildings 
(including social housing) formed the key anchor loads, but owing to different 
priorities of each business, expansion plans varied. For example, municipally 
owned Thameswey established a subsidiary company in Milton Keynes to 
develop further district energy networks, whilst the private sector-led 
Birmingham District Energy Company had different return on investment 
requirements. 
 
Studies of local authority energy initiatives thus establish a high level picture 
of widespread ambition, but only modest pockets of activity. Most activity is 
shown to focus on heat and energy efficiency projects associated with 
council owned buildings, at least initially. In addition, there is no single 
business structure used to support such projects. Experimentation with a 
diversity of business structures suggests that negotiation of value is likely to 
involve the different actors across various ownership and contract models. 
 
Energy project development is not yet at the pace or scale needed to reach 
net zero carbon targets. Limited resources and lack of capacity are 
emphasised as limiting current levels of energy project development. There 
appear to be scarce opportunities for generating a groundswell of sustained 
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local authority planning, implementation and investment. This implies the 
need to know more about local authority organisation and governance, and 
consider how this shapes how decision making about ownership, operation 
and financing of energy projects. 
2.3 Institutional capacities, competition and 
efficiency in local public services  
UK local authorities’ formal institutional capacities are heavily shaped by 
central governments, who set their overall funding, powers and 
responsibilities (Eckersley, 2016; 2018; Ladner, Keuffer, & Baldersheim, 
2015). This centralised control shapes the legitimacy of the value of local 
authority energy. Local authorities are governed by statutory duties set out in 
legislation, statutes, of parliament (Aguma, 2013; Braithwaite, 2018). The 
main statutory responsibilities set for local authorities span economic 
development, education, environmental health, housing, planning, public 
facilities, social care, transport and waste management (Slack & Côté, 2014). 
Because local government is devolved, there is a patchwork of how statutory 
responsibilities are organised across different local authority structures in 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (see Appendix I). 
 
Importantly, central government mandating local authority action can shape 
their legitimacy as a local actor. However, there is no clear statutory local 
energy mandate and associated set of resources. In turn, local authority 
capacity for carbon management is ‘weak’ (Centre for Sustainable Energy, 
2005). To provide more scope for local authority energy action, in 2012 the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2012, p. 9) recommended creating a 
new statutory duty for local authorities to “develop and implement low-carbon 
plans”. UK Government did not act upon this recommendation3. This 
absence of core responsibilities is likely to make it challenging to justify 
                                            
3 Proposals are forthcoming in Scotland, and are discussed in Chapter 10. 
 22 
energy projects. They may need to be aligned with existing responsibilities 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The majority of local government funding is channelled to delivering statutory 
roles, meaning that the allocation of funding to energy is minimal. Austerity 
budgets have also led to severe cuts in funding to local government. In 
Scotland and Wales financial pressures were less severe with cuts of around 
10% (Audit Scotland, 2019; Downe & Taylor-Collins, 2019; Ferry, Coombs, & 
Eckersley, 2017). English local authorities however “faced a 
disproportionately high share of the cuts” (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012, p. 23) 
and during the period 2010-2018 lost around half of their centrally allocated 
budgets (National Audit Office, 2018) across revenue and capital grants. 
Across this period demand for services simultaneously increased (Hastings 
et al., 2015), leading to major cutbacks and restructuring of local services.  
 
And at the extreme end, councils have faced difficulties providing their 
statutory services. For example, in 2018 Northamptonshire County Council 
issued a Section 114 notice meaning it had effectively gone bankrupt. This 
brought about intervention from UK Government, on the grounds the council 
had failed in its legal obligation to secure ‘best value’ (Caller, 2018). To avoid 
a central government bailout the council was allowed to fund day-to-day 
revenue services by using capital receipts4 of around £50 million from selling 
and re-leasing5 its main building (Pickard, 2018). Against a background of 
austerity budgets, local energy is unlikely to be consistently prioritised 
(Bawden, 2019; Dixon & Wilson, 2014; Morris et al., 2017; Roelich et al., 
2018).  
Neo-liberal governing: instruments and organisational practices 
In this model of centralised control, analyses conclude local authorities are 
particularly susceptible to central government agendas of neo-liberal 
                                            
4 This is usually prohibited. 
5 Which itself will increase day-to-day running costs (Northamptonshire County Council, 2018). 
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governing in public services that have been implemented over the past 40 
years (Bourn, 2012; Eckersley & Ferry, 2019; Ferry et al., 2017; Lowndes & 
Gardner, 2016). Coined ‘new public management’ (NPM), neo-liberal 
governing has involved introducing competition into public services under the 
guise of efficiency, value for money, and restrictions in public spending. This 
has involved adopting private sector business management and accounting 
practices within the public sector, and outsourcing to the private sector 
through procurement and contracting (Hood, 2007). This institutionalisation 
of markets applies to local government through introduction of specific tools, 
procedures and organisational practices (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2008; 
Lapsley, Miller, & Panozzo, 2010). The Best Value Framework, business 
case model and public procurement are three contemporary tools which 
attempt to extend neo-liberal governing in local authorities and are likely to 
mediate energy project development. These are introduced below, situating 
them within the wider context of neo-liberal governing since the 1980s. 
 
A key priority of all NPM action was to find “less costly ways to deliver public 
services instead of laying the emphasis on institutional continuity” (Hood, 
1995, p. 97). The transformation of local authorities under NPM was 
characterised as a shift from local government providing services 
themselves, to local governance of new partnership arrangements and 
networks of private, and latterly third sector actors, involved in delivering 
public services (Murray, 2011; Stoker, 2004). Under such ‘local governance’, 
local authorities thus moved away from a core role as a local service delivery 
body to more strategic roles (John, 2001), commissioning other delivery 
partners through competitive procurement (Higgins, James, & Roper, 2005). 
In local authority energy, this has prioritised ‘enabling’ and facilitative 
governance roles such as helping other actors take up energy efficiency 
measures, rather than having a significant direct energy provision role 
(Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Eadson, 2016). 
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Moreover, introducing competition as an organising principle for local 
authority services positioned finance in a primary role under NPM. Lapsley et 
al. (2010, p. 309) described this as transforming the city into “an economic 
entity competing for resources in a market-like environment”. The task for 
council managers, according to this rationale, is to make the assets of a city 
countable, quantifiable, and ultimately tradable as investments. In turn, local 
authorities are expected to develop energy projects as responsive to a 
market-led economic development agenda (Wurzel et al., 2019). There are a 
range of tools and devices that shape any negotiation of an energy project 
(Rydin et al., 2015; Webb & Hawkey, 2016). Webb (2019) for example, 
illustrated how this ‘financialised governance’ remoulded Glasgow City 
Council’s sustainability strategy into a financial object to attract (international) 
investment. Under NPM, local services are thus characterised as ‘products’ 
with ‘customers’ and ‘investors’. The job of local authorities portrayed in 
these more critical accounts of NPM is that of providing the enabling capacity 
for the other actors to secure income streams from local services. 
 
Compulsive Competitive Tendering (CCT) was the key instrument through 
which NPM was implemented in local authorities during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Wilson, 1999). CCT was a procurement model of outsourcing for the whole 
organisation based on a short-term cost saving rationale that perceived 
markets could deliver local services more (cost) effectively. It required open 
competition whereby local authorities tendered their services and award 
contracts according to a lowest cost model of delivery. 
 
This led to the deconstruction of municipal monopolies where local 
authorities lost exclusive rights over services like social housing, public 
works, aspects of social care and local public transport (Segan, 2013). Local 
authorities could compete for their own contract but if they won these on the 
basis of lowest cost, an external delivery body separate from the local 
authority needed to be set up. 
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CCT was widely criticised. Requiring that local authorities bid to run their own 
services was described as unpopular and wasteful (Wall & Martin, 2003). 
Contracting out was associated with adversarial and prescriptive contractual 
relationships (Walker & Davis, 1999), and was criticised for high transaction 
costs yet no demonstrable improvement in local service performance. 
 
Alongside CCT, during the 1980s and 1990s local authorities were also 
constrained by the principle of ultra vires (‘beyond legal powers’) which 
prevented them from undertaking any activity not explicitly permitted in their 
statutory powers (Aguma, 2013). This meant that unless local authorities had 
a statutory power for ‘X’ it was illegal for them to do ‘X’. Although legal 
challenge had to be brought for any direct consequence from contravening 
ultra vires, this did happen across various local authority activities, from 
providing laundry services to investment in derivatives (Braithwaite, 2018). 
Lack of statutory mandate is likely to have meant that, historically, councils 
had to align the value of energy projects within existing statutory 
responsibilities. 
 
The virtues of privatising local government through CCT and the tight control 
of local authority agency through ultra vires were under increasing political 
pressure by the late 1990s. New Labour’s political discourse encapsulated in 
its ‘modernisation agenda’ (Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions, 1998; UK Government, 1999), argued that competitively 
tendering local services according to a narrow assessment of lowest cost 
financial value forced an unnecessary privatisation of local government 
services. This led to an overhaul of local government at the turn of the 21st 
century. CCT was replaced with the Best Value Framework as the main 
device at the core of local authority governance today (see e.g. National 
Audit Office, 2019). Development of the business case as a decision making 
tool also gained traction across the public sector, and public procurement 
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was reshaped and extended. The prescriptive ultra vires model was also 
somewhat relaxed by general ‘well-being’ and latterly general ‘competence’ 
powers, and new public borrowing rules were introduced. 
Securing ‘better value’ local public services 
The Best Value Framework abandoned CCT’s upfront requirement to 
outsource services and procure on the basis of lowest cost financial value. 
Instead, a ‘duty of Best Value’ sets an overarching requirement for local 
authorities to secure and evidence ‘continuous improvement’ across all 
functions and local services (National Audit Office, 2019), whether delivered 
in-house or outsourced through public procurement. This includes the 
effectiveness of both political leadership and senior management, and the 
scrutiny arrangements in place to make decisions accountable and 
transparent (Downe et al., 2008). Through this greater focus on corporate 
governance, considerable effort was given to bringing about behavioural and 
cultural change; the requirement to secure ‘continuous improvement’ covers 
the whole organisation, spanning all statutory front line services and back 
office corporate functions. This means that in principle the duty of Best Value 
impacts on all council activities and decisions, including those in energy 
project development. 
 
UK and devolved government approaches to Best Value have minor 
variations, and there have been changes over the 20 year period since its 
introduction (Downe et al., 2008; Nutley et al., 2012). For example, the 
extensive programme of ‘Best Value service reviews’ (Boyne, 2000; Higgins 
et al., 2005; Stoker, 2004) were scaled back. Some elements of auditing 
were changed, including abandoning the highly unpopular ‘Best Value 
national performance’ metrics in England (Downe & Martin, 2007). 
Guidelines in place at the time of data collection are reviewed in Chapter 6. 
 
There has been limited investigation into the Best Value Framework in local 
authority energy provision. Analysis on local authority action on energy and 
 27 
climate change in England and Wales in the early 2000s (Allman et al., 2004) 
made some speculative suggestions. Recognising the lack of direct statutory 
mandate for energy, this study noted that two, now defunct, Best Value 
performance indicators concerning energy performance of local authority 
owned social housing and corporate buildings, might have stimulated action 
in emissions reduction in the early 2000s. However, Ball (2005, p. 364) 
reported that some officers did not think that any of the then Best Value 
performance indicators were “in line with environmental objectives”. 
 
Determining what constitutes ‘better value’ services is considered in terms of 
meeting social, economic and environmental goals, opposed to lowest cost. 
However, evaluating this is tied to ‘economy’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’, 
reproducing the public sector concept of ‘value for money’. This trio first 
emerged in the National Audit Act 1983 which established the National Audit 
Office and gave it powers to assess ‘value for money’ in the use of public 
funds in relation to economy, efficiency and effectiveness6 (Bourn, 2012). 
Bourn identifies this development as particularly significant because prior to 
this, public audit had focussed on the legality of public spending, but not 
whether it was a ‘good’ use of spending. Such alignment with the concepts of 
public sector auditing thus closely binds ‘value’ within the Best Value 
Framework to the audit of ‘value for money’ in public spending and the ‘good’ 
use of public resources. It is even drawn on in the legislation setting out the 
‘Best Value duty’, which is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
There was however, a lack of transparency and clarity about what Best Value 
actually meant to local authorities (Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2008; Boyne, 1999). 
The notion of ‘continuous improvement’ itself was hard to interpret on the 
ground (Ball, Broadbent, & Moore, 2002). There was confusion over what it 
                                            
6 In these terms economy is whether something cost more than it needed to; efficiency is the level of 
output gained from the level of input; and effectiveness is whether what has been set out has been 
achieved (Jones and Pendlebury, 2010). 
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meant and also fears that cost saving would be the crude measure of 
improvement simply located under the banner of quality services. Similarly, 
there has been uncertainty over the meaning of the concept of ‘value for 
money’, with a tendency for front-line staff to equate it with cost-cutting 
(Prowle, Kalar, & Barrow, 2016). 
 
Thus, whilst more autonomy was granted on how to deliver services 
compared to CCT, there was concurrently a heavy burden on evidencing 
‘continuous improvement’, and uncertainty about what Best Value and its 
attachment to value for money actually meant. However, how this negotiation 
plays out in the case of local authority energy projects is not yet known. 
Chapter 7 extends this discussion. 
Options appraisal 
Within the ‘continuous improvement’ of local services required by the Best 
Value Framework, the use of a business case tool to assist options appraisal 
in spending decisions has become key to ‘good governance’ (e.g. Audit 
Scotland, 2014). For example, the business case is identified as the tool local 
authorities should use when conducting options appraisal across service 
reviews, budget planning, self-assessment, when there is a new 
administration, and in instances of poor performance. It is also recommended 
for evaluating investment options across all capital expenditure projects, 
including energy; and when major contracts are being awarded through 
public procurement (see Chapter 6). 
  
Focus on the business case in local energy (Foxon et al., 2015; which is 
sometimes used synonymously with business model see e.g. Hannon & 
Bolton, 2015) has tended to be relatively exploratory. We have little actual 
evidence about how local authorities construct or evaluate an energy project 
business case. Using smart grids and district heating examples, Foxon et al. 
emphasised that when assessing costs and benefits of these investments, 
economic (and financial) value was usually prioritised over societal and 
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environmental value. They argue that “increased uptake of business models 
that facilitate capture of value beyond the economic will require changes in 
the way business cases are developed and in the way infrastructure is 
valued at the local level” (Foxon et al., 2015, p. 8). 
 
UK Government official guidance (The Green Book) for business case 
assessment uses cost-benefit analysis. Foxon et al. (2015) conclude that this 
promotes a narrow assessment of revenue streams rather than incorporating 
a comprehensive assessment of different benefits from low carbon projects. 
One of the outcomes of this was proposed as the curbing of larger scale 
carbon saving projects (Bale et al., 2014). Other accounts emphasise that 
the business case evaluation contains an unrealistic assumption that 
alternative options exist (Hughes, 2020). Hughes’ account emphasises the 
idea to ‘do nothing’, or ‘do something else’ is not feasible when it comes to 
meeting the scale of net zero carbon targets. Cost-benefit analysis has also 
been criticised for depoliticising decisions to reduce or stop government 
funding programmes by turning them into ‘technical exercises’ (O’Brien, 
2012). Furthermore, it has been suggested there is a general tendency to 
under estimate costs and over-estimate benefits in evaluating the business 
case of major public infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, 2009). 
 
How this unfolds in energy project development is unclear. For instance, we 
lack evidence about how local authorities construct a business case, or 
whether the business case has a well-defined role in local authority energy 
project decision making. Chapter 8 explores this further. 
Procuring and outsourcing 
Within the Best Value Framework, when procuring external services, councils 
can set a price-to-quality award criteria, instead of lowest cost evaluation 
(which CCT had required). Procurement is hence one of the ways that 
councils evidence they are securing ‘best value’ from market actors. There is 
 30 
also an overarching set of EU public procurement rules,7 which promote 
competition and economic efficiency across the single market (see e.g. 
European Commission, 2014). 
 
As a set of rules and procedures governing local authority spending, public 
procurement has received relatively little attention in social research on local 
energy. Most focus has been the establishment of procurement ‘framework 
agreements’ which intend to standardise the contracting process for energy 
performance contracting projects among public sector clients (Nolden & 
Sorrell, 2016). Brief mentions of procurement within energy initiatives are 
also found in Ince and Marvin (2019). This study noted that in Haringey’s 
Green Deal Communities domestic retrofit scheme, procurement rules 
encouraged contracting larger companies but not local SMEs.  
 
Beyond local energy literature, studies of contract management emphasise 
the significance of the buyer-supplier relationship to securing intended 
outcomes (Andrews & Entwistle, 2015). This includes the ability of the local 
authority buyer/client to engage in complex procurement and contract 
management in public-private partnerships where private finance largely 
funds public infrastructure and investment is recouped from long-term 
contract payments. For long-term Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts for 
major projects such as schools, Asenova et al. (2002, p. 18) noted that, 
“VFM [value for money] and Best Value are premised on the assumption of 
mutual gains from partnership”. However they reported this was difficult to 
achieve in practice. Notable issues raised included: the overall complexity of 
procuring the PFI contract structure, especially nuances over the transfer of 
risk; the extensive use of consultants in legal and financial contracting which 
did not build up incremental expertise in-house; and that public sector clients 
                                            
7 Across the EU contracts over a certain value must be conducted in accordance with public contract 
regulations including publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (this is termed as 
being ‘OJEU compliant procurement’). 
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and private sector parties had different aims and objectives, which tended to 
be hard to align (Akintoye et al., 2003; Asenova et al., 2002). 
 
Not all energy projects are analogous to long-term private finance 
outsourcing; however, this suggests that the ability for the local authority to 
engage in procurement and contract management is likely to vary, depending 
on factors including previous experience, the type of supplier relationship, 
and the use of consultants. It would also suggest that more extensive 
procurements involving the outsourcing of financing, under concession 
contract models could also involve longer, more complex contract 
negotiations. Chapter 9 expands on this in more detail. 
Discretionary powers and new borrowing rules 
When the Best Value Framework was introduced there was also some 
relaxing of the prescriptive ultra vires model. Broad ‘general powers’ of ‘well-
being’, were introduced in 2000 in England and Wales, and in 2003 in 
Scotland, but not in Northern Ireland. As a ‘general power’ this allowed local 
authorities to undertake any legal activity that supported well-being in their 
area. However, the definition of ‘well-being’ was unclear (Aguma, 2013), 
including being treated by UK government as synonymous with sustainability 
(Ball, 2005, p. 354). These general powers were not resourced and thus 
were not prioritised amidst other statutory duties. This suggests limited scope 
for energy projects to be demonstrated as valuable on the basis of ‘well-
being’. 
 
To further move away from the ultra vires principle, a ‘general power of 
competence’ to undertake any lawful activity8 (i.e. not restricted to well-being) 
was subsequently introduced in England in 2011 (replacing well-being 
powers) and in Northern Ireland in 2015 (Northern Ireland Audit Office, 
                                            
8 Exemptions with an impact on capacity for local energy development are: raising taxes; changing 
the political structure; and trading in services which are statutory requirements (Sandford, 2014). 
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2014). It remains a proposal in Wales (Bowyer, 2018), but has not been 
introduced in Scotland. 
 
In addition, local authority borrowing rules were relaxed with the introduction 
of prudential borrowing in the early 2000s (but not until 2011 in Northern 
Ireland). Prudential borrowing adopts a self-regulating approach (Bailey, 
Asenova, & Hood, 2012) meaning local authorities have greater control over 
financial decision making. First, there are no longer upper limits on borrowing 
from the Public Works Loan Board, ⁠ which is the UK Government’s facility for 
lending money from the National Loans Fund. Second, loan requests are not 
directly subject to central government approval. Instead using the prudential 
code,9⁠ individual local authorities assess their own ability to repay loans they 
take out (UK Debt Management Office, 2020).⁠ In principle relaxed borrowing 
rules mean that local authorities can access long-term low cost finance to 
fund the capital expenditure of energy projects. Nevertheless, in 
demonstrating the value of energy projects, officers would likely need to need 
to justify to finance managers why prudential borrowing should be allocated 
to these projects, as opposed to other council (statutory) priorities. 
 
In principle these new ‘general powers’ and more autonomy in the use of 
government lending, provide local authorities discretion over use of budgets 
which could be directed toward local energy provision. However, similar to 
suspected contravention of ultra vires, there have also been cases of legal 
challenge in local authorities’ use of both well-being powers and the general 
power of competence (Aguma, 2013; Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012). These are 
likely to cause a degree of scepticism about the reliability of these 
discretionary powers and the legitimacy of using public borrowing facilities for 
energy. 
 
                                            
9 ‘Prudent’ and ‘affordability’ requirements are satisfied by having “regard” to the Prudential Code 
published by CIPFA and DCLG/MCHLG. 
 33 
Analyses conclude that local authorities’ institutional capacities have 
significant limitations (Ferry et al., 2017; Lowndes & Gardner, 2016; O’Brien 
& Pike, 2018) and fail to resolve issues concerning resourced mandates. 
This has led to a characterisation of ‘austerity localism’, where local 
authorities simply have more responsibility about which local services are 
reduced, rather than any greater agency (Blanco, Griggs, & Sullivan, 2014; 
Hastings et al., 2015). Morris et al. (2017) concluded that given the enormity 
of budget cuts under austerity, these general powers have done little to 
assist local authorities develop and implement domestic energy efficiency 
projects. Thus, instead of these reforms providing the catalyst for local 
energy action, local authorities still focus on delivering their statutory 
services. They remain without direct mandate or specific resources for action 
on local energy. This suggests that local authorities are likely to be reliant on 
both central governments’ energy policies to provide funding for specific 
initiatives, and willingness of local officials to prioritise energy activities 
outside the boundaries of their core statutory remit. 
2.4 Research scope of this thesis 
This chapter has provided a brief background to local governance and 
energy in the UK. Here I emphasise two inter-related themes relevant to 
informing my investigation into the value of local authority energy initiatives. 
First, I have stressed that central-local government institutional relationships 
are critical to understanding the marginal status of local authority energy 
provision in the UK. There has been inconsistent policy for local authority 
level intervention in low carbon energy systems. Although local authorities 
formally have discretion to engage beyond their statutory remit, in practice 
they have little agency to develop energy projects on any significant scale. 
Austerity also now means even statutory services are underfunded, most 
chronically in England. This suggests that the value of energy projects could 
be constructed in relation to their contribution to cost saving, thereby easing 
budgetary pressures. Or conversely, they may have been even further 
marginalised given other priorities, especially funding front-line services. 
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Second, I have foregrounded the UK state prioritisation of markets as the 
‘optimal’ route for governing local public services. This is broadly 
characterised in the literature as ‘new public management’. Within local 
government, extending markets has seen the normalisation of performance 
management and exposing local services to competition and outsourcing. 
Literature emphasises this as a response to central government (ideological) 
priorities about improving public sector efficiency through markets, but notes 
that efficiency here tends to be reduced to cost saving. This suggests that as 
energy projects are developed they are likely to interact with procedures and 
tools that may be aimed at securing ‘best value’. This includes at any point of 
public procurement, but also potentially at other stages in project 
development such as use of the business case as an investment evaluation 
tool. How these are applied in energy projects is still understudied. 
 
These two themes imply that where local authorities develop energy projects 
they are increasingly ‘breaking the rules’ of centralised governance and 
control (Tingey & Webb, 2020a). As case studies have shown (e.g. Webb, 
2015), this requires considerable local capacity for improvisation by 
politicians and officials. Furthermore, the fact that most local authorities are 
active to some degree, despite there being no clear role for energy within 
their governing framework, also opens up intriguing questions about how the 
value of local energy is assembled. 
 
To operationalise this research question, I propose to focus on the use of 
different tools identified across the literature and consider their influence in 
project development. First, local government studies emphasise the 
importance of the Best Value Framework as an overarching performance 
management regime that, in principle, is intended to guide local authority 
decision making. This overarching concept thus appears as potentially 
significant to local authority energy projects and should be investigated. 
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Second, the business case is suggested as an important tool for evaluating 
public spending, but it remains unclear to what extent it is used in energy 
projects. There is some suggestion that the business case and/or business 
model influences the ownership and business structures adopted, but we 
lack detailed accounts of what this process entails. Third, public procurement 
is emphasised across local government and contract management literature 
as influential in shaping the actors involved in delivering, operating and/or 
owning public services. This could helpfully be extended into local authority 
energy. 
 
The next chapter introduces the conceptual framework guiding development 
of this thesis and the specific research questions. Attention is given to 
conceptualising these different tools and procedures within project 
development, whilst ensuring sensitivity to the two inter-related themes 
above. This includes incorporation of the politics and power at play within 
central-local government relations, and how this is tied into the use of tools 
and procedures in project development. To do this, I combine concepts from 
economic sociology of valuation and programmes of governing. This helps 
me to conceptualise the use of tools within project development as a 
constituent component of a ‘valuation practice’. In turn, this enables me to 
consider how local assessments of the value of energy initiatives influence 
material developments.  
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3 An Economic Sociology Perspective on 
Valuation of Local Energy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The valuation practices through which a local energy initiative is developed 
are critical. They shape whether projects proceed at all, and where they do, 
they influence their eventual form including their size, ownership, financing 
and ongoing operation. Projects generally cannot proceed without navigating 
development stages where the value of the project is negotiated and 
contested. Critical points in the decision process are: when formal decisions 
allocate resources (whether human and/or financial); as options for investing 
in a project are assessed through development of a business case; and as a 
variety of goods and services associated with a project are procured. This 
reveals intriguing questions about how the value of a local authority energy 
project is shaped. 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical approach guiding the thesis investigation 
and identifies the specific research questions emerging. In particular, the 
thesis uses the economic sociology perspective to direct attention toward the 
use of formal valuation frameworks – Best Value, the business case model 
and public procurement – which local authorities use to support decision 
making within the development of local energy initiatives (Chapter 6 details 
this). Although these frameworks are a critical part of valuation processes in 
local authority energy developments, they have received limited attention 
from social studies of energy. 
 
Very few previous social studies of municipal energy investment have 
examined the effects of the valuation instruments that are actually used in 
development of projects. Studies first emphasise that different actors develop 
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valuations according to distinct financial and economic logics (Åkerman & 
Peltola, 2012) and they use different kinds of calculations to represent these 
valuations. The distinct logics shape the types of local energy solutions 
presented and selected. Bertelsen et al. (2019) illustrate this in their analysis 
of how energy system modelling tools were involved in shaping the role of 
future thermal storage in the Copenhagen district heating network. Distinct 
logics were found to shape valuations as each actor attempted to represent 
their preferred investment option through calculative metrics. The waste 
incinerator companies prioritised seasonal storage options as this would limit 
their mandatory shutdown requirements, whilst the transmission operators 
prioritised short-term storage as this would enable greater use of CHP 
electricity and increase the associated revenues. This suggests potential 
amongst different actors for varied assessments and interpretations of the 
same valuation frameworks such as the business case. 
 
Additionally, comparative studies illustrate how the financial and economic 
cases of local energy projects are determined in part by different institutional 
and regulatory contexts (Hawkey & Webb, 2014; Rydin et al., 2015) which 
structure factors such as the cost of capital. Studies focussed on UK local 
authority district energy developments (Hawkey et al., 2013; 2016; Webb, 
2019; Webb & Hawkey, 2016), illustrate the challenges of translating local 
low carbon projects into ‘viable business case’ investments. This includes an 
institutional, policy and energy market context which disincentivises 
investment in local clean heat business development and energy saving in 
buildings. One of the impacts is a perception of increased investment risk 
which shuts off some sources of capital for projects, and raises costs from 
other sources, as investors price risk. Despite the relatively secure return on 
investment from long-term infrastructure investment, in the case of district 
heating this leads to ‘island’ systems focussed on short-term financial return 
and limited carbon saving. Turning a direct focus onto the valuation 
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instruments themselves, would therefore add to our understanding about 
how these project developments processes unfold. 
 
There are however few studies incorporating analysis of the neo-liberal 
governing models implemented in the UK since the 1980s that impose 
particular constraints on how local authorities develop energy initiatives. 
Studies of local government which address the influence of accounting 
techniques in societal organisation (e.g. Arnaboldi & Lapsley, 2008) have 
had very little to say about local energy provision. Equally, most energy 
literature focussed on UK neo-liberal governing has considered this in 
relation to community energy (e.g. Eadson & Foden, 2019), but has not 
applied these concepts to analysis of local authority energy provision. 
 
An exception is found in Webb, Hawkey and Tingey (2016) which used a 
programme of governing framing to understand contrasting approaches to 
ownership and operation of local energy initiatives in Aberdeen, Birmingham 
and London. Eadson (2016, p. 1613) also explored UK government modes of 
“governing energy-carbon at a distance” which selectively sought to enroll 
local authorities into central government policy, rather than substantively 
creating capacities and agency for local and community level low carbon 
energy initiatives. Furthermore, Webb and Hawkey’s (2016) analysis of 
public sector collaboration in district heating in two British cities, illustrated 
how competing performance management regimes among different public 
organisations disincentivised their collaboration. Different regimes across 
local authorities, public health and universities sought to work against 
assembling what Webb and Hawkey termed a ‘problem owner’ for district 
energy developments serving multiple customers. This was despite the 
commitment from each public organisation to engage in principle in a 
collaborative scheme. These studies thus emphasise the need to understand 
wider economisation and governing processes that are likely to interact in 
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determining the energy project valuation processes occurring in local 
government. 
 
Social studies of energy have not however, tended to incorporate 
investigation of the Best Value Framework or public procurement into 
analysis of local authority energy provision. Social studies of energy have 
thus only just begun making inroads into addressing questions about how 
valuation frameworks shape the development of local authority energy 
initiatives. There is little connection between economic sociology and 
valuation studies concepts, and programmes of governing. This provides 
fertile ground for a developing a conceptual framework that bridges these 
divides. 
 
To explore this further, I use an economic sociology and valuation studies 
perspective (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009; 2010; Muniesa, 2012; 2014) to prise 
open the complex inter-actions occurring within project development. Using 
this perspective, the value of an energy project is shown not to be absolute 
or fixed, but instead shaped by ‘valuation’ processes (Muniesa, 2012) in 
project development. This includes the selection of instruments involved in 
assembling the value of energy projects such as project proposals, the 
business case and public procurement. Insights from ‘economisation’ 
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2009) suggest a pervasiveness of economic science 
within valuation practices, as tools such as the business case are likely to 
conform to economistic rationales.  
 
I combine this economic sociology perspective with the concept of ‘a 
programme of governing’ (Miller, 2008). Rooted in the sociology of 
accounting, this helps unpack the political dimensions of valuations within 
local authority energy projects. Importantly, incorporating the concept of a 
programme of governing allows for analysis of how political control is 
exercised through ‘everyday doings’ (Miller & Power, 2013) of valuations. 
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These are structured by government guidelines, codes of practice and 
protocols that stipulate how to appraise energy project proposals, develop a 
business case to evaluate investment options and organise public 
procurement processes. I also incorporate the sociology of knowledge 
concept of finitism (Barnes, 1995), to explain how the ‘rules’ encoded in the 
guidelines that intend to structure valuations in local authority energy projects 
are interpreted differently. 
 
The remainder of the chapter introduces the elements of the sociological 
literature used to develop this theoretical approach. Section 3.2 explains the 
main features of economic sociology and distinguishes the approach taken in 
this thesis from other perspectives. Section 3.3 outlines each of the key 
concepts guiding the investigation into valuing local energy, and Section 3.4 
sets out and discusses the research question emerging from this conceptual 
framework. 
3.2 Economic sociology perspective on value 
A particularly helpful theoretical approach for conceptualising how valuation 
frameworks shape the development of local authority energy initiatives is 
found in the social studies of markets, and latterly valuation studies, of Michel 
Callon, Fabian Muniesa and colleagues (Callon, 1998b; Çalışkan & Callon, 
2009; 2010; Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013; Muniesa, 2012). In these terms, 
influenced by actor-network theory, development of an energy project can be 
understood as a process shaped not only by the agency of human actors, but 
also by the interactions between a variety of infrastructural, material, and 
institutional objects and practices. Taking a pragmatist approach, Muniesa 
(2012) considers this an active process of ‘valuation’, where these material 
processes produce value. Applied to the case of local energy projects, 
valuation is hence expected to be mediated through project proposals and 
council reports, the creation of a business case, and procurement processes. 
This process of valuation is important, because it asserts that value is not 
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pre-determined or fixed, but assembled and shaped by these actor-networks, 
and is hence the result of negotiation. 
 
This approach to valuation stems from the economic sociology perspective 
on societal organisation which probes the interactions between economy and 
society. Economic sociology aims to understand economic behaviour not as 
an absolute natural order, but as a social process resulting from, and 
intertwined within, socio-political organisation (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; 
Preda, 2007; Swedberg, 2005). In its attempt to turn around the historic 
distinction between the study of economy and value (economics) and the 
study of society and values (sociology) (Stark, 2000; 2009), economic 
sociology rejects any clear-cut distinction between economy and society. 
Instead of the idea of absolute definitions of economic value derived from 
economic laws, value is instead something which is created and stabilised. 
Economic value is thus not pre-defined, it is a societal process open to 
disruption or destabilising. 
 
Early economic sociology built on the conjecture that economic organisation 
is a social phenomenon. This was a direct critique of the dominant rational 
economic actor perspectives developed in economic science in the 1960s. 
Rational economic actor theories rest on the belief in a natural order of 
human organisation based on economic individualism, self-interest and utility 
maximising, embodied in the rational actor model ‘homo economicus’10. This 
led to studying economic organisation as though it were a natural 
phenomenon with ‘laws’ akin to natural sciences and a domain separate from 
society. Economic analyses derived from this world view thus presume 
decision making is governed by rational economic calculation. 
 
                                            
10 See Callon (1999; 2008) for extended discussion. 
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Economic sociology criticises the rational actor thesis, arguing that economic 
science tends to be asocial and lacking necessary historical context. This is 
encapsulated by North (2005, p. 45) as, “Economics is a theory of choice, but 
what is the source of choices?”. For economic sociology the ‘sources’ of 
choices, are associated with contemporary society and historical legacies. 
Economic sociology in its broadest sense aims to provide an account of the 
social-political-historical contexts upon which economic organisation is 
contingent. 
 
Within economic sociology, sociology of markets and social studies of 
markets provide the two most developed accounts of the linkages involved in 
shaping markets (for review see Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; Mackenzie, 2009; 
Preda, 2007; 2009). Sociology of markets uses a meso-level political 
economy perspective, drawing on social structural and neo-institutionalist 
theories to develop analysis of the ‘embedding of markets in society’. The 
core argument is that markets are a product of societal organisation, with 
market organisation embedded within societal processes to the point where 
markets are not separable into a discrete sphere of economic rationality 
(Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). This perspective includes a series of arguments, 
first that market actors and organisations are shaped by networks of social 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985); second that markets are social institutions 
in which economic decision making is a politically motivated self-legitimising 
and rationalising process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and third that markets 
are governed by institutional fields. The latter attempt to hold different actor 
groups together and in doing so cause spill over effects into other fields 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). 
 
Thus whilst the sociology of markets perspective binds markets, economy, 
society and politics as interconnected rather than separate spheres of life, 
little attention has, until recently, been paid to the influence of economic 
science in shaping market (and hence societal) organisation. In a departure 
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from this, social studies of markets use a sociology of knowledge perspective 
to turn its gaze directly toward economic science. 
 
Drawing on actor-network and performativity theories, this perspective 
conceives of the potential for economic science to play an active role in 
shaping the institutions of society (Callon, 1998b; Mackenzie, 2006). Society 
is understood as shaped by accepted tenets of ‘economics’, as theories of 
economic behaviour of so called rational actors encourages formatting actors 
to conform to behaviour encoded in these models. In attempting to make 
markets more like its theoretical propositions, rather than a science of 
observation, economics is instead understood as a set of assertions about 
human behaviour and its ‘law’ like features (Callon, 1998b). MacKenzie 
(2006, p. 11) describes the performative role of financial economics as an 
‘engine not a camera’ in shaping the actual activities of financial trading, with 
economic science itself understood as “an active force transforming its 
environment” rather than passively recording or observing. 
 
This perspective thus examines the role of economic science in formatting 
societies. Callon terms this an ‘economisation of society’ (Çalışkan & Callon, 
2009; 2010), whereby instead of social organisation producing markets, 
‘economics’ shape and are shaped by societal organisation. Importantly this 
implies that disentangling or categorising ‘economic’ from ‘society’ is not 
possible; they are not separate spheres, but rather mutually self-reinforcing. 
 
Significantly, the concept of ‘economisation’ suggests that valuations, 
including those associated with an energy project, are often captured by 
economic concepts of value. Economisation accounts for how this could 
occur through the wide boundary used to carve out what constitutes 
‘economics’. Economic influences range from formal economic science like 
finance theories, through to lay economic knowledge or instruments which 
contain economic rationales. ‘Economics’ thus also resides outside formal 
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economic science settings, in valuation frameworks, such as the business 
case and specific calculations contained within it, such as in the financial 
model. Economisation is considered as contingent and open-ended 
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2009), but as primarily influenced by valuation practices 
which conform to this broad definition of ‘economics’: 
to speak of economisation is to consider that economies, in all of their diversity, 
depend heavily upon divergent and often controversial analyses both scholarly and 
lay that define, explain and enact economic forms of life. The theoretical approach 
we have been introducing is acutely attentive to the plurality and open-endedness of 
‘the economic’ as it is brought into being through processes of economization…We 
use the term ‘economization’ to denote the processes through which behaviours, 
organizations, institutions and, more generally, objects are constituted as being 
‘economic’. 
Çalışkan and Callon, 2010, p. 2 
Callon (2007) uses the term “economics in the wild” to describe instruments 
and knowledge across a variety of settings which contain economic 
rationales, such as the energy project business case or public procurement. 
For example, beyond financial trading (Mackenzie, 2006; 2019), it is argued 
that one of the key economising behaviours is found in the spread of 
quantification (Lamont, 2012). This is both as a general phenomenon within 
society, and in particular a growth in the use of specific economic 
assessments which rely on methods of quantification rooted in finance 
practice (Chiapello, 2015). 
 
The notion that economic and financial rationales are encoded in instruments 
is important because it suggests that energy project valuations may be 
oriented towards certain economic representations of value, while 
marginalising other forms of value. The process of constructing, for example 
the business case, may therefore involve economising local energy projects. 
Or where there are multiple economic, environmental and social valuations 
occurring within a single stage of project development, economisation would 
indicate that economic valuations have potential to be the most powerful in 
shaping decisions about the scale, scope and organisation of projects. 
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Instruments which promote the energy project according to an ‘economic’ 
valuation are thus considered as possible instances of economisation. 
 
Chiapello (2015, p. 15) argues that we are currently witnessing 
‘financialisation’ as the most prevalent form of economisation whereby 
“financialised conventions are becoming an established approach to all kinds 
of questions that used to be relatively untouched by economic reasoning”. 
From this perspective, financialisation and by extension economisation is 
active in shaping society, because it assigns financial value to objects, rather 
than a social or environmental value (or as public goods). Chiapello explains 
this transformative process: 
This financialisation of valuation not only transforms the pre-existing financial 
quantifications; it also proposes new ways of judging the actions of an organisation 
for social, artistic, or cultural activities, and even nature. In each case there is a 
redefinition of the object being valued, which comes to be seen from the investors’ 
viewpoint. 
Chiapello, 2015, p. 30 
By doing so, Chiapello argues that other systems of value, social, artistic and 
so on, are being ‘colonised’ by financialisation and economisation. 
 
Within social studies of markets, economisation thus establishes the role of 
economic science in making markets. Importantly this establishes that 
economic activity is not pre-given or absolute but constituted through 
practice. This includes attempting to make reality conform to models of 
economic behaviour. The notion that there are sets of actors, instruments 
and forms of knowledge that interact to assemble economic value, leads 
Callon to claim that, “the construction of markets is a socio-technical 
construction, not a purely social one” (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009, p. 386). As 
this implies, practices of value-making could vary as different tools, or sets of 
knowledge are involved and deployed in different settings. How such 
processes unfold in energy project development is not yet known. A study of 
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practices will enable new insights into how value is assembled and why in 
specific domains – such as local energy – and its consequences. 
 
Although the concept of economisation does conceive of ‘economic’ forms of 
knowledge in broad terms, it has been criticised for its prioritisation of 
economic science. Miller (2008, p. 53) for example argues that by seeing all 
other influences as “derivate of or secondary to the discipline of economics”, 
economisation is not sensitive enough to the variety of influences which 
contribute to ‘calculating economic life’. According to Miller (1998) this is 
unsatisfactory because (economic) calculation is influenced by a various 
bodies of knowledge such as engineering, finance and accounting. Of the 
latter, Miller notes that accounting itself has drawn on calculative methods 
from domains such as manufacturing. As such, for a study of local energy 
projects, it necessary to look beyond the concept of economisation. A first 
step is to turn to the concept of ‘valuation’ (Muniesa, 2012) which is agnostic 
on the influence of ‘economics’. 
3.3 Conceptualising making of value from local 
energy initiatives 
Following on from the evidence of economisation of value in contemporary 
societies, it can be argued that the value of an energy project is not absolute 
or pre-existing according to valuation studies, but instead shaped by 
processes of ‘valuation’ in project development. Muniesa (2012, p. 26) 
describes how valuation “refers to something that happens to some-thing... In 
this sense, the idea of valuation may be tackled… as an action”. Valuation is 
hence a process of value-in-the-making and not something in itself. As a 
result, this leads to a particular focus on enactment (Helgesson & Muniesa, 
2013), shifting attention away from absolute definitions of value to 
procedures for assessing – or assembling – value. The concept of valuation 




One of the aims of using the concept of valuation is to maintain a broad 
conceptualisation of practices of valuing – economic or otherwise. In the 
launch of the journal Valuation Studies in 2013 for example, the concept is 
described as follows: “valuation might both denote something like the 
establishing of a monetary price for the sale of a book and the non-monetary 
assessment of the academic quality of a scholarly journal article” (Helgesson 
& Muniesa, 2013, p. 6). The valuation concept is not solely or primarily about 
the activity of economic value and is instead aiming to understand the variety 
of ways in which value is made meaningful (Doganova et al., 2018). 
 
Muniesa’s perspective stems from a close association with pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey [1859-1952]. Valuation, for Dewey, focussed on the 
notion of ‘use-value’ rather than universal value. Leaning on this, Muniesa 
(2012) sets this out as valuation’s conceptual ‘flank movement’ away from a 
study of value, to one of valuation. Doing so shapes the thesis that value is 
produced through rendering something valuable. Put most straightforwardly, 
something “does not have the same value before and after it has been 
valued” (Muniesa, 2012, p. 28). Valuation then, is not a theory of value per 
se, but is denoting a practice in which various kinds of worth (not just 
economic worth) are materially constructed. As Muniesa explains: 
a pragmatist viewpoint shifts attention to valuation as an action… This idea of ‘as an 
action’ should be understood in the sense of a process, a form of mediation, of 
something that happens in practice, something that is done to something else, and 
so forth; value is definitely not something that something just has. If value is 
something that something just has, then we need to ask: by virtue of what? 
Muniesa, 2012, p. 32 
Indeed, according to Muniesa there is no external reference for value, 
because it is only through practicing valuation that value is made meaningful. 
Relative to the concept of economisation, external references or influences of 
economic science or theoretical models are downplayed. It is only when 
there is something to value that there is valuation and vice versa. In this 
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sense value merges with its measure through value-making processes. This 
is how the concept of valuation explains the economic sociology idea that 
value is not pre-determined. 
 
In this framing, the measures, metrics and methods of evaluation, and the 
value of the item under evaluation are one in the same, they “intermingle, 
and become two aspects of the same act” (Muniesa, 2012, p. 31). The idea 
that value and its measure collapse into one is what leads to the focus on 
procedures for assessing value. This points a clear direction toward the 
material practices of valuation. It suggests it is more fruitful to focus on the 
effects of different techniques for assembling value from local energy 
projects, rather than the extent to which techniques do or do not represent 
what they claim to be measuring. 
Making value through market devices 
If certain instruments, measures and metrics are important to valuations, 
then it is necessary to explore how these might be identified. Conceptualising 
the instruments involved in valuations borrows the notion of ‘market devices’ 
from social studies of markets, defined by Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007, 
p. 2) as “the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the 
construction of markets”. Denoted by the statement that devices ‘intervene’ in 
market organisation, the idea of a market device is to reveal the non-human 
elements of actor-networks involved in a value-making process (Çalışkan & 
Callon, 2010).  
 
Muniesa (2014, pp. 17-25) has expanded on this, arguing that the 
composition of devices, such as the descriptions contained in a device, is 
relevant to the effects devices create. This suggests a procurement 
specification for example is materially significant to the eventual form and 
scope of an energy project and emphasises the need to understand more 
about its contents. The concept of a market device has been applied to 
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various scales encompassing artefacts and objects such as specific 
instruments, techniques, methods of evaluation, regulations and frameworks, 
and even the technical expertise from which these are derived. Callon 
(1998a) for example explores how marketing tools in supermarkets format 
consumers to calculate their preferences. Doganova and Muniesa (2015) 
illustrate the business model as a capitalisation device, creating investors, 
transforming things into assets, and creating flows of capital. At a difference 
scale, Pollock and Campagnolo (2015) show how the 2x2 matrix device 
routinely used in business management to display information, participates in 
shaping how decisions are made. 
 
Importantly, in this framing these instruments and techniques are not passive 
objects but are active in the shaping of markets and economic actors. In the 
case of a local authority energy project, devices involved in valuations could 
include: financial models, or a specific method within a financial model such 
as net present value, internal rate of return or payback term; business case; 
a technical assessment; key performance indicators; procurement 
specifications or a specific method within a procurement specification such 
as price-to-quality ratio; and (even) frameworks such as Best Value or 
carbon accounting methods used in the public sector. The variety of devices 
that could shape the value of local energy hence ranges from an individual 
financial calculation up to a framework like Best Value which is embedded in 
legislation and European wide public procurement rules. 
 
The interactions between devices and users within valuations is understood 
as a configuration of a complex actor-network. Helgesson and Muniesa 
(2013, p. 3), interpret valuations as “often performed by highly complex 
socio-technical orderings involving several actors and instruments”. This 
builds most closely on Callon’s notion that markets are socio-technical 
constructions. In Callon’s (2008) framing, economic actors are not singular 
persons, but actor-networks or a ‘socio-technical agencement’. This 
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‘agencement’ signifies agency as distributed among human, infrastructural, 
material, and institutional objects and practices. Importantly, because an 
‘agencement’ must be assembled and is not pre-given, this signals potential 
for variation in how valuations take place, including, for the purposes of this 
thesis, energy project valuations. Callon (1999, p. 194 emphasis added) for 
instance surmises that agency is “delegated and is formatted in networks 
with multiple configurations”. This suggests that because valuation ‘devices’ 
comprise part of the actor-network involved in valuing an energy project, they 
deserve critical investigation themselves, and should be a core aspect of an 
examination into assembling value from local energy projects. 
 
Kjellberg and Mallard (2013, p. 22) have considered how the stability of 
actor-networks is established and maintained, asking how “actors set up the 
collective socio-technical agencement that make valuation possible, stable, 
credible, accountable, and liable to compete with alternative perspectives on 
value”. The response has been to consider these actor-networks as involved 
in ‘valuation practices’ (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013), in terms of how shared 
belief systems construct objective value (Muniesa, 2014, Ch 1). This implies 
that as a set of related practices, valuations establish ‘facts’ as matters of 
shared belief. As such valuation practices are not set in stone, but rather 
more malleable. For example, actors could begin valuing things differently, 
with different devices. 
 
From this perspective, ‘devices’ such as Best Value, public procurement and 
the business case are all constitutive elements of valuations. Furthermore, 
the implication of variation in configurations of actor-networks across local 
authority energy projects emphasises the importance of focussing on first 
how valuations actually take place, and second how local authority offices 
interpret the use of these valuation devices. Assembling value from local 
energy is hence dependent, in part, on particular valuation instruments, and 
on the negotiations involved in assembling energy valuation actor-networks. 
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The agency of the ‘user’ of valuation devices however, is somewhat opaque 
in this conceptual literature. Little is said within the concept of devices about 
how local authority officers might interpret and use valuation devices within 
an energy project, whether they are likely to resist the (economising and 
governing) tendencies of devices, or attempt to redefine or adapt them within 
valuations. The sociology of knowledge concept of finitism (Barnes, 1995) 
provides a route to conceptualising how the ‘rules’ encoded in devices that 
intend to structure valuations in local authority energy projects are interpreted 
by their users. 
Finitism in value-making 
The concept of finitism tackles the application of rules, norms and 
classifications and learning about knowledge within a culture. According to 
Barry Barnes (1995) it is not possible to determine meaning simply from the 
existing use of terms. Classifying terms do not have an inherent meaning on 
their own, instead they have to be interpreted. According to finitism, the rules 
shaping use of a valuation device are not pre-given, but instead are 
dependent on a continual process of interpretation. Any assumption that 
people will use a device in the way it has been ‘designed’ is a false view of 
the world according to finitism. This is because users do not simply apply 
‘proper usage’ based on existing knowledge or instructions, they determine 
use in a variety of ways, depending on use-context. 
 
This reflects the science and technology studies perspective about the 
constant re-interpretations and negotiations in the use of technologies and 
devices. Importantly, finitism (re)inserts the significance of the discretion of 
human decision makers in valuation practices, with users having to decide 
how to interpret information and apply devices in a situation. This would 
suggest valuation practices are highly open and contingent processes and 
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not a simple case of path dependency. Instead, valuation practices depend 
on the occurrence and the interpretation of rules in every instance. 
 
Finitism thus leads to a focus on the role of discretion and judgement in the 
use of valuation frameworks in individual instances of what are termed ‘acts 
of classifying’ (Barnes, Bloor, & Henry, 1996). The notion of acts of 
classifying suggests that knowing previous examples does not determine 
future application of terms. Barnes (1982, p. 36) argues it also depends on 
acts of classifying in the moment, “what the rule implies in the next instance 
is always indeterminate — something to be settled by judgment and decision 
in every successive case. Rule-governed activity is what has to be 
explained”. As a result considering Best Value, procurement and business 
case valuation frameworks from this perspective would suggest there is no 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way to implement each of them; there will be legitimate 
variation depending on how groups of people are using them. 
 
For example, Hatherley, Leung and MacKenzie (2008) use finitism to delve 
into the variation found in what appear at first glance normal or routine 
accounting practices. They argue that recording items of expenditure as an 
expense or a purchase relies on the judgement accountants employ. In their 
case this is significant because it shapes how earnings are reported to tax 
authorities and investors. As such these are acts of classifying and not 
simply the work of recording static facts. This perspective thus suggests a 
degree of caution is needed when considering any abstract influence of 
devices outside of their use within concrete settings. The knowledge 
contained within devices therefore does not prevent discretion in the 
application of knowledge in valuation practices. 
Negotiating value through obligatory passage points 
Within energy project development, valuations could in principle occur at 
multiple points. These are depicted in Figure 6.1 (Chapter 6) which 
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characterises the development stages of an energy project. To narrow down 
options to a manageable and targeted number, I use the notion of an 
‘obligatory passage point’ (Law & Callon, 1994) to identify those points most 
critical to the eventual scale and form of local energy provision. Using the 
imagery of a funnel, an obligatory passage point necessitates that actors 
converge on an idea or issue in order to progress forward. 
 
This suggests that across a range of different local authority energy projects, 
there may be specific situations when those leading on project development 
must enrol and mobilise other parts of the council to enable continued 
development of the project. For example, selecting supplier(s) and awarding 
contracts in public procurement could emerge as an obligatory passage point 
where the council must converge on a valuation in order to progress the 
energy project. The negotiations involved at this potential obligatory passage 
point are thus likely to materially shape the scale, ownership and operation of 
energy projects. 
 
During the negotiation of each obligatory passage point it is possible that a 
given valuation framework may operate as a ‘boundary object’ between 
different actors within the council. Susan Leigh Star who developed the 
concept in the late 1980s describes that “boundary objects are a sort of 
arrangement that allow different groups to work together without consensus” 
(Star, 2010, p. 602). Importantly, the notion of a boundary object suggests 
that the same thing can mean different things to different people. Other 
significant aspects are the role of boundary objects in standardising, 
classifying and organising. Star uses the example of a map, which might 
point out a camping ground for some users whilst for others it shows 
archaeological sites. What this illustrates is that boundary objects can have a 
‘shared structure’ but contain a degree of interpretive flexibility that depends 
on their use and interpretation.  
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Studies of the business model (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault, 2009; 
Doganova & Muniesa, 2015) for instance find that the business model 
operates as a boundary object, coordinating across different partners who 
are brought into a business venture beyond the direct audience for whom the 
initial business model is constructed (such as a business plan for a funder). 
This suggests a potential for an overflowing of valuation practices and a 
degree of malleability in how valuation frameworks could be used in practice 
as actors mobilise valuation frameworks in unexpected ways. Similarly, 
Bertelsen et al. (2019) explored the how the ‘heat plan’ for the Copenhagen 
district heating network shaped dialogue between municipalities, local heat 
supply companies, and local waste companies. Though they did not use the 
concept of a boundary object, this indicates further potential for such 
boundary work.  
 
In a local authority energy project, boundary objects could feasibly emerge 
around a number of obligatory passage points. For example, this could 
revolve around constructing the case for support from local councillors for 
energy projects. Also, in public procurement the tender could forms the basis 
of mediating relationships between the local authority as a buyer and 
suppliers. Ultimately this suggests that each valuation framework may have a 
coordination role across different actors involved in the energy project. The 
idea of a boundary object also suggests these valuation devices could take 
on lives of their own in different contexts, going beyond the application and 
use they were originally intended or designed for. 
Politics and power in value-making  
In order to fully understand valuations of local authority energy projects, a 
conceptualisation of the political dimensions of valuations is also required. 
Some valuation practices are already acknowledged as stemming from 
macro political trends including neo-liberalism and new public management 
(Lamont, 2012). Quantification for example is viewed as a particular form of 
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valuation that provides a mechanism for comparison of qualities (transformed 
into quantities) in a way that is both compatible with, and produced from, 
neo-liberalism (Chiapello, 2015; Espeland & Lom, 2015). However, 
incorporating a conceptualisation of how the political dimensions of 
valuations occur, and why, has been limited within valuation studies thus far 
(see e.g. Helgesson, Krause, & Muniesa, 2017). A lack of due attention to 
political agency is also a source of criticism targeted at the concept of 
economisation (McFall, 2009; Miller, 2008). 
 
The concept of a ‘programme of governing’ provides a political anchor for 
local authority energy project valuations. Rooted in the sociology of 
accounting, this concept traces the political ideas and beliefs that structure 
forms of calculation and their significance for economic and social life (Miller, 
2008). The programme of governing concept is concerned with turning a 
direct focus onto the historical and political dimensions which make it 
possible for particular valuation and economising practices to become 
dominant. It therefore seeks to understand how political agendas promote 
specific sets of economic, market and management beliefs. In turn, this 
attempts to comprehend the power dynamics, forms of agency and control 
which are enabled as a result. Peter Miller argues that a concern with 
programmes of governing: 
puts to the fore the analysis of the ways in which present calculative practices have 
been formed historically, what conditions made them possible, what ideals and 
aspirations they embody, and how they seek to programme the world so as to fit 
these ideals. 
Miller, 1998, p. 177 
The programme of governing concept proposes that a ‘programme’ of 
political power is exercised and made operable through tools, procedures 
and valuation practices that comprise the “everyday doings” at work (Miller & 
Power, 2013). Assembly of the business case for example, is a central step 
in development of a local authority energy project and can be thought of as 
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one such ‘everyday’ activity. Critically, what this perspective adds is the 
argument that valuing energy initiatives comprises governing processes that 
are intertwined with, and structured by, politics and power in the institutions 
of government which promote (economistic) valuation frameworks through 
standardising decision processes. 
 
In a programme of governing framing, to shape the world according to a 
political belief, governing is required to ‘represent’ the world 
programmatically, shaping what is to be made calculable and what ideas it 
should be conforming to. Then it is possible to ‘intervene’ in its shaping 
through technologies, organising how it is to be made calculable (Lapsley et 
al., 2010). This is described as a process of ‘governing at a distance’ in 
which norms and standards are not ‘neutral’ in assembling information for 
decisions, but are encoded with neo-liberal beliefs that set out to “transform 
the terms of calculation” (Rose & Miller, 2010[1992], p. 298). Some valuation 
practices and devices are thus thought to explicitly advance policy measures 
encoded with specific beliefs about the efficacy of market organisation for 
solving societal problems. Critically this belief in markets has historic 
specificity and is not simply an outcome of economisation. 
 
In governing public administration in the UK, management accounting is 
perceived as particularly significant, especially audit (Power, 2010[1997]) and 
capital discounting techniques (Miller, 1998; 2001). They are significant 
because of their transformative qualities. Accounting itself is now understood 
as an organising societal processes (Power, 2010[1997]). Within 
organisations this is visible in the managerial significance of accounting and 
its ability to structure decision making. 
 
This perspective argues that accounting tools have redefined the basis of 
decision making. As Miller (2001, p. 389) surmises, “where subjectivity and 
intuition once reigned, the calculative practices of accounting were to impose 
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objectivity and neutrality”. In shaping what are perceived to be valid and 
legitimate assessments of value, management accounting methods are 
hence a political governing device through which decision processes have 
been reoriented to demonstrate the ‘scientific’, ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ 
evaluations of investments (Miller, 1998, p. 184). Performance management 
is understood as a central component to this governing process. The Best 
Value framework for example involves audit, compliance and performance 
management meaning that it is possible to attempt to control the actions of 
local authority managers through enacting the framework (Arnaboldi & 
Lapsley, 2008). 
 
The political appeal of introducing management accounting techniques as an 
instrument of UK economic policy, particularly discounting techniques have 
also been traced, gaining in popularity since the 1960s (Miller, 2001). 
According to Miller (2001, p. 390), these techniques were advanced because 
they enable a form of control from a distance, they are: “a simple way of 
governing the actions of managers. Net present value methods are based on 
a simple rule: only those projects with a positive net present value are 
acceptable”. Net present value is a financial calculation based on discount 
rates (Chiapello, 2015), used in government decision making. It attempts to 
forecast future economic flows of different investment options and calculate a 
comparable measure of their current value. In socio-economic cost-benefit 
analysis of energy projects, it is used to attempt to represent net benefits to 
society (Groth, 2018). However, its calculation removes the specifics of 
projects and their other forms of value and judges them based on a single 
figure, from the perspective of an investment. This implies that in capital 
investment projects such as the energy initiatives studied here, the value of 




Economisation in public life is thus not solely about the influence of 
economics (Miller, 2008). Rather, it is about how forms of valuation, such as 
assessment through a business case, creates possibilities of political control, 
by disciplining and structuring decision processes. The little discretion 
afforded to local authority actors in UK governance and power sharing 
structures (see Chapter 2) is thus fixed in a particular socio-political historical 
(opposed to purely ‘economic’) context, associated with neo-liberal models of 
UK governing, implemented since the 1980s. 
 
This perspective thus provides insight about how negotiation of value is likely 
to be structured within overarching constraints or limits from a programme of 
governing. Importantly, there are historical legacies and rules governing local 
authority valuations. The users of valuation devices in local government for 
example are not totally free to select devices at will. Rose and Miller 
(2010[1992]) formulate this as an exercise of control through “technologies of 
government”. In the instance of the business case for example, this is 
important because it is recommended to local authorities as the ‘correct’ 
valuation device for assessing capital investment proposals and making 
prudent and accountable decisions concerning use of public funds (see 
Chapter 6). The business case could be considered one of these 
‘technologies of government’ in this perspective, because its terms fix the 
representation of the domain being governed (here the local authority energy 
project), according to a political belief, in this case informed by neo-classical 
economic theory of market efficiency. 
 
Equally, Best Value is articulated as a fundamental component of local 
governance (e.g. National Audit Office, 2019). Public procurement is also a 
rule governed valuation process embedded in legislation and structured to 
deliver specific political objectives, particularly minimising nepotism in 
awarding contracts and ensuring fair and open competition. Each of these 
valuation frameworks are thus about more than economisation; they are 
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structured by a political agenda. Take open competition, although it is 
associated with market functioning, the promotion of open competition within 
procurement is not a purely economising issue: it is also something which is 
at stake within the political domain. As a result, it must be governed through 
the application of standardised rules, guidelines and practices which local 
authorities are expected to structure their own energy project valuations 
around. From this point of view the economic and performance management 
rationales contained within valuation devices are politically motivated, 
reflecting a specific theory of efficiency in public spending. 
 
This perspective thus emphasises the political attempts to control 
performance in public organisations through formal rule governed valuations. 
Importantly however, this opens up the idea that a programme of governing 
is incomplete. Political and economising governing processes are described 
by Lapsley, Miller and Panozzo (2010) as “congenitally failing”, never fully 
achieving what they set out to do. This is attributed in part to the expectation 
that what can be programmatically controlled and economised is always 
more ambitious than what could be achieved in practice. A huge number of 
dynamics need to be working in concert for a ‘successful’ programme of 
governing economic life, leading to all sorts of divergences in practice. 
 
Valuation practices are thus inevitably contingent, unstable and fragile. They 
have the potential to be disrupted or obstructed by a number of different 
forces. Minimally this is thought to include: the introduction of new methods 
and new ways of counting (Miller, 1998), such as Best Value or the business 
case; the disruptive force of their ‘users’ who instead of simply operating 
devices, may manipulate or set off to use them for alternative purposes 
(Rose & Miller, 2010[1992]); and as the result of a reflection to other 
concerns, such as the desire for greater transparency in decision making in 
the wake of the financial crises (Miller & Power, 2013). A degree of open-
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endedness and the potential for struggles and contestations surrounding 
energy project valuations is thus envisaged. 
3.4 Establishing a research question to 
investigate value-in-the-making of local 
energy initiatives 
The perspective introduced in this chapter opens up inquiry into practice of 
assembling value in local authority energy projects. This shifts attention away 
from definitions of value to procedures for assessing value. The implication of 
the theoretical concepts brought together is that the value of local energy is 
not pre-given, but materially constructed through instances of valuation 
practices. Valuations are therefore contingent practices, involving 
establishing a shared meaning about value judgements. Valuation practices 
can feasibly vary as different groups start valuing things through alternative 
sets of practices, and also change over time. The significance of this is the 
proposition that how things are valued matters, having consequences for 
local energy systems development. Prompted by this sociological 
perspective, the following research question has been developed to guide 
the investigation: 
Overarching RQ. How is the value of local energy initiatives 
assembled? 
This research question is derived from the conjecture that a local authority 
energy initiative is constituted through a process of ‘value-in-the-making’ that 
is mediated through formal ‘instruments of valuation’. The pervasiveness of 
economisation processes suggests that energy initiatives are likely to be 
defined in economistic terms, as valuation frameworks – instances of 
‘economics in the wild’ – are likely to contain economic rationales. 
Nevertheless governing processes are a reminder that valuing local authority 
energy initiatives is not simply the outcome of an economisation of society. It 
is instead intertwined with, and structured by, politics and power relationships 
across institutions of government, which are implicated in economising 
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processes. These political programmes create historical legacies and set the 
boundaries of valuation, through requirements such as public procurement 
rules. 
 
Economisation and governing processes are however, dependent on how 
valuation instruments are used in practice. This is poorly understood and 
lacks empirical evidence. Although we know little about the use of such 
instruments by local officials, a degree of open-endedness and a struggle 
over economising and governing processes is envisaged. The finitism 
concept suggests valuations are open ended, owing to the need to interpret 
how to use valuation frameworks in each instance. The need to establish 
coherence within an actor-network to enable the stability of valuations also 
suggests variability in how this unfolds in individual instances. Valuations are 
also likely to revolve around processes of contesting and negotiating formal 
valuation frameworks according to both obligatory passage points within 
energy project development. This suggests critical junctures within 
valuations, and the potential for valuation frameworks to work as boundary 
objects. Thus despite pervasive economisation and governing processes, 
there should be some malleability and a degree of interpretive flexibility in 
valuing local energy initiatives. Findings about assembling the value of local 
energy initiatives may therefore illuminate the limits of economising and 
governing processes when they are put into practice. 
 
Local Authorities are thus expected to use a variety of practices to navigate 
and negotiate the three valuation frameworks selected for investigation – the 
Best Value framework, procurement processes and the business case 
device. Some are expected to resist economisation processes, exercising 
agency by working with more diffuse notions of ‘best’ value and financial 
value in order to include broader socio-economic and low carbon energy 
benefits in assembling value. In other instances, orientation to relatively 
short-term financial value is expected to restrict potential to capture other 
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forms of social and environmental value, and public goods. Impacts on local 
energy governance and organisation are likely to manifest in: the scale and 
scope of energy initiatives; the costs of project development; and in choices 
concerning business and delivery structures and the ongoing control and 
management of projects. 
 
Subsidiary questions open up the investigation. They have been developed 
considering the conceptual framework and previous research on local energy 
governance. Each question will be analysed through the empirical chapters 
which are structured according to the three valuation frameworks. Overall 
findings are brought together into a final discussion considering how the 
frameworks for organising and measuring value inter-relate with assembling 
local energy value. 
RQ1. What roles do formal valuation frameworks play in decision 
processes for local energy initiatives? 
This question enquires into the operation of the three selected valuation 
frameworks – ‘devices’ – in the development of local authority energy 
projects. An important step will be identifying how, if at all, an energy project 
is itself structured to fit into established valuations. This will provide an 
opportunity to consider instances of economising and governing at a 
distance, analysing the ways in which each valuation device promotes the 
energy project according to set terms. Based on the theoretical perspective, 
preliminary expectations about the role of each valuation instrument are as 
follows. 
 
The Best Value Framework was set-up as a fundamental component of a 
local authority’s agency to shape service organisation, providing the means 
to move beyond the lowest cost model of delivery hence opening up 
valuations beyond economistic terms. Given local energy is not a statutory 
area of local government provision, Best Value seems likely to be important 
to the development of initiatives; it should, in principle, assist in recruiting 
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new discourses to justify activity and investment. Specifically, it should, in 
principle, help to integrate forms of non-financial value into project proposals 
(each device is described in detail in Chapter 6). However, as introduced in 
Chapter 2, the Best Value Framework replaced a procurement model, and 
widened its reach across the organisation. It simultaneously contributes to 
the audit of local government performance, particularly in relation to the 
central government stipulation that value for money is achieved in public 
spending. Within the Best Value Framework, both the business case and 
public procurement can be used to demonstrate its application. The 
programme of governing concept suggests the constitutive aspects of this 
performance audit theme are likely to be particularly powerful in structuring 
valuations through focus on the procedural dimensions of transparent 
decision making and prudent use of public funds. Because we have little 
evidence about how Best Value unfolds in practice, Chapter 7 explores this 
by considering how these two dimensions of Best Value collide with the 
value-in-the-making of local energy projects. 
 
The business case for a local energy project is a techno-economic options 
appraisal, developed to support decision processes about energy projects. It 
is recommended by UK and devolved governments as the correct valuation 
framework for local authorities to use in evaluating capital investment 
projects (see Chapter 6), including energy. The programme of governing 
argument that political power is exercised and made operable through 
everyday activities is used in Chapter 8 to conceptualise assembly of the 
business case as one such ‘everyday’ activity. Council internal assessment 
of the merits of the business case proposal is thus expected to be critical to 
local energy systems development, because energy projects involve 
commitment of capital resources, and are a discretionary area of provision; 
without ‘sign off’ projects do not proceed. The concept of ‘economics in the 
wild’ suggests also that the business case is likely to promote economised 
valuations and has potential to go beyond its anticipated application and use. 
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Chapter 8 thus uses this concept to interrogate how, if at all, economic 
rationales restrict assembly of social or environmental value which often 
provide the initial motivation for local authority engagement, and whether 
energy projects are instead increasingly geared towards ‘attractive’ financial 
returns. 
 
Public procurement is the main point at which local authorities interact with 
supply chain actors in energy project development and is one of the central 
steps in project development (e.g. Greater South East Energy Hub, 2020; 
King, 2016a). It involves coordinating across energy and procurement teams, 
potentially external procurement specialists, and also a variety of suppliers. 
There is a fair degree of variation depending on the nature of an individual 
procurement process (see Chapter 6). However, the notion that valuations 
depend on distinct constellations of calculative actor-networks suggests that 
how local authorities navigate the maze of procurement rules for their energy 
projects is significant. Chapter 9 therefore explores strategies to configure 
the ‘intelligent buyer’, as local authorities seek to exert influence in the 
procurement process in order to capture local forms of value. 
RQ2. To what extent are there degrees of interpretative flexibility 
within formal valuation frameworks with implications for local 
energy initiatives? 
The second step to understanding how value is assembled involves 
enquiring into how local authority officers interpret the meanings encoded 
within valuation frameworks. This involves identifying how valuation 
frameworks are interpreted in practice, and exploring how they are 
negotiated and contested in decision processes. This will provide the 
opportunity to consider the proposition that local officials’ interpretations of 
devices are likely to structure the material impact of a device on decision 
making. Based on the conceptual literature about user’s agency, preliminary 
expectations in relation to RQ2 are as follows. 
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As Chapter 6 explains in more detail, each valuation framework is presented 
within government guidelines as though they are standardised instruments 
with core ‘rules’ for uniform application. In principle this suggests there 
should be normalised and systematised applications of each valuation 
framework within decision processes. However we have little evidence about 
how valuation instruments are used in practice; this remains a question for 
empirical examination. The conceptual framework developed here suggests 
1) that users are likely to interpret meaning contained within valuation 
frameworks in a non-deterministic way, suggesting a degree of interpretative 
flexibility within what appear at first glance to be ‘standard’ or routinised 
decisions; and 2), the limits of economising and governing processes insert 
the potential for local discretion and ‘divergence’ from prescribed use of 
these valuation frameworks. 
 
Local authorities are complex organisations with differing compositions of 
skills, expertise, resources and commitment to local energy. Using the 
argument that valuation involves a socio-technical constellation of actors, 
objects and structures, each local authority could utilise specific valuation 
frameworks differently within this process. Because assembling value is 
argued to involve processes of ‘making’, there is an expectation of inevitable 
variation in how such processes take place across the cases. Ultimately this 
repositions the potential for exercise of agency by officials interpreting rules. 
This could create divergences in the use of valuation frameworks, as well as 
struggles over outcomes. 
 
Struggles are likely to be contingent on: the expertise of the officer tasked 
with assembling the business case; the institutional characteristics of the 
local authority; the pressures of austerity; the degree of shared 
understanding about the different evaluative methods; and the extent to 
which the results of ‘standardised’ valuations are accepted as factual 
valuations of the energy project. These are likely to be significant to 
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economisation, because they all have potential to shape the financial and 
economic ‘viability’ of projects. As Chapter 9 explores in relation to 
procurement, such ‘factors’ are hence not analysed as barriers or enablers 
for local authority energy projects, but as constitutive elements of a 
calculative actor or ‘intelligent buyer’ of local energy. 
 
Additionally, despite the standardising attempts associated with these 
valuation frameworks, they may be adapted according to circumstances of 
individual energy projects. For example, Best Value remains a contested 
concept within local government (see Chapter 7), despite continued 
assertions that it is a core element of local governance (see Chapter 6). 
Furthermore, there may be various ways in which the business case is 
compiled and drawn on in decision processes. For instance projects that rely 
on grant funding, or have lower levels of capital expenditures, may be subject 
to less formal evaluations of the business case (see Chapter 8). 
 
Within procurement, the detailed specification, and the relative emphasis 
placed on price and quality indicators in assessment, are likely to be key 
areas where the value of energy initiatives is contested. For instance the 
weighting given to lowest cost versus quality indicators in assessing and 
awarding contracts may be a point of contention, exacerbated by austerity 
budgets. More broadly, given the costs and resource intensity of public 
procurement, it is expected that there will be debate surrounding whether 
procurement itself enables ‘best’ value to be delivered (see Chapter 9). 
 
Local officials may also use each valuation framework in ‘unintended’ ways. 
For instance, empirical chapters consider how each valuation framework 
operates as a boundary object bringing new actors within the local authority 
into decision processes. Best Value may provide a language through which 
to communicate the value of local energy initiatives where they contribute to 
social, economic and environmental value. The business case device may 
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act as a means to mediate coordination with finance directors over the value 
of local energy initiatives. In each instance, this presents a potential route to 
institutionalising local energy as a central feature of a local authority 
activities. 
 
This chapter has outlined the conceptual model guiding this thesis, which 
bridges economic sociology of valuation and programmes of governing. I 
have emphasised how concepts of valuation, economisation and governing 
bring distinct elements to allow analysis of the influence of formal tools and 
procedures within energy project development. Most importantly, this 
perspective is used to conceive that the application of formal valuations 
involves interpretation, negotiation and contestation. The subsequent 
analysis is therefore sensitive to exploring valuation practices configured 
during project development. The conjecture that formal valuation instruments 
attempt to standardise valuation practices and therein enable governing at a 
distance, is examined in relation to the Best Value Framework in Chapter 7. 
The notion that valuations are likely to assemble energy projects in 
economistic terms, is investigated in relation to assembly of the business 
case in Chapter 8. The proposition that valuations involve negotiation 
between multiple actors, is explored in relation to navigating public 
procurement in local energy in Chapter 9. 
 
Prior to moving onto the empirical chapters, the next chapter details the 
methodology and research design.  
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4 Methodology and Research Design 
 
4.1 Methodology 
In this chapter, I detail the methodology and research design shaping my 
thesis investigation. My research question asks how local authorities 
assemble value from local energy projects, despite a governance context 
that fails to provide a clear route for consistent engagement with energy. A 
qualitative research design uses analysis of multiple-case studies (40) to 
investigate this topic. This methodology is first explained, before the 
remainder of the chapter details the research design. 
 
The methodology adopted in this thesis addresses four key limitations in 
existing literature on this topic. First, the study generates social science 
research on local energy. Overall, evidence shows that energy research has 
too narrowly focused on engineering and economics, with relatively few 
social science studies. The opening volume of Energy Research and Social 
Science, reported that only a fifth of research published in policy relevant 
energy journals between 1999-2013 involved social scientists and social 
science methodologies (both quantitative and qualitative) (Sovacool, 2014). 
These contributions were predominantly from public policy and business, 
with less than 1% from sociology. Although the use of social scientific 
approaches to energy is growing (see Van Veelen et al., 2019), there is still 
much to do. 
 
Social science enquiries have a role in bringing ‘society back in’ (Urry, 2011) 
to energy research. Rather than skimming over societal processes and 
locating them as separate or detached from energy, social science grasps 
energy as an interconnection of economic, technical, societal and political 
issues (Shove, 2010). The local energy projects studied in this thesis provide 
a lens through which to critique the societal processes shaping contemporary 
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local government institutions, by asking how and in what ways these 
influence local energy systems. 
 
Second, the study acknowledges the limited availability of in-depth 
qualitative evidence on the processes shaping energy developments among 
local authorities. For example, in studies of urban energy governance, local 
authorities are identified as important actors in directly leading and facilitating 
energy project development in the UK (Rydin et al., 2013), and globally 
(Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). However, these studies were based on 
compiling secondary data sources and have not provided detailed evidence 
about what shapes project development. 
 
Given their status as local institutional actors, and their ambiguous 
positioning as a ‘new’ energy actor within energy and climate policy (see 
Chapter 2), it is essential that social energy research focus squarely on local 
authorities. Questionnaires have been used to gather local authority 
perspectives about municipal capacity building through knowledge exchange 
networks to progress action on climate change (Aylett, 2015). Quantitative 
analysis about climate plans has also explored the role and extent of climate 
change within local government planning in both UK (Allman et al., 2004; 
Heidrich et al., 2013), and European cities (Heidrich et al., 2016; Reckien et 
al., 2018). Combined, these studies provide important insights about forms of 
urban energy, the impact of capacity building attempts, and the extent of 
climate planning processes. They are however, less informative about the 
actual feasibility of implementing ambitious local authority energy and climate 
strategies. Nor do they provide answers about why some local projects 
proceed, but others do not. For this, more in-depth qualitative research is 
required. 
 
Third, this thesis adds to the case study body of evidence in a novel way. 
Case studies have begun to provide this important in-depth contextualised 
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analysis of local energy developments, but have focussed on small numbers 
of cases. Case studies can be grouped as follows. Single-case studies of: 
local authority energy processes (Bale et al., 2012; Lemon, Pollitt, & Steer, 
2015; Rocher, 2017; Webb, 2015); or, urban energy processes that are not 
specific to local authorities, but they nonetheless heavily feature (Åkerman & 
Peltola, 2012; Coutard & Rutherford, 2010; Hodson & Marvin, 2016). 
Comparative multiple-case studies usually using two or three cases of: 
municipal urban energy initiatives and processes within the same state 
(Becker, Beveridge, & Naumann, 2015; Becker, Naumann, & Moss, 2016; 
Hawkey et al., 2013; Shackley et al., 2002; Webb & Hawkey, 2016); or, 
cross-country comparative multiple-case studies exploring the impact of the 
different institutional capacities of local authorities and urban energy 
developments in each country (Eckersley, 2018; Emelianoff, 2014; Hawkey & 
Webb, 2014; Wurzel et al., 2019). Often classed as leading or pioneer cities, 
the small number of cases limits understanding patterns across a broader 
range of local authorities. 
 
To add to this literature, I draw on a much larger number of case studies (40) 
of UK local authorities. This enables building a broader picture of the patterns 
in decision making, across a breadth of different councils, energy projects, 
and ownership and business structures within the same state. Generating 
insights from this larger group of multiple-case studies will also yield answers 
about the transferability of conclusions offered through single and small 
number case studies. It will also tell us more about the feasibility of 
conducting multiple-case studies of local energy on this scale. It also avoids 
over researching a small number of cases. 
 
Fourth, the study uses the economic sociology of valuation perspective to 
focus on an understudied area of local authority energy: detailed analysis of 
assembling value from energy project development. Areas of local authority 
responsibility and concern are required to meet UK commitment to a net zero 
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carbon economy and society by 2050, including major improvements in 
energy efficiency, heat and transport (Tingey & Webb, 2020b). Economic 
analyses have already demonstrated the economic case for these cost-
effective investments at city scale (Gouldson et al., 2015; Sudmant et al., 
2016; Williamson et al., 2019), yet systematic change is not occurring. 
Studies such as these hence only show us part of the picture. With no 
resourced mandate for local government engagement, and no significant 
municipal energy sector, it is therefore critical to understand more about how 
and when councils actually proceed with energy initiatives. Sociological 
concepts, with their focus on how investment options are assembled and 
assessed in project development offer an ideal way to explore this problem. 
 
In addition, the sociological literature on value-making (Chapter 3) has mostly 
focussed on theory building. There are now calls for empirical studies of 
valuation in practice (Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013). Thus far, social studies of 
energy have mostly responded through analyses of ‘market devices’ of 
energy, such as feed-in tariffs and smart grids (for review see Silvast, 2017). 
 
This theoretical literature can however be applied in the empirical context of 
UK local authority governance and local energy development (e.g. Webb & 
Hawkey, 2016). This includes examination of specific valuation frameworks. 
Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008, p. 32) for instance, argue that we lack the 
“empirical evidence on what Best Value means in practice” to accurately 
assess its effects in governing local authority decision making. In particular, 
we lack knowledge about the role of valuation frameworks in shaping the 
type, size and scale of projects; and, about how some councils manage to 
create headway in local energy despite no statutory mandate, but others do 
not. Studying how value of projects is assembled is critical to understanding 
the changes needed to make tangible progress on net zero goals. 
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In response to these four limitations, this thesis applies an economic 
sociology perspective to 40 UK local authority case studies to analyse energy 
project valuation practices. This offers generating an in-depth understanding 
of the struggles councils face as they negotiate tools and procedures during 
project development, and the impacts this has on local energy systems. 
Background to the study 
This PhD was funded through the Local Engagement in UK Energy 
Systems11 (LEUKES) research, and my involvement in this played a key part 
in determining appropriate data collection methods. LEUKES is one of the 
major social science research projects on UK local authority energy in the 
past seven years. My involvement provided significant opportunities to devise 
an extension to LEUKES data collection, to specifically examine local 
authority valuation practices in energy investment. 
 
The LEUKES project had a much broader scope and objective than my PhD 
investigation of value making in local energy (see Webb et al., 2017)12. 
Aspects of LEUKES research relevant to this thesis include my selection of 
case studies and main data collection methods. LEUKES created a new UK-
wide database from secondary data, and mapped the extent of energy 
strategy and projects across the entire UK local authority population13. 
Findings informed subsequent development of a strategic sampling frame to 
select 40 local authority case studies, with the aim of further investigating the 
variety and scale of local engagement across the UK. In 2015 – 2016, I led 
on original data gathering about 40 local authorities actively developing 
project investments, using semi-structured interviews, local authority 
documents and an online questionnaire.  
                                            
11 Co-funded by the Energy Technologies Institute and RCUK through the UK Energy Research Centre. 
12 Also see https://heatandthecity.org.uk/project/local-engagement-with-uk-energy-systems/. 
13 I first created this UK-wide database in a pilot study during 2013 – 2014 (Hawkey, Tingey, & Webb, 
2014; Tingey et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2016), and updated and extended it in 2015 (Tingey & Webb, 
2020a; Tingey, Webb, & Hawkey, 2017; Webb et al., 2017), during the main phase of research which 
ran from 2014 – 2017. 
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Data collection about these 40 local authority case studies was extended to 
incorporate my investigation of valuation practices for local energy 
investment, and the focus on the Best Value, business case and public 
procurement frameworks. This involved a dedicated topic within the LEUKES 
interview schedule, using supporting data from the LEUKES online 
questionnaire, and requesting documents from case study local authorities 
(see Section 4.4). In addition, for my PhD investigation I gathered and 
analysed documents about formal council decisions on local energy projects 
and procurement advertisements, and central government rules and 
guidelines about each framework. I also carried out informal observation at 
district energy workshops between 2012 and 201814. 
 
In total, data I draw on was generated about specific energy projects in each 
case. This aimed to understand the origins and objectives of energy projects, 
and subsequent development trajectories, including negotiating each 
valuation framework. In addition, data collection explored councils’ wider 
approach to energy beyond these individual projects. This aimed to uncover 
more about the extent energy was situated and made valuable in relation to 
organisational priorities, and the influence of the programme governing local 
authority energy strategy and investment. 
 
The remainder of the chapter describes the method in detail; aspects of the 
wider LEUKES data collection strategy are included where it is necessary to 
explain my data gathering. 
                                            
14 This comprised a total of ten one-day workshops: six of the UK Local Authority District Energy 
Vanguard Network; and four of the Scottish Heat Network Partnership Practitioner Group 
workshops. I also played a supporting role in convening these networks. 
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4.2 A multiple-case study approach 
Developing multiple-case studies aimed to uncover how the value of local 
energy initiatives is assembled. The economic sociology and valuation 
studies perspective aided conceptualising processes of value making in local 
authority energy initiatives, and selecting three valuation frameworks for 
dedicated investigation (Best Value, the business case and public 
procurement, see Chapter 6). 
Generating in-depth understandings 
The case study traces back to the ethnographic work of Malinowski in the 
early 20th century, but is now used in a huge variety of social settings and 
includes multiple methods of data generation. Case studies therefore vary in 
their scope and application, such as in-depth investigation into a single-case 
study or comparison across multiple-case studies. 
 
Case studies are especially suited to examining ‘how’ or ‘why’ social 
interaction at micro- and meso scale influences societal changes (Yin, 2014). 
As Chapters 2 and 3 uncovered, despite the proposition that the assessment 
of energy initiatives is materially significant to their value, little is known about 
the actual processes involved in ‘value-in-the-making’. There is limited 
evidence about how valuation instruments are actually used in the 
development of projects. In addition, it is unknown how the phenomena of 
‘valuation’ create material consequences for local energy systems 
development. A multiple-case study approach offers means to generate new 
primary data and combine multiple data sources to explore, in-depth, how 
three different valuation frameworks shape the development of energy 
projects in each local authority case, as well as comparing interpretations 
across cases. 
 
Case studies hence enable analysis of multiple dimensions of local action to 
assemble value, including multi-level governance context. Analysis of 
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secondary data on local authority energy strategies would provide limited in-
depth evidence about actual processes shaping when, and under what 
conditions, local energy is pursued. By contrast, case study approaches 
generate detailed and complex understandings about social research 
problems (Flyvbjerg, 2006). There is also limited secondary data about local 
authority energy initiatives available, in part because reporting requirements 
for local energy are unclear. My area of research requires collecting new 
data. I draw on Yin (2014) and Flyvbjerg (2006) in developing my case study 
approach. 
Identifying cases 
The topic investigated in this thesis is value-making in local energy. 
Specifically, the local authority organisation is defined as the actor of focus, 
and the valuation practices involved in development of energy projects is 
explored. The case study design treats each local authority as a single case, 
understood as a ‘bounded system’ (Yin, 2014) distinct from other cases.  
	
According to Yin (2014), by building conclusions from multiple independent 
cases, multiple-case designs provide a route to generating reliable findings 
and drawing analytical (rather than statistical) generalisations. Similarly, 
Flyvbjerg (2006) explains that context-dependent case study research 
provides examples of a phenomenon in situ and/or enables generalisation. 
The use of multiple-cases and a case selection strategy is one way to ensure 
findings are not skewed by an ‘unusual but artefactual condition’ (Yin, 2018) 
that could be associated with a single-case study. Higher confidence in 
thesis conclusions can therefore be derived from the cross-case analysis. 
 
Because local energy governance is open ended and has no clear trajectory 
(see Chapter 2), these factors contributed to my adoption of the case study 
analysis approach. Consequently, multiple cases are essential for uncovering 
how valuations in energy initiatives actually occur in different local authority 
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contexts, and understanding how different approaches impact on the shape 
and form of local energy projects. 
	
Furthermore, because of the variability in local energy developments, 
reliance on a single case would provide limited additional knowledge to the 
existing case study literature outlined in the Methodology. The larger number 
of case studies used here (40) is instrumental to building a broader picture of 
the intersecting dimensions of assembling value in local energy investment. 
Both single and two/three comparative case studies are unable to provide 
this kind of contribution. 
Data and methods 
Case study research typically combines different methods of data generation, 
for triangulation (Yin, 2014). Multiple sources of data strengthen the body of 
evidence developed, minimising the potential for partial data. The approach I 
developed focussed on conducting interviews with local authority officers, 
and reviewing documents from different sources. To supplement this and to 
support findings from interview data, I used data gathered through an online 
questionnaire. 
 
I also conducted informal observation at practitioner workshops throughout 
my period of study (as noted earlier in Section 4.1). Discussion during these 
events, my notes and the presentations (where they were made available) 
were an invaluable additional resource about contemporary local authority 
energy. They helped me develop my own understanding of local authority 
energy, the pressures officers faced in project development, and areas 
requiring further support. For instance, ‘building the business case’ and the 
role of ‘public procurement agencies’ were both dedicated topics of district 
energy practitioner workshops I attended. I inferred from these workshops 
that the business case and procurement were ongoing areas of difficulty in 
project development. In particular, they seemed points where the project was 
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liable to breakdown, or divert from original intentions, mostly by reducing in 
scale or being delayed by lengthy contractual negotiations. Exploring further 
how the value of energy was constituted and conformed within these 
valuation frameworks, hence seemed a logical approach. 
4.3 Selecting a strategic sample of local authority 
cases 
Selecting cases is a crucial element to the multiple-case study approach. 
Because of the large number of cases used I drew on a sampling frame; this 
depicts how elements from a population are captured and represented in a 
given sample. The sampling frame sought to ensure that local authorities of 
different types (in England) and across devolved government with active 
engagement in energy projects were included. The population for this study 
is all UK local authorities. From this sampling frame, in keeping with case 
study research the 40 local authority cases selected are intentionally 
strategic rather than representative. As such, it can be described as a 
purposive sample for selecting ‘information-rich’ cases of certain types of 
interest (Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2012). 
 
In particular, these strategic multiple-case studies aimed to extend LEUKES 
findings from an earlier high level mapping (see Chapter 2), with in-depth 
investigation. Building on these results involved prioritising certain regions 
(Yorkshire and the Humber, and Greater London) and types of local authority 
within England (metropolitan district boroughs), as well as Scottish and 
Welsh local authorities. The sampling frame also incorporated the degree of 
engagement with energy defined within the LEUKES research. This 
characterised a continuum of local authority engagement with energy from 
least to most active. The least active authorities showed no evidence of 
strategic energy planning or investment in energy projects. These were 
excluded because it was expected they would generate limited data. 
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An initial target sample of local authorities was generated (see Appendix III). 
This provided additional ‘back-up’ cases. 40 case study authorities were 
successfully recruited; the sample is summarised in Table 4.1. 
	
Table 4.1 Sample case study authorities 
Country Region Count      Authority Type Count 
England 
East Midlands 3    Unitary 9 
East of England 3    London Borough 6 
Greater London 6    Metropolitan District 7 
North East 2    County Council 2 
North West 3    District Borough 3 
South East 2    Combined Authority 2 
South West 4   
West Midlands 2   
Yorkshire & the Humber 4   
Northern Ireland  1   
Scotland  7   
Wales  3   
  40  29 
	
Representative generalisations are therefore not possible from this multiple-
case sample; however this is not the goal of case study research. As 
described in Section 4.2 there is potential for analytical generalising from the 
study. The large number of cases (40, approx. 10% of the local authority 
population) also offers the potential for identifying key shared themes, as well 
as more specific and individualised findings. 
 
This large multiple-case design also provides a significant opportunity to 
broaden the existing case study literature described in the chapter 
introduction. I therefore chose to include all 40 local authorities in my 
multiple-case study research design, rather than select a sub-group. Chapter 
5 provides an overview of the 40 cases. 
Recruitment 
A database of lead contacts in each target local authority was developed. 
Some potential contacts were already known through the LEUKES team’s 
prior involvement in local authority district energy knowledge exchange 
networks. Others were identified from checking council websites for 
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energy/climate change teams, through lead contacts named in council 
documentation about specific energy projects, and via informal approach at 
local energy events and conferences.  
 
An initial email, including a ‘Project Overview’ (see Appendix VI), was sent to 
lead contacts. This requested an informal telephone call to discuss their 
potential participation in the research. The follow up telephone call lasted 
between 20 and 60 minutes and was used to explain the LEUKES research 
including the focus on energy plans and strategies, and selecting specific 
energy projects for review within the wider context of the organisational 
priorities. Following this telephone call, the respondent received an online 
questionnaire and full details about the research, and a date for an interview 
was confirmed. 
 
Because the LEUKES data gathering involved two stages (completion of 
online questionnaire and subsequent interview), one potential issue was 
recruitment of local authority participants to complete both stages. It was 
crucial to my investigation that participants contributed to the second stage 
interview. To mitigate against the potential for drop off between the two 
stages, participants were fully informed during recruitment about the two 
stages and how much time they would need to contribute. 
 
In total officers from 51 local authorities from the target sample were 
contacted; 40 agreed to take part, seven did not respond to emails and 
telephone requests, and four declined. Two of the officers that declined 
explained that they had previously contributed to academic research, but that 
current work pressures prevented them from participating. It is possible that 
those who did not respond were also facing similar pressures. 
	
In discussion with each lead contact, a specific energy project was selected 
for close examination that was ideally near completion or operational. 
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Practically, specific projects provide concrete examples to structure data 
collection. They also provide a lens through which to gain in-depth insight 
into the process of negotiating value within local authority energy provision. 
Projects further along in development or operational were prioritised so that 
the three valuation frameworks could be considered in each case. This 
helped to obtain as complete as possible a picture of the project’s 
development. Projects in early stages of development have uncertainties 
which would limit the validity and reliability of the data including eventual 
size, scope, financing and ownership, and risk of stalling. Where this was not 
possible the interview schedule included enough flexibility to discuss the 
expected trajectory of the specified project, and to talk about other projects 
which were also being developed within each case. This allows me to draw 
on data about a total of 52 energy projects in subsequent chapters.  
 
When determining the inclusion of energy projects, priority was given to 
decentralised generation and supply, and demand management through 
improving the energy efficiency of buildings, because these accounted for 
75% of all 458 projects found in the mapping phase of the research (Tingey 
& Webb, 2020a; Webb et al., 2017). A small number of projects fell outside 
this remit and were selected on the basis of their importance to the particular 
local authority (projects are introduced in full in Chapter 5). 
 
As explained in Chapter 5, local business and governance models for these 
projects range from full council ownership and control, shared 
ownership/control with other project partners, to the council not having a 
direct involvement in ownership of the project. Project legal structures 
included in-house, community interest company, community benefit society, 
company limited by shares, company limited by guarantee, cooperative 
society, and limited liability partnership. The variety of different ownership 
structures and legal forms included in the cases is helpful for exploring value-
making in different contexts. For example, this will help understand how 
 81 
negotiating a project’s value influences decisions about ownership and 
control and the eventual scale and scope of projects. 
4.4 Case study data collection 
Case studies typically draw on multiple data sources (Yin, 2014). I use three 
main data sources; interviews, energy project documents and guidelines 
about the selected valuation frameworks. Below describes the data 
generation tools and process, according to the following phases of data 
collection: background (understanding framework guidelines); piloting data 
collection; gathering data through interviews and supplementary documents. 
Background: guidelines about the Best Value Framework, 
the Business Case and Public Procurement 
Background data gathering about each selected valuation framework 
focussed on documentary evidence. This was drawn from legislation, 
published guidelines and protocols from government and related agencies. 
Materials were obtained from government and related agency websites (as 
described in Table 6.1, Chapter 6). These were used in analysing how each 
framework is expected to operate and be implemented. 
 
The goal was to form an understanding about the intended programme of 
governing of local authority practices through each framework. This is an 
important step because of the conjecture that any such programme of 
governing is ‘congenitally failing’ (Lapsley et al., 2010; P. Miller & Rose, 
2008)	and hence filled with deviation from the intentions designed into rules, 
guidelines and tools. One dimension of understanding how these valuation 
frameworks shape value-making thus involves creating a picture of what 
effects they intend to create. 
 
As legislation, regulation and guidance is specific to the frameworks, these 
documents do not necessarily have a direct focus on local energy. 
Documents were selected on the basis of considering them as ‘schemes of 
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social organisation’ (Prior, 2008) within valuations. Results help to develop 
indicative factors relating to how each framework is expected to govern 
assembling of value from local energy. 
Piloting primary data collection 
Primary data collection was enabled through extending the two existing 
LEUKES data collection instruments: an online questionnaire and interview 
schedule. For each of the 40 cases, an online questionnaire was designed to 
capture accessible information about a specific energy project and basic 
information about the development of any local energy strategy. A follow up 
semi-structured interview discussed in more depth: decision making about 
local energy strategy and projects, including discussion of each framework; 
the value of local energy projects, as defined by the council; achievements 
and challenges over the project lifetime; and policy changes to support local 
energy. 
Using a workshop to assess feasibility of data collection tools 
A central objective of piloting was to identify the feasibility of extending either, 
or both of the LEUKES instruments to incorporate my primary data collection. 
The questionnaire and interview instruments were developed iteratively and 
included holding a workshop session with district energy practitioners (public 
and private sector) at a UK Local Authority District Energy Vanguard Network 
workshop on business models in December 201415. This workshop session 
was used to discuss a subset of topics, including exploring local approaches 
to ‘value’ and ‘value creation’. The workshop also provided opportunity for 
informal discussions with local and central government officers and district 
energy specialists about the research, including rationale for case selection, 
key contacts, topics covered, and additional data sources. 
 
                                            
15 This was one the practitioner networks that I attended and conducted informal observation (and 
also supported convening). 
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Open-ended discussion revealed that value is conceived along multiple 
dimensions. Value attributed to carbon and energy savings, and housing 
upgrades which reduced costs of management (e.g. through fewer voids) 
was thought to be measurable in financial terms and could be incorporated 
into a business model. The value of reducing fuel poverty, or improving 
community benefit, political capital and local energy resilience was noted to 
be harder to monetise and capture in a business model. For example, 
although fuel poverty reduction per se was easier to identify as a source of 
value, the associated health benefits and reduction in household debts (and 
therefore local economic benefit and social prosperity) were deemed to be 
harder to capture. 
 
The political make-up of Councils was also regarded by officers as significant 
in driving and justifying energy initiatives, and in the relative emphasis on 
values such as economic development or fuel poverty reduction. Emphasis 
may shift from carbon savings priority to fuel poverty in response to changes 
in the political party/parties in control. Officers seemed to structure local 
value creation in three-parts: ‘how do we make the case for “x” project?’; 
‘how do we defend the project and project viability?’; and ‘how do we 
communicate the project as a valuable enterprise for the local authority to 
invest in, either in staff resources, financial investment, or both?’ The depth 
and nuance of discussion at the workshop revealed that analysis of value-
making in local authority energy is a topic worthy of investigating further and 
has relevance to practitioners. 
 
This workshop helped identify which of the data collection instruments would 
suit gathering data for my investigation. Discussion made clear it would be 
hard to capture meaningful data about ‘valuation practices’ via an extension 
to the LEUKES questionnaire. This was confirmed by a workshop activity (I 
designed) where attendees identified which kinds of topics they thought 
could be explored via a questionnaire, and which would be more suited to an 
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interview. Officers reported that providing basic information about both a 
project (such as project stage and capital expenditure costs) and local 
energy strategy in a questionnaire would be relatively straightforward. They 
thought that process questions, including about how and why a project came 
about, its development through council decision making, and assembly of the 
business case, would need to be discussed in an interview. In part this was 
because under current local energy governance, projects had no predictable 
trajectory and emerged from different parts of the council. Officers thus 
emphasised there was more to tell about the subtleties of valuation in local 
energy practice than could be captured purely in a questionnaire. 
 
Following this feedback, I therefore prioritised extending the LEUKES 
interview as my primary data collection tool. This involved including 
questions about valuation practices in local energy projects covering 
discussion of Best Value, the business case and public procurement. This 
was supplemented by amending the LEUKES questionnaire to gather 
additional data on: financing and ownership; the impact of public 
procurement rules; whether projects generated income or savings that 
released pressure on council budgets; and if projects had either stalled 
and/or been abandoned in recent years16. 
Piloting interviews  
The interview was then piloted with four local authority officers and one 
district energy practitioner in Spring 2015. Pilot interviews were used to 
develop responsiveness to interviewing situations and determine possible 
practical difficulties (Rubin & Rubin, 2005; van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). 
Practically, piloting helped to clarify that the time suggested for completing 
interviews was correct and check whether participants were willing and able 
to give up their time. 
 
                                            
16 See Appendix V for the list of questions drawn from the LEUKES questionnaire which I used in my 
analysis. 
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It was important to ensure the interview schedule generated useful data. In 
particular, piloting proved very useful in clarifying terminology used. It was 
especially beneficial to hear the language local authority officers use and are 
familiar with. Pilot interviews also identified that officers might not be able to 
discuss each valuation framework for the main project selected, for instance 
because they hadn’t been involved the whole way through, or the project was 
at an early stage. However, piloting revealed interviewees would be able to 
discuss this in relation to other projects which were also being developed. 
The interview schedule was therefore designed to provide the necessary 
flexibility to accommodate this. 
 
Piloting also helped verify the suitability of these data collection methods. For 
instance, piloting confirmed that alternative qualitative data collection 
methods, such as ethnography, were not feasible given energy project 
development timelines. It generally took at least one year for most project 
development, but for larger scale projects this stretched over several years. 
Methods such as ethnography would have created a more partial dataset in 
terms of the trajectory of a project and the types of projects I could 
incorporate. I would have also had to focus on only one or two local authority 
cases, which would have been detrimental to providing an account of how 
local authorities value energy projects, in general terms. Limitations of the 
chosen approach are discussed in Section 4.5. 
Interviewing local authority officers 
Primary data collection involved interviewing local authority officers, exploring 
actual value-making practices within developing energy projects. Interview 
data were used to analyse how each framework operated within negotiations 
about projects, and how each shaped the terms of project development. This 
is an important step because of the expectation that local authority officers 
are likely to be finitist ‘users’ (Barnes, 1995), who bring a degree of 
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interpretative flexibility to negotiating these frameworks in ways that are not 
envisaged by the guidelines reviewed.  
 
Interview data provide a route into local authority officers accounts of these 
processes. Interviewing lends itself to the generation of data about how 
individuals construct social worlds (Mason, 2002) and interviewing offers a 
route into the “meanings people attribute to their experiences and social 
worlds” (Miller & Glassner, 2011, p. 133). Interviews are suited to exploring 
local authority officer accounts of the activities they go through in project 
development, how each valuation framework is involved in progressing 
projects through internal decision making process, when and how they are 
recruited, and what outcomes they shape. 
 
Conducting interviews requires establishing a trusting environment with 
participants (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Creating mutual respect within interviews 
involves listening to interviewees, communicating questions using accessible 
language and style, and using eye contact in face-to-face interviews. 
Interviewees should feel they have had an opportunity to discuss their 
professional history and identity, co-creating the data within interviews, rather 
than viewing interviewees as the ‘vessel-of-answers’ (Holstein & Gubruim, 
2011). Some participants specifically thanked me for taking the time to listen 
to them, highlighting that our interview meeting provided chance to reflect on 
the pressures of working in local government at the time. This reinforces that 
local authority officers have been working under considerable pressure, with 
few opportunities to either ‘take stock’ of the situation, or have their views 
heard. On balance I conclude that our interaction provided a useful space for 
interviewees to explore these tensions and did not aggravate the situation. 
The interview schedule 
I treated interviews as ‘structured conversations’ with questions asked in a 
conversational style that generate rich qualitative material (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005). A semi-structured interview schedule allowed flexibility to tailor each 
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interview according to the direction of individual interviews within the bounds 
of seven pre-defined topics (see Appendix IV). Topics were devised to enable 
questions relevant to both the wider LEUKES research and my PhD’s focus, 
particularly: how the council defines the benefits of local energy initiatives 
and the approach to achieving ‘Best Value’ and value for money in justifying 
council activities; use of a business case within council decision making; and 
the procurement process. 
	
The broader interview schedule covered: the interviewee’s role and 
background; objectives within the approach to energy and carbon 
management; the benefits of local energy, value for money and justifying 
resources for energy; location of the project with council structures, support 
and reporting; outcomes, achievements and challenges over the project 
lifetime; project ownership, business model and financing; and policy 
changes to support delivering an energy strategy. 
 
Aspects of the wider interview are drawn on to contextualise responses to 
value-making in local energy, particularly responses concerning project 
ownership, business model and financing; internal support for the project; 
reporting about the project; and challenges experienced over the course of 
the project lifetime. Interviews were expected to vary according to matters 
such as the ease of conversation (Holstein & Gubruim, 2011), but also 
depending on factors such as the role and specialism of each interviewee, 
the focus on energy within each local authority, and the stage of project 
development. 
 
The schedule was prepared and emailed to participants a week in advance 
(see Appendix IV). Across the 40 local authorities, I conducted 41 interviews: 
25 were face-to-face and 16 were completed by telephone. Two face-to-face 
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interviews (Derby17 and Fife) were conducted at the University of Edinburgh 
because of the availability of the interviewees who were travelling through, 
one took place in a café nearby council offices; the others were all at council 
offices. 
Interviewees 
In total 49 local authority officers were interviewed: 35 were with the lead 
respondent, and 6 were joint interviews with the lead respondent and one or 
two other colleagues. This reflected the specialisms of colleagues and their 
involvement in local energy. In one case (Fife), two separate face-to-face 
interviews were completed, again reflecting interviewees’ specialisms and 
availability to participate. Interviewees were based in various council 
departments: energy services, sustainability, economic development, 
planning, capital investment and finance. This breadth of experience from 
across the council organisation provides a rich set of accounts for analysing 
value-making.  
 
I also conducted an interview with a representative of a Welsh public sector 
intermediary agency. This organisation assisted Welsh local authorities in 
developing energy programmes on their own estates. The purpose of 
including this additional interview was to understand more about how their 
support helped to ‘unlock’ energy project business case development among 
Welsh local authorities. 
 
Face-to-face interviews lasted around 90 minutes; telephone interviews 
generally lasted 60 minutes. Two interviews (Islington and Warrington) 
included a site visit to the relevant energy project. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. One interviewee requested a copy of 
their interview transcript. All participants were also contacted after the 
                                            
17 This interview was also conducted with a colleague. 
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interview thanking them for their contribution and requesting any final 
documentary material. 
 
Interviews took place between December 2015 and July 2016 (following pilot 
interviews in Spring 2015). Data collection for each local authority case took 
between three weeks and seven months to complete. This reflected the time 
taken to organise participation through multiple emails and phone calls, and 
the availability of participants. 
Local authority documents 
Documents underpinning formal council decisions, procurement 
specifications, and business case development were also gathered. These 
documents form an important element of the body of evidence informing 
decisions that shape the eventual scale, organisation and governance of 
projects. 
 
I used these documents in analysing the value of the energy projects and 
exploring each framework in operation. For example, reports submitted to 
council decision bodies (such as Council Executive – see Appendix II) 
include sections about the ‘Implications’ arising from the council activity being 
reviewed. Prior to submission different departments indicate that the contents 
of the report (i.e. the energy project) has a base of support from relevant 
areas of the council. A consideration of Best Value was sometimes 
incorporated within this. These documents also tend to outline the core 
rationale for proceeding with a project. Business case documents include 
important assessments about the value of projects along multiple 
dimensions, but as Chapter 8 shows they vary widely in their construction 
and use. It was hence important to establish whether a ‘business case’ 
document was developed, and to review their contents where they existed. 
Public procurement specifications are online documents that contain 
important information about how the council assess value in the price-to-
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quality ratio and defines each indicator. Collecting this documentary data was 
thus an important step in forming an understanding about how these 
frameworks are drawn into value-making processes. 
	
Gathering business case documents was managed via the LEUKES online 
questionnaire which asked, where applicable, for copies of documents18. The 
questionnaire provided the option to directly upload these or to trigger a 
request via an automated email. Where documents were not provided via the 
online questionnaire, I asked for them at the end of the interview. Copies of 
documents were provided where officers had access to them. As Chapter 8 
explores in more detail, not all projects had a specific business case 
document. 
 
Further documentary sources were obtained directly from council websites, 
especially the documents underpinning formal council decisions which are 
public record and available to download. Sometimes certain confidential 
material is not included in the public document packs. This can mean the 
business case is not always included in full19. Some interviewees however 
were willing to share unpublished financial case documents on a confidential 
basis. Data from documents provided in confidence are not reported within 
this thesis, but I reviewed them to inform the analysis in Chapter 8. 
 
I also viewed public procurement tender advertisements which are available 
online at sites, including: 
• Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) the EU procurement portal  
• Contracts Finder (England) 
• Public Contracts Scotland 
• Sell2Wales 
• eTendersNI  
	
                                            
18 The LEUKES research concerned a wider sets of documents than the scope of my thesis 
investigation. 
19 The Local Government Act 1972 allows councils to remove confidential or exempt information 
from documents of public record. 
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4.5 Limitations  
Research findings from case study and qualitative interview data can be 
difficult to replicate, having been influenced by context and time specific 
factors (Blaikie, 2010). According to Flyvbjerg (2006), one the main criticisms 
directed at case studies is that they contain a ‘bias toward verification’, where 
the method itself facilitates a conforming to the researcher’s world view and 
preconceived expectations. Considering my own position, a theoretical bias 
toward observing ‘economistic’ valuations could manifest in my study. 
 
Flyvbjerg however, notes that bias toward verification is actually a feature of 
all research, and each method has actions to manage it. The case study 
method provides a closeness to the object of study that helps to manage bias 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235). This means there is an ongoing process of testing 
out views, and continuing questioning of my interpretation of the data. 
Considering plausible rival explanations is a key tool to help this testing of 
views and interpretation. Furthermore, cross-case analysis is also likely to 
produce ‘credible results’ (Yin, 2014), because the researcher is less likely to 
be able to exert given biases across multiple cases.	In reviewing options for 
summarising and generalising, I also draw on Bechhofer and Paterson 
(2000, p. 40) who advise: assessing whether the research observations are 
representative; reflecting on the theoretical assumptions of the research; 
other existing research; and, the researcher’s own judgement. 
Respondents 
Case study evidence is also derived from those local authority officers willing 
to participate. From the initial target sample there was a high recruitment 
success rate of almost 80% (40 of 51 local authorities approached). This 
suggests considerable willingness to participate and minimal impact on the 
validity of data. 
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The data also rely on respondents’ accuracy and openness, and their ability 
to discuss both energy projects and the council’s broader approach to 
energy. Partial data of this kind is nevertheless considered a feature of 
empirical research (Benney & Hughes, 1984; Blaikie, 2010; Mason, 2002). 
Techniques used to minimise these limitations include the multi-method 
approach, and triangulating data sources and types which helps build a 
coherent picture across the sources of evidence. Yin (2018) suggests 
approaching the data with the same question. The use of multiple-case 
studies rather than depending on a single or small number also prevents 
over-reliance on any single individual. Where required, possible and feasible, 
I also interviewed multiple officers within a local authority to cover the 
necessary range of topics. This, coupled with the piloting approach described 
in Section 4.4, minimised the potential for gaps in interview data. 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
In developing the research design, ethical considerations were reviewed 
including, participation and confidentiality, consent, data storage, and 
potential for risk or harm arising from the study. 
 
Participation in the research was voluntary and respondents had the right to 
withdraw at any time or to refuse to participate (in line with good practice for 
social research, Creswell, 2013; Ryen, 2011). It was emphasised that the 
Local Authorities taking part would be named in project reporting (such as 
this thesis), but individuals would not be identified unless otherwise agreed 
on a case-by-case basis. All participants names are concealed and 
pseudonyms are used throughout. In instances where commercially or 
otherwise sensitive information was included, the interviewee pseudonym 
was omitted and the local authority was substituted with a code20.  
 
                                            
20 Sensitive data was reported on three occasions across Chapters 5-9 and a code was used in these 
instances. 
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In gaining consent for participation in the LEUKES project, I explained that I 
was a researcher on the project and also completing a part-time PhD in 
which I was using a sub-set of the data for my thesis. Participation, 
confidentiality and consent were discussed and documented in the following 
ways: 
• During recruitment of contributors, a Project Overview (Appendix VI) 
was provided by email that explained information about participation, 
confidentiality, use of data provided and people with access to the 
data. Questions were also fielded during the initial telephone call 
including the type and level of participation involved.  
• Prior to data collection, a Detailed Information document (Appendix 
VII) was provided by email to lead contacts reinforcing participation 
and confidentiality; providing further detail about the specific data 
being gathered, and how; and, explaining data storage and access. 
• Before starting the online questionnaire, respondents viewed a 
statement explaining confidentiality and participation including how to 
withdraw (this was to close the internet browser and inform me by 
email). 
• Before the interview, participants were provided with a personalised 
Interview Schedule (Appendix IV) which explained that I wished to 
record and transcribe the interview. This also detailed that data would 
be stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 
data storage statement provided in the Detailed Information 
document. I also directly asked for consent to record at the beginning 
of each interview. A copy of the transcript was offered to all 
interviewees; one requested a copy, and was provided with it. During 
interview I also explained that interviewees were welcome to identify 
when specific aspects of the discussion were in confidence (such as 
commercial sensitivity) and not to be attributed to their local authority. 
• Before publishing the findings (e.g. Webb et al., 2017) all participants 
were asked for feedback, including the opportunity to anonymise the 
council where quotes were used. In every instance where quotes were 
attributed to a council, participants confirmed they consented to this. 
We provided a copy of our research report to everyone who 
participated and made it available online via a permanent URL: 
https://heatandthecity.org.uk/resource/local-authority-engagement-in-
uk-energy-systems-highlights-from-early-findings/. 
• Contact details were routinely provided so that respondents could 
easily get in touch with me if they had questions. 
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Data handling and protection followed the terms of the Data Protection Act 
1998 (note data were generated in 2015 – 2016, prior to GDPR), and 
University of Edinburgh policies. This included secure storage of online 
questionnaire responses on the Qualtrics-secure database, prior to transfer 
to password protected secure database at the University of Edinburgh. Audio 
recordings, interview transcripts and documents provided by interviewees 
were also safely stored on a password protected database at the University 
of Edinburgh. Audio recordings were permanently deleted from the handheld 
recording device used to record interviews. Appendix VIII contains the data 
use and storage statement that was provided to every participating local 
authority. 
 
Finally, considering the potential for causing harm to researcher and/or 
participants, and risk-taking are important dimensions to ethically conducting 
social research (Ryen, 2011). Causing harm or distress from participation 
was deemed as negligible because participants were not asked to disclose 
personally sensitive information. Interviews focused on their professional, 
expert views on energy projects and strategies in their local authority. Equally 
the potential for reputational damage to the local authority organisation was 
not regarded as a significant issue given the commitment to confidentiality 
discussed above. 
 
Conducting fieldwork was evaluated as low risk. Interviewing did not include 
travel to dangerous locations and interviews took place during normal 
weekday working hours, either over the telephone from University of 
Edinburgh premises, or in person on Council or University premises. In one 
case an interview took place in a café, this was deemed an open public 
space that posed no specific risks. Although travelling alone to interviews can 
pose risks, the LEUKES team were aware of my location and we remained in 
email and telephone contact. I also signed in at local authority offices on 
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arrival to scheduled meetings. It was therefore evaluated this posed no 
greater risk than other forms of UK travel for university business. 
 
Prior to data gathering, I completed the Research and Research Ethics 
Committee Self-Audit Checklist for Level 1 Ethical Review and the following 
statement is made: 
I confirm that I have carried out the School Ethics self-audit in relation to my 
proposed research project on the struggles in assembling value in local authority 
engagement with energy systems and that no reasonably foreseeable ethical risks 
have been identified. 
4.7 Analysing the data 
There is no definitive way of analysing data in case study research. Instead, 
analysis is described as ‘custom-built’ (Creswell, 2013), with ‘few fixed 
formulas or cookbook recipes’ (Yin, 2018). There are however, a menu of 
possibilities and standard procedures, which provide useful guidance and 
some clear options for structuring analysis. For instance, the use of case 
notes, data reduction tools, and constructing tables to classify themes across 
cases (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014), all feed into my analysis. 
 
It is agreed that case study analysis is an iterative process (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Yin, 2014). Creswell (2013, p. 182) describes this as a ‘data analysis spiral’ 
where “the researcher engages in the process of moving in analytic circles 
rather than using a fixed linear approach”. Moving between organising data, 
writing notes, describing cases, developing categories and so on, is thus an 
ongoing back and forth process. 
The role of key concepts and research questions 
Theoretical concepts and research questions informed the structuring of data 
analysis. The goal was to connect theory and empirics: to operationalise 
interest in assembling value into a topic of investigation which could feasibly 
be analysed. Piloting and developing data collection instruments were key 
elements to this, but the role of concepts was also central to the analysis. 
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As Chapter 3 explained, concepts from the economic sociology of valuation 
drove research questions oriented to the co-creation of value. In turn, this 
pointed the focus of analysis toward documenting and exposing how value is 
assembled. Research questions drew the boundaries of analysis around the 
three valuation frameworks selected, and directed the analysis of these 
valuation frameworks toward: understanding how actors, structures and 
instruments came together in project development value-making activities; 
what trade-offs, contestations and struggles emerged in that process; and 
tracing what impact these had on local energy. 
	
Practically, I translated theoretical concepts into analysis as follows. The 
concept of devices (Muniesa et al., 2007) was used to hone in on the 
valuation frameworks and consider them as constituent elements in value-
making, rather than passive objects or instruments. I opted for the term 
‘valuation framework’ because there were also valuation devices within each 
valuation framework. For example, there are specific calculations within the 
business case which I considered potential devices (such as financial 
calculations), and different types of procurement devices (such as framework 
agreements and the tender specification).  
 
Detecting and analysing ‘valuation practices’ drew on argument of ‘valuation 
as a social practice’ that involves work and labour to perform (Helgesson & 
Muniesa, 2013; 2014). This guided me first toward activities in energy project 
development where assessments were being assembled; and second, as 
this work involves different sets of actors, toward the potential for different 
valuations involving the three valuation frameworks. This was complemented 
with the programme of governing argument that political power and control 
(Miller & Rose, 2008), is exercised through (bureaucratic and mundane) 
‘everyday work’ of valuations in public organisations. This guided me toward 
tracing formal assessments and evaluations of energy projects. Furthermore, 
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I used Callon’s (2007) notion of ‘economics in the wild’, to consider that in 
local authority energy (i.e. outside the application of formal economic 
science), these valuation practices could involve economising energy 
projects. 
 
To operationalise that governing and economising processes are malleable 
and contested valuation practices, I applied first the finitism (Barnes, 1995) 
notion that rules concerning a valuation framework are always subject to 
interpretation; and second, the boundary object (Star, 2010) notion that 
valuation frameworks are open to interpretative flexibility. Importantly, this led 
me to consider users interpretations of the valuation frameworks, and how 
they were drawn on by different actors across the council. For example, this 
led me to analyse not only how the business case was constructed, but also 
how contrasting interpretations and decisions were made about it. 
Data organisation and reduction 
I adopted four main elements to organising data: keeping a case book for 
each local authority, as a reference guide and site for notes; creating a 
central database for cross-case examination; developing a central library of 
interview excerpts; and, storing guidelines about each framework. (Secure 
storage is discussed in Section 4.6). 
 
An electronic case folder for each local authority was created within which a 
single case book, and original copies of documents were stored. Documents 
provided by respondents (such as business cases) were kept in a separate 
folder to documents which I accessed from the internet (such as procurement 
specifications). The case book (in Microsoft Word) operated as an activity log 
for storing key information for the individual local authority case, and all of my 
typed notes for that case in a standard format21. This included updates pre- 
                                            
21 The format included sub-headings: local authority name, key contact person and contact details, 
pre-phone call information, initial phone call, energy project selected, interview data, interview 
prep, interview notes, reflections on interview, things to follow up on, other. 
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and post- both the initial telephone call and subsequent interview, as well as 
further reflections and notes after reviewing documents and reading 
transcripts. Having notes in one place for each case allowed me to begin 
generating case descriptions. I also kept a paper folder for each case where I 
stored annotated copies of interview schedules and any other paperwork. 
	
A central case study database (Microsoft Excel) including project type, 
business structure and project stage was used to keep an overview record 
and allow initial high level cross-case examination. Populating this initially 
drew from responses to the online questionnaire. Additional information was 
added iteratively, and captured data about each of the frameworks in a 
summarised form for that case. This included short summary notes for each 
framework from the case book, interview transcript and documents. This 
database was also used to store additional notes and actions, and to assign 
pseudonyms to individual respondents. 
	
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and thematically analysed according to 
each valuation framework. Generally one or more computerised program is 
used to aid qualitative data reduction, though no single approach dominates 
(Blaikie, 2010, p. 210; Creswell, 2013, pp. 201-210; Yin, 2014). Whether a 
computer or paper based approach is taken, Creswell (2013, p. 201) explains 
the underlying process of qualitative analysis is the same, because “the 
researcher, not the computer program, does the coding and categorising”. I 
tested three approaches to aid organising and analysing interview data: first, 
qualitative computer software package NVivo; second, printed paper based 
coding of transcripts; and third, using Microsoft Word computer program. 
Because the LEUKES interviews covered ground beyond the scope of my 
thesis investigation, I found both NVivo and paper based coding less useful 
to my analysis. In particular, initially they took much longer to code compared 
to key word searching, reviewing the area of transcripts around (including 
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before and after key words appeared in the transcript), highlighting text and 
exporting22.  
 
Therefore within the overall series of data reduction activities, I opted to 
create a central library of interview excerpts in a single Microsoft Word 
document. This process included first reading my case book notes, before 
scanning the whole transcript to get a sense of the overarching discussion. 
From this, key areas and specific points were highlighted, and initial codes 
developed. The central library of excerpts was organised by codes (rather 
than cases) and grouped them under overarching themes. Following the 
initial reading of transcripts, key terms were also used to search transcripts23. 
As the thematic analysis developed iteratively, I returned to transcripts and 
notes. This meant adding to the case book, database and central library on 
multiple occasions. 
 
The legislation and guidelines about each framework were downloaded from 
the internet and stored in folders. The content of each document was 
considered as the ‘resource’ (Prior, 2011) and I had specific interest in how 
this content could have meaning for local authority users; in particular, how 
this content might come into ‘being’ (Prior, 2008). This meant that analysis 
focused on the descriptions that defined what each framework was, and the 
instructions about how to construct, apply, and/or use them. For instance, in 
the Best Value Framework legislation and accompanying statutory guidance, 
I was interested in whether there was a hierarchy or prioritisation of certain 
forms of value over others. This content analysis was used to develop an 
analytical description of how each valuation framework was conceived of 
within guidelines. 
                                            
22 It is possible that had I continued with NVivo, it would have become more useful as the analysis 
progressed. 
23 These included: value, benefit, objective, procurement, business case, business model, council 
decision, document, report, cabinet, committee, executive, finance, money. 
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Developing themes 
Description is one of the main forms of data analysis in case study research 
(Creswell, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2014). Descriptive analysis helps to 
identify the main themes arising from each case, for instance by examining 
similarities and differences. In multiple-case studies, themes are analysed 
comparatively across the cases. This cross-case synthesis is considered by 
Yin (2014) as the most important aspect of multiple-case study research.  
 
Description thus played a central role in identifying the dominant and 
peripheral elements of the analytic narrative emerging about valuation 
practices. For example, the narrowing toward short-term financial planning 
within decision making of the business case was a strong theme in the 
struggle in assembling value examined in Chapter 8. Within this there were 
clear and marked contestations about how individual ‘devices’ were pulled 
into this process, and valuation practices across the cases illustrated 
different strategies in response. The cross-case synthesis is hence aided by 
zeroing in through description, and then standing back to generate the 
overarching picture. 
	
Yin (2014) suggests that generating contrasting categories in tables, and 
adding evidence into the different categories is a helpful tool in this multiple-
case analysis process. For example, this is one way of juxtaposing data from 
multiple interviews about tensions and trade-offs between competing 
valuations, and impact in project development. I used this method of analysis 
to categorise different aspects of data for each valuation framework. This 
was then revised over rounds of classifying cases into categories, and 
revising categories and classifications. One example of the outcome of this 
process is my development in Chapter 9 of a typology of the ‘intelligent 
buyer’ in local energy procurement. 
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Writing up the analysis 
Presenting the analysis aimed to convey cross-case synthesis. As such I 
chose not to make extensive use of case write-ups or vignettes (which would 
have been impractical given my use of 40 multiple-case studies). Instead, 
Chapter 5 adopts a mainly descriptive approach in providing an overview of 
the cases. In the remaining empirical chapters, individual cases serve as 
exemplars of cross-case themes. Given my focus on cross-case synthesis of 
valuation practices concerning the three frameworks, I adopted high level 
organisation around the frameworks. This informed choices about how to 
display the analysis across Chapters 5–9: 
 
Analysis in Chapter 5 sketches energy within the local authority organisation, 
introduces the energy projects, and suggests likely areas of tension in energy 
project valuation practices. Interview and online questionnaire data are 
visualised using tables, figures and quotes. 
 
Analysis in Chapter 6 sets out the perspective from legislation and 
government guidance on each valuation framework, and how they are 
imagined to shape valuation practices. Content analysis is presented using 
excerpts. 
 
Analysis in Chapters 7–9 take each valuation framework in turn, teasing out 
the valuation practices involved in negotiating and navigating each 
framework. Interview data most powerfully conveyed tensions in valuations, 
and hence overall I prioritised this in writing up each of these chapters, 
relative to documentary analysis and the online questionnaire. Interview and 
documentary analysis are visualised using quotes and tables; in the 
discussion sections, I also draw on findings from the questionnaire to 
consider the significance of the analysis presented. Different cases also fed 
into each chapter, as appropriate to the key narrative themes. 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter has detailed the methodology and research design used to 
investigate valuation practices in local authority energy. In summary, my 
approach responds to the need for qualitative social science investigation 
into local authority energy initiatives, with a specific focus on valuation 
practices. Informed by economisation, valuation and governing concepts, my 
focus is on how the three valuation frameworks selected structure the 
development of local energy. 
 
Given how little is known about actual valuation practices, I have gathered 
and analysed data about both the intended operation of each valuation 
framework, and what happens in practice. I use the strategic sample of forty 
case studies to build understandings of valuation practices beyond single, or 
a small number of comparative, case studies. This original data gathering 
and analysis contributes new knowledge to social studies of energy. 
 
The empirical chapters commence with an overview of the local authority 





5 Overview of the Local Authority Cases 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the Local Authority case studies 
examined in this thesis. My aim here is two-fold. First, I seek to further build 
the argument about the importance of the governance context within which 
valuation practices for local energy projects take place. In particular, 
focussing on how energy is situated within the organisation. Second, I use 
this chapter to familiarise the reader with the breadth of energy projects and 
business structures underpinning the analysis of value-making in subsequent 
chapters. For example, long-term concession contracts for district energy 
and energy performance contracting for corporate estate retrofit are both 
associated with specific forms of public procurement valuations.  
 
The remainder of this Introduction details where the case study local 
authorities were located. Section 5.2 discusses the marginal status of energy 
within the local authority, relative to statutory services. Section 5.3 introduces 
the different energy projects and the business structures adopted; this 
information is essential for understanding the empirical material discussed in 
Chapters 7–9. Section 5.4 discusses the richness of the case sample for 
analysing valuation practices across a range of local energy projects and 
ownership and contractual models adopted. 
 
The 40 selected cases were a strategic sample that took into account results 
of mapping engagement across the whole UK local authority population 
(Tingey & Webb, 2020a; Webb et al., 2017). Those results showed differing 
levels of local authority energy activity across UK countries, English regions 
and local government structure (see Chapter 2). As a result, my sample of 
English cases used regional clustering (principally Yorkshire and the 
Humber, and Greater London), and included a larger number of metropolitan 
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district boroughs. There were also proportionally more Scottish and Welsh 
local authorities. Figure 5.1 shows the location of the case study authorities. 
	
Figure 5.1 Location of case study local authorities 
Note: Larger dot represents all London case study authorities.  
Aberdeen City Council 
Aberdeenshire Council 
Bath & North East Somerset Council 
Birmingham City Council 
Bridgend County Borough Council 
Bristol City Council 
Calderdale Council 
Cambridge City Council 
Cambridgeshire County Council 
City & County of Swansea 
City of Cardiff Council 
City of Wolverhampton Council 
Derby City Council 
Derry City & Strabane District Council 
Dundee City Council 
Exeter City Council 
Fife Council 
Gateshead Council 
Glasgow City Council 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
Kingston upon Hull City Council 
Leeds City Council 
Leicester City Council 
Leicestershire County Council 
London Borough of Camden 
London Borough of Enfield 
London Borough of Haringey 
London Borough of Islington 
London Borough of Sutton 
Manchester City Council 
Newcastle City Council 
Oxford City Council 
Peterborough City Council 
Plymouth City Council 
Reading Borough Council 
Royal Borough of Greenwich 
Stirling Council 
The City of Edinburgh Council 
Warrington Borough Council 
West Yorkshire Combined Authority 
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5.2 Locating energy within the organisation 
Energy and climate change have a relatively marginal status within the local 
authority organisation, with statutory services given priority at senior levels: 
[In] local government climate change is not a priority, carbon reduction is not a 
priority because… we’re too busy emptying the bins and keeping the streets clean 
and trying to save children at risk, and keep the street lights on and that. And it’s not 
a statutory requirement, it’s not high up on the list. 
Gary, City of Wolverhampton Council 
Conversely, with local energy, “Nobody is holding us to account at all. And 
ultimately it doesn’t matter how interested you are in it, if you’re not being 
held to account it’s going to go down your priority list, sadly” (Louise, 
Warrington). Critically, the lack of accountability for energy meant there were 
no established or consistent routes to value-making. Energy was not well 
understood, or routinely prioritised: 
what you find with energy is it’s not an item for the Director’s table, and it’s full of… 
people that nobody listens to. 
Mark, Peterborough City Council 
who has ownership of energy in a local authority? […] There’s a bill of about 10-12 
million pounds per annum, somebody should have responsibility for that at the 
highest level [… but] there is none of that accountability for things like this in local 
government. 
Trudy, City of Edinburgh Council 
In the absence of a statutory mandate, the value of developing local energy 
projects was uncertain. Thus, the valuation practices examined in this thesis 
surround something that has peripheral status. As a result, it is likely that 
valuation practices will require recruiting and enrolling other actors from 
across the organisation, who may not automatically support energy project 
development. 
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Temporary policy measures offered some routes to value-
making  
Routes to senior management and the corporate agenda were however 
temporarily secured through related policy requirements. Two examples 
noted by officers were the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency 
Scheme (CRC) (UK wide) and National Indicators (England). The CRC was 
established in 2010 and aimed to stimulate investment in energy saving 
measures in high energy users (public and private sector). Officers could use 
this to justify investment in energy projects that reduced the cost to the 
council of their CRC liability. As Hannah (Bath) explained, “that was really 
compelling for a while, we’d got to meet the Carbon Reduction Commitment, 
we’d got to do it.” CRC requirements were reduced over time meaning fewer 
local authorities qualitied24, and was subsequently closed following 
incorporation into the Climate Change Levy (Environment Agency, 2019). 
 
English National Indicators (NIs) were a local government performance 
framework of nearly 200 indicators set by central government. These were in 
place between 2008–2010, and included emission reductions (Dixon & 
Wilson, 2014; Friends of the Earth, 2011). However, NIs were abolished by 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government in 2010 under its new 
‘localism’ agenda (Lowndes & Pratchett, 2012). English local authority 
officers interviewed (including in Bath, Calderdale, Derby and Leicester) had 
a shared perspective on aligning energy and climate change initiatives 
around the NIs for emissions reduction and climate adaptation25. Hannah 
(Bath) emphasised that these NIs made it easy to make the case to senior 
management about investing in carbon saving projects. John (Derby) 
elaborated further, noting that because NIs linked energy projects into the 
Council’s Corporate Plan: “[The] national indicator […] gave you… metrics 
                                            
24 Around 45% of local authorities initially qualified, but this went down to around a third by 2015-16 
(Tingey & Webb, 2020a). 
25 Three National Indicators (NIs) measured progress in relation to climate change: NI85 council 
estate emissions, NI86 for area-based emissions, and NI188 for adaptation. 
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against what you’re doing and you’ve got number crunching and it has to be 
fed into your corporate plan, you know… it helps you.” Policies such as these 
hence created a window of opportunity that enabled energy projects to be 
made valuable within the core functions of the council. Conversely, optional, 
or discretionary energy projects required alternative valuations. 
 
Removal of these policy tools further weakened the status of local energy 
within local government. Energy fell back down the priority list of senior 
managers. As Rob (Calderdale) stated, “They used to have a national 
indicator for CO2 emissions… and they’ve all been dropped. If no one’s 
asking the senior managers these questions, it’s not on their radar as a hot 
issue for the moment.” Combined with lack of a direct statutory mandate, this 
inconsistent policy support means energy is unlikely to be routinely prioritised 
to the extent required to allow larger scale long-term energy projects, which 
may take years to develop. 
A mix of departmental leads and decision making channels 
Reflecting the lack of a mandate for local energy, there was no consistent 
‘home’ for local energy within the council organisational structure. Local 
energy was hosted across different departments and directorates, responded 
to different departmental priorities, and was coordinated under different 
approval groups. Correspondingly, the local stance on the value to be 
derived from energy projects was shaped by a mix of different actors and 
priorities across councils. 
 
Environment and Corporate were the two service areas that officers most 
frequently identified as initiating projects, but also noted were Economic 
Development, Housing, Communities/Place, Planning, and Highways. The 
corporate estate and social housing were also the most frequently cited 
target groups prioritised in the council’s approach to local energy26. 
                                            
26 Officers were asked to select which user groups were prioritised in the council’s approach to local 
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Nevertheless, officers commonly identified multiple areas of the council’s 
work which shaped the strategic approach to energy (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 Areas of the Council that shape the approach to local 
energy  
Multiple Choice question Count 
Corporate estate energy and/or carbon management 29 
Fuel poverty 26 
Climate change 25 
Area/borough-wide energy and/or carbon plan 22 
Economic development 18 
Spatial planning 18 
Waste management 11 
Environmental services 6 
Question response rate 34/40 
Source: LEUKES (2017) questionnaire data. 
  
Different approval groups were thus responsible for different projects, and at 
times, this made it unclear how to progress a project through internal 
decision making channels, “it’s navigating all of [them]… and often you end 
up going up the wrong one and having to go back again to another one and 
so that takes a lot of our time really” (Hannah, Bath). Nevertheless, when a 
project had the status of a ‘major project’ it tended to fall within the category 
of a ‘key decision’ and then typically progressed through either Council 
Executive or Committee (depending on which organisational model was 
being operated) and then Full Council. 
 
However, drawing the boundary around what constituted a major project, and 
thus a key decision, was not clear cut. For instance, Chris (Leicester) 
emphasised that only projects over a certain value (in Leicester, around £1m) 
or with a higher political profile typically fell into category of a key decision. 
Still, it was difficult to define what constituted ‘political profile’ in an energy 
project, “a project of a lesser value that has got a higher profile politically… 
                                            
energy. Corporate estate was identified as a high priority by 25 of 30 responses and social housing 
was a high priority for 18 of 28 responses. By contrast, user groups with lower priority included 
industry and industrial processing (13 of 22 responses) and transport passengers (6 of 15 responses). 
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would [also] be taken because it would be seen as a major project. But it 
would be hard to define exactly what that might be” (Chris, Leicester). Any 
energy project could thus in principle fall within the definition of a key 
decision, given energy is not a statutory responsibility, and therefore any 
allocation of resources could be determined as having a ‘political profile’. As 
this suggests, there was no clear picture across the cases about what 
constituted accountable decision making in energy projects. 
 
Energy strategy and projects also shifted throughout the organisation. For 
example, in Dundee the approach to energy originally emerged from 
Housing. When the Council began developing a corporate approach to 
district heating, which was the basis for then developing a city-wide energy 
strategy, other actors became involved. The Sustainability and Climate 
Change Manager (located within the Office of the Chief Executive) took a co-
lead role with Housing; Estate Management also became more involved at 
that point. This evolution in terms of the ownership of energy within the 
organisation suggests that valuation practices within a council may vary over 
time, as different actors become involved. 
Variable levels of staff resourcing for energy projects 
With no core funding for energy as a service within local authority 
governance, staff resources varied widely, and were dependent on senior 
management commitment. Subsequent resource variability ranged from a 
single project officer to a team of over 20, but not all posts were permanent. 
Generally, but not exclusively, city unitary, metropolitan and London 
authorities had managed to assemble larger teams. Exceptions to this 
included Birmingham and Newcastle city councils, both major UK cities with 
few energy officers. There was also some temporary growth in teams; for 
instance in Bristol, Cambridgeshire, Manchester and Oxford, the councils 
had secured European funding to support a new energy team over a 3-4 year 
period (see Section 5.3). Although these were not permanent roles, the idea 
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was to retain some staff on a long-term basis after the initial grant funding 
ended. 
 
There was however also downsizing or dissolution in other cases, such as in 
Leicester and Swansea. In Leicester the team had shrunk following a 
departmental restructure including into new job sharing roles. In Swansea the 
Sustainable Development team that led the community solar cooperative 
initiative (see Section 5.3) was subsequently disbanded. Another officer 
reported that although there had been some forward momentum in the 
council on energy and climate change, questions were raised by a previous 
Chief Executive about whether they should be involved in any non-statutory 
services at all. This officer described how this Chief Executive was “against 
us… didn’t see why we needed a [climate change] team” (Council Officer, 
LA_18). This combined with a change in the service Director and resulted in 
the gradual downsizing of the team, “it got really uncomfortable for the team. 
And… we started to be eroded, year on year” (Council Officer, LA_18). The 
pattern of staff resourcing was thus one of general uncertainty. Teams 
responsible for energy projects were particularly susceptible to only 
temporary organisational commitment. This is likely to shape the ability of 
project officers to influence value-making in the organisation. Institutional 
memory about the value of local energy is also likely to suffer under such 
precarity. 
The hard-to-reach status: an ‘operational’ energy project 
The struggle to assemble value from energy was made apparent when 
officers reported that projects were prone to stalling and being abandoned. In 
the questionnaire, there were 28 officers who responded to this question. 
Most of them (22) said that energy projects had stalled in recent years, and 
14 said projects had been permanently abandoned. Temporary stalling of 
projects was mostly attributed to issues connected with subsidy regime 
change (and policy changes), and financial issues including budgetary 
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pressures and cuts to funding. These issues were further illustrated during 
interviews. For example, Elizabeth (Greenwich) noted that budget pressures 
extended to the capital programme. In Greenwich they were trying to secure 
funding to complete integrated energy retrofit (external insulation, communal 
heating, double glazing) and housing upgrades (new kitchens, bathrooms 
etc) across the social housing estate. Elizabeth explained finding it difficult to 
secure finance from the Council’s housing investment programme, “the 
question is that with all of the pressure on the capital programme… it’s going 
to be more challenging to bring about these large scale works.” Budgetary 
pressures such as these are further explored in Chapter 8. 
 
Associated financial issues noted were staffing levels, building stock 
rationalisation and the financial climate not being supportive for investment in 
medium- to long-term initiatives. Fewer respondents noted issues including: 
internal organisational support; lack of technical energy knowledge; issues 
with obtaining planning consents; and legal costs.  
 
Similar reasons were cited for permanently abandoning initiatives. 
Respondents also said that grid constraints, building rationalisation and 
issues with commercial negotiations had been causal factors, but these were 
raised less frequently. One project was also abandoned because of public 
opposition to ground mounted solar PV. In this case (LA_14), the council had 
tried to build a solar farm on council owned land that was opposed and finally 
abandoned at a cost of around £3 million. Partly due to concerns over the 
failure of the proposal, this council chose not to publicise the internal council 
estate work and instead focussed more on promoting their community and 
civic orientated energy work. 
 
The uncertain status of local energy in the organisation meant energy 
projects thus emerged ad hoc where there was commitment to clean energy 
as a valuable component of core services, including having staff resourced to 
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work on project development and an opportunities to assemble the finance. 
As a consequence, there was no dependable trajectory for energy projects. 
5.3 Local energy projects and business structures 
The energy projects discussed in subsequent chapters encompass a wide 
range of heat, electricity, energy efficiency and other energy provision and 
innovation projects. As Chapter 3 uncovered, previous sociological studies 
suggest that as a valuation device, the business model has no one specific 
definition or stable form (Doganova & Eyquem-Renault, 2009; Doganova & 
Muniesa, 2015). The term business structure is used here to describe the 
arrangement for managing the energy project. Business structures adopted 
were diverse, spanning in-house, energy performance contract models, 
municipally owned energy businesses, independent third sector 
organisations, and private sector-led companies. From the perspective of a 
valuation practice, assessing options for, and adoption of, a business 
structure (which involve different financing and procurement arrangements) 
are interconnected and mutually reinforce each other; this is explored in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Furthermore, the ownership arrangements under distinct business structures 
entail negotiating different public, third and private sector organisations within 
energy project valuation practices. Table 5.2 provides a full list of projects, 
identifying project stage and type, business structure, capital expenditure and 




Table 5.2 Key features of the energy projects  

































Municipal In-house Under 
£1m 
budgets; grants 
Bath & North 
East Somerset 
Council 
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Municipal In-house £1-£5m - 
City of Cardiff 
Council 





















Ram Energy Development Local energy 
tariff 








Municipal In-house £1-£5m budgets; borrowing; 
grants 
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Business structure Capex1  Funding sources2 
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Local Third Sector 
Business 
£5-10m borrowing; grants; 
third party equity; 















Winter Watch Operational Domestic 
retrofit 











Municipal In-house £10-15m budgets 





decision not made - - 




decision not made £15-20m grants; city deal 
The City of 
Edinburgh 
Council 
































n/a - - 
 
1 range, actual or planned 
2 actual or planned 
3 This project is not reported in the rest of the chapter to avoid double counting (the Leeds HN was 
also examined from the perspective of West Yorkshire Combined Authority – as a supporting actor to 
Leeds City Council). 
 
The majority of projects in this study – around two thirds – were either 
operational (24) or in the build/construction phase (9). The remaining third 
were in procurement (5), development (7), or feasibility or initial scoping 
stages (7). As Table 5.3 below shows, this meant the decision on the 
business structure had been made in most cases. My discussions with 
officers necessarily reflected the different stages projects were at. The 




Table 5.3 Energy project business structures adopted 




Biomass boilers, CHP, communal gas boilers, 
double glazing, external wall insulation, heat 
networks1, LED street lighting, small scale 
hydropower, solar thermal, solar PV, thermal 
storage 22  
Energy Performance Contract BEMS, biomass boilers, CHP, LED lighting, solar PV  9 
Municipal District Energy 
Company CHP, heat networks1, thermal storage 4 
Local Third Sector Business 
CHP, heat networks, small scale hydropower, 
solar PV  5 
Private Sector-led District 
Energy Concession Contract CHP, heat networks 3 
Licensed energy supply co n/a 1 
White Label local energy tariff n/a 1 
Demonstrators and pilots 
Heat pumps, smart grid simulation, range of near 
to market technologies e.g. roll out solar PV, 
sewerage heat extraction 3 
Decision not yet made Heat networks, urban wind turbines (feasibility) 4 
Total 52 
1 In four heat network projects this included (actual or planned) heat offtake from energy from 
waste plant (Enfield, Leeds, Sutton), and/or use of landfill gas capture (Fife, Sutton). 
 
Municipal in-house: 22 energy projects 
For the in-house council-led business structure the local authority internally 
retained full responsibility for the energy project. The largest proportion of 
projects were directly managed in-house and the majority of project types 
were represented in this group (Table 5.3). Energy projects covered the full 
range in terms of scale. For example Reading Council’s Winter Watch fuel 
poverty project was smaller scale. This project was concerned with energy 
vulnerability and provided emergency heating to approximately 200 residents 
per annum. Residents were supported with emergency heating repairs, 
access to boiler replacement, small insulation jobs, and income maximisation 
through benefit checks. Larger scale project (£20 million plus capital 
expenditure) examples include the whole street lighting replacement and 
LED upgrade project in Calderdale, and a new major district heating network 
in Leeds. This included connecting to an energy from waste facility and 
providing heating to around 2000 social housing residents; a second phase 
involved extending to the city centre (see Tingey & Webb, 2020b). 
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Energy performance contracts: 9 projects 
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) is a distinctive model for retrofit on 
an estate-wide basis, based on a ‘guaranteed savings’ contract structure. 
Under an EPC, an energy services company is contracted by the local 
authority to install a variety of energy efficiency, building management 
systems, and sometimes renewable and low carbon energy generation (such 
as solar PV, biomass boilers and CHP). Each contract provides a specified 
level of guaranteed savings (energy or financial), usually no more than 20%: 
if the contractor failed to deliver they cover the shortfall, where savings from 
installed measures exceed the contract, they are split between the contractor 
and local authority (Tingey et al., in preparation). 
 
The savings are intended to allow local authorities to pay for energy 
efficiency upgrades on a spend-to-save basis, where capital costs and other 
project costs (such as maintenance, monitoring and verification) are repaid 
through energy cost reductions and new income from renewable subsidy 
payments and/or grid export. The contract had pre-agreed terms, with some 
adaptability to local circumstances, such as: level of agreed saving; the level 
of supplier input into project design; maintenance contract options; and 
payback periods. Buildings tended to be packaged together initially by 
councils to avoid the risk of a contractor ‘cherry picking’ only the easiest 
upgrades, though selection of buildings was subject to review. 
 
To reduce public procurement time and cost, local authorities commonly 
used an OJEU compliant framework agreement (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4) 
to appoint a contractor through a ‘mini-competition’ between pre-approved 
suppliers. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 9. 
 
EPC projects in the case sample were diverse, ranging from upgrading of a 
small number (under 10) of corporate buildings such as in Hull and 
Edinburgh, through to Cambridgeshire County Council which used the 
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flexibility within the EPC to develop a project pipeline of £20 million. This was 
the Council’s ‘Milly’ project, an Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE) Mobilising 
Local Energy Investment (MLEI) initiative,27 which ran from 2012-2016. This 
included a large 12MW solar farm, and retrofit of 30 county council buildings, 
including 22 schools. Further to this, Cambridgeshire also made their EPC 
project available to neighbouring local authorities, by naming them as project 
sponsors when procuring the EPC contractor (see Chapter 9). 
Municipal district energy company: 4 projects 
Municipal district energy companies were independent companies (limited by 
guarantee or shares) established, and wholly owned by the local authority, to 
build and operate district energy. This business structure aimed to provide 
long term coordination and continuity of district energy development, and a 
defined role for the council in shaping the remit and scope. 
 
Under this business structure, councils set-up ownership of the energy 
assets differently. For example, Gateshead District Energy Company was 
responsible for billing customers (a mix of public, private and domestic with 
either heat and power, or heat only), but the Council retained ownership of 
the network and energy centre (which consisted of CHP and large thermal 
storage) assets on the balance sheet, and provided staff to run the business 
via a service level agreement. Conversely in Enfield, Energetik (the trading 
name of Lee Valley Heat Network Operating Company Ltd) had a two tier 
ownership structure with a holding company and an operating company. 
Several satellite networks were being developed, with the first becoming 
operational in 2017. The main network was scheduled at Meridian Water, a 
large urban redevelopment site (of more than 10,000 new homes) which has 
a long term build programme into the 2020s. The Meridian network intends to 
utilise heat from the new energy from waste plant at Edmonton Park (due to 
                                            
27 This funding stream was used to support the teams in Cambridgeshire County Council and Oxford 
City Council; a large sister scheme ‘Elena’ run by the European Investment Bank supported projects 
examined in Bristol and Manchester (for elaboration see Tingey & Webb, 2020b). 
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be operational in 2025), via a heat supply agreement with the North London 
Waste Authority. 
Local third sector business: 5 energy projects 
Independent third sector structures were developed for community owned 
renewables and district energy. The community owned renewables were 
energy cooperatives and social enterprises formed as Community Benefit 
Society (Bath, Plymouth and Swansea) and Industrial & Provident Society 
structures and Community Interest Company (Oxford), and included the use 
of subsidiary ownership structures for some renewable assets. For district 
energy, Aberdeen Heat and Power Ltd was established by the council as a 
not-for-profit company limited by guarantee: Aberdeen City Council is one of 
five members and thus does not have majority decision making power. 
 
In Aberdeen, Plymouth, and Swansea, the local authority was instrumental in 
establishing these organisations; in Oxford and Bath the councils supported 
their establishment. Aberdeen Heat and Power was the oldest, having been 
established in 2002. It has developed district energy networks over time to 
serve multi-storey social housing blocks, sheltered accommodation and 
public buildings across the city.  
 
Newer organisations were established in the 2010s but emerged with 
different trajectories. For example, Plymouth Council’s co-operative agenda 
included establishing Plymouth Energy Community (PEC) as an independent 
community organisation. They provided grant and loan financing, and 
rooftops for solar PV across 30 buildings and a solar farm. Council staff were 
involved in day-to-day running of PEC through a service level agreement. 
PEC also offered an energy advice service, and access to a wall insulation 
and boiler replacement service. Conversely, in Oxford, the council partnered 
with the Oxford Low Carbon Hub as part of OxFutures (2012-2016), an EU 
funded IEE-MLEI project (the same used by Cambridgeshire in the EPC 
 121 
section). This funded staff and development costs to deliver a pipeline of low 
carbon projects; grant conditions required projects met a combined capital 
investment value of £15 million. The Low Carbon Hub was ineligible to apply 
for IEE-MLEI funding and instead the City Council took the lead role. Solar 
PV was installed on a range of council (city and shire), commercial and 
domestic rooftops, Osney Lock hydropower scheme was established, and a 
small energy efficiency retrofit of 100 homes was completed. 
Private sector-led district energy concession contract: 3 
projects 
Long-term concession contracts were awarded to private sector companies 
who then had responsibility to finance, build, own and operate district energy. 
In these cases, the local authority had no direct responsibility for the district 
energy networks per se, and was instead the paying customer. In two 
projects a commercial Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was established, 
Birmingham District Energy Company Ltd and Leicester District Energy 
Company Ltd. In the SPV model, a new company limited by shares was 
established as a subsidiary of the private sector parent company. 
 
In Newcastle a Joint Venture (JV) was being set-up to run the concession 
contract (being procured at time of data collection). In the JV, the council 
intended to have a partial ownership stake (and contribute financing) with 
some ongoing control and responsibility for the networks. 
 
The duration of these concession contracts lasted for 25-40 years. The 
private sector partner recovered investment from long term guaranteed 
energy sales to the council and other customers including universities, 
hospitals and social housing tenants. Responsibility for upfront capital 
investment was allocated to the concession holder, although an initial 
financial contribution was part of contract terms. Both the SPV and JV limit 
financial risk to the parent company (and to the local authority in the JV). 
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Chapter 9 explores attempts to secure local value from energy delivered 
under this business structure. 
Licensed energy supply company: 1 project 
Bristol Energy, owned by Bristol City Council began trading in 2015 as a fully 
licensed gas and electricity supply company serving around 80,000 
customers across Britain. 
White label local energy tariff: 1 project 
A white label is where the local authority established a local energy tariff 
without setting up a fully licensed energy supply company. The white label 
involves partnering with a licensed supplier who provides the back office 
functions and complies with licensed energy supply regulations. A local tariff 
is then offered to a specified area (i.e. Derbyshire) or group of people (such 
as social housing tenants). Derby City Council used this structure to establish 
Ram Energy, a local energy tariff that partnered with not-for-profit municipal 
energy supplier Robin Hood Energy Ltd (owned by Nottingham City Council). 
Demonstrators and pilots: 3 energy projects 
Finally, the sample includes pilot and demonstrator projects of varied scale 
and focus. The council played different roles in each project, but all were 
reliant on external grant funding (InnovateUK in Wolverhampton), public 
sector funding rebates (Greater London Authority in Haringey), or project 
sponsor funding (Japanese R&D agency in Greater Manchester). 
 
Nedo Smart Communities was a £20 million domestic energy efficiency and 
demand side response demonstrator in Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority. Around 600 households received air source heat pumps, which 
were installed alongside technologies to test aggregation and flexible shifting 
of demand. Small scale insulation upgrades were completed where needed 
to install the heat pumps. The project involved three housing providers 
(Northwards Housing, Six Towns Housing and Wigan and Leigh Housing) 
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and two Japanese heat pump manufacturers (Daikin and Hitachi) with 
investment from the Japanese R&D agency New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development Organisation (NEDO). 
 
Low Carbon Innovation Hub was a “hands on ‘dating agency’” (Ian, 
Haringey), piloted by Haringey council during 2015-16. The project tested out 
how to improve sourcing and uptake of low carbon energy technologies in 
construction and buildings, particularly among property developers and 
building owners (including local authorities and social landlords) within the 
local area. Local organisations were invited to join the Innovation Hub as 
potential buyers or demonstrators of new technologies. The project worked to 
bring this group together with technology developers or suppliers to facilitate 
partnerships for demonstration sites for near to market technologies. 
 
Optimising Regional Clusters of Smart Energy Networks was an Innovate UK 
funded local smart grids pilot project. Wolverhampton City Council was a 
partner. The study explored management of electricity demand at 
substations in Wolverhampton to test the feasibility of distributed control of 
electricity networks, using network simulation and a prototype demand 
management algorithm. The longer-term aim was to develop a smart grid 
demonstration site enabling local demand management, storage, trading and 
distribution; a substation adjacent to a future site of 150 new homes was 
identified. 
Financing the energy projects 
Through the questionnaire it was possible to gather estimated capital 
expenditure costs on 37 of the energy projects. This data provided a total 
estimated capital expenditure of around £356 million, with a significant range 
from £10,000 to £47m (median £4.6 million; mean £9.6 million). The largest 
(projected) capital expenditure in this data was for Bridgend’s town centre 
district energy network, which planned to serve around 10,000 domestic, 
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public and private sector buildings when fully built. However, the project was 
at feasibility stage when data were collected so this could change. The 
smallest capital expenditure was for Reading Council’s Winter Watch fuel 
poverty initiative which provided emergency winter heating to vulnerable 
residents. 
 
Projects over £10 million capex usually included heat network infrastructure, 
but also projects such as Calderdale’s LED street lighting upgrade and the 
Greater Manchester’s heat pump demonstrator in 600 homes. Projects under 
£5 million included local renewable electricity projects, some smaller heat 
networks and most Energy Performance Contracting improvements to 
corporate estates. This range of capital expenditure costs provides scope to 
explore whether valuation practices are shaped by the scale of the project. 
For example, negotiation of the business case could be dependent on the 
size of the project. Chapter 8 will consider how this interacts with how 
projects proceed through assembly and assessment of the business case. 
 
Sources of finance were obtained for 35 projects. Table 6.2 notes the 
sources of finance where this data were available. Councils typically 
combined multiple sources of public funding across council budgets, public 
borrowing (such as low interest Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) and 
interest free Salix Finance) and grant funding. There were also third party 
contributions from member share offers in community owned renewables, 
and a non-UK research and development agency in the large scale heat 
pump demonstrator in Greater Manchester. Commercial partner contributions 
were included in projects such as the private sector-led district energy 
concession contracts (Birmingham, Leicester and Newcastle). 
 
These different funding sources could shape energy project valuation 
practices. For example, councils could take different stances evaluating the 
use of public borrowing such as from the PWLB. Co-investing with members 
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in an energy cooperative could become implicated in concerns over State 
Aid. State Aid regulations (see e.g. Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 2015), aim to prevent unfair advantage being given to certain ‘market 
actors’ through preferential treatment from public agencies (such as an 
interest rate on a loan that is lower than what is available in the market). 
Equally, projects which were mostly grant funded may be subjected to less 
formal evaluation of the business case, or conversely may be required to 
conform to funders requirements. Chapter 8 will explore how such factors 
impinge on valuation practices associated with the business case in more 
detail. 
5.4 Discussion: implications for value-making 
from local energy  
This chapter has set out the organisational context within which energy 
project valuations take place. I have emphasised the marginal status of 
energy relative to core council priorities. The chapter has illustrated that 
energy is poorly institutionalised within the local authority organisation as a 
whole; it is liable to slip down the corporate agenda. Varied departmental 
responsibilities, lack of consistent policy support, and unclear routes to senior 
management were key inter-related themes. Within this context, numerous 
energy projects were susceptible to never quite materialising. There was 
recycling and rework to get some projects back into active development. 
However, some were abandoned. This suggests that there are unlikely to be 
clear routes for value-making in local energy within local authorities. A 
particularly critical interpretation is that a lack of any central legitimacy means 
that energy has little-to-no value within the local authority. 
 
This overarching picture however, makes the energy projects studied 
particularly interesting. Despite this organisational context, a diverse range of 
energy projects under a variety of innovative business structures have 
materialised. If energy projects do not routinely progress, how has the 
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struggle to assemble value been tackled and overcome in this diverse group 
of projects? What has allowed these projects to become valuable to the local 
authority? 
 
Subsequent chapters take this forward. This overview of cases indicates that 
energy projects may have to be translated into standardised valuations which 
multiple actors across the council can interpret and support. It also suggests 
that the case for why resources should be allocated to energy is critical. Lack 
of consistent senior management support also hints that valuations may be 
contested by different actors across the council, who could perceive energy 
as either more or less relevant to their service area. The different ownership, 
contractual and procurement models involved invite building a broad picture 
of what happens to the energy project as it is put through established council 
valuations. The next chapter details the three valuation frameworks 
examined in this thesis. The contemporary programme of governing obliges 














In Chapter 3 I advanced the proposition that how local authority energy 
projects are valued has consequences for local energy systems 
development. This claim directs my empirical focus toward the analysis of 
valuation frameworks implicated in assembling value from energy projects. 
This chapter introduces the three valuation frameworks selected for 
investigation within local authority value-making processes: the Best Value 
Framework, the Business Case model and Public Procurement. The 
remainder of the Introduction explains the rationale for selecting these three 
frameworks. Sections 6.2 – 6.4 introduce the key guidelines of each 
valuation framework. Section 6.5 discusses these as constituent components 
of a ‘valuation practice’ in energy project development. 
 
Within energy project development, valuations are likely to emerge at various 








1 For example, for energy performance contracts using a multiple supplier procurement framework 
agreement this includes using an ‘invitation to mini-competition’, shortlisting from proposals, 
development of investment grade proposals for selected buildings, and entering into contract. 
2 For replacement kit etc. 
3 Of future options, refinancing, spin outs etc. 
 
 
The three valuation frameworks selected for detailed examination emerged 
as prominent throughout my data. In different ways they each impinged on 
the eventual scale and form of local energy provision. Officers also 
interpreted them differently, which suggested there was merit in analysing 
them in more detail. 
 
This rationale was combined with four insights from the conceptual 
framework introduced in Chapter 3 to guide my selection. First, the emphasis 
placed on the potential significance of the programme of governing for 
dimensions of valuation (Miller, 2008). This pointed attention toward 
externally imposed frameworks which formally attempt to structure and 
standardise decision processes within project development as part of the 
‘everyday’ work (Miller & Power, 2013) of local government. Second, the 
likely importance of economising processes within valuations. This prioritised 
frameworks that were likely instances of ‘economics in the wild’ (Callon, 
Initial scoping Feasibility Design/ Development Procurement
Build/ 
Construction Operational
Strategic outline case 
Technical studies 
Outline business case 
Full technical design 
Business model & legal 
Financial viability 














2007), and thus contained economic rationales. Third, the significance of 
‘obligatory passage points’ (Law & Callon, 1994), directed focus to valuation 
frameworks involved at critical junctures within project development. In 
particular, I was interested in valuations that required officers to enrol and 
mobilise other actors within the council in order for the project to proceed. 
This pointed toward frameworks prior to operational stage. The notion of 
obligatory passage points within project development thus made a project’s 
key performance indicators less central to this investigation. Fourth, the idea 
that valuation ‘devices’ are active in shaping the value of local energy implied 
that a variety of potential devices at different scales could shape the value of 
local energy. Therefore this led to an interest in devices ranging from 
individual calculations up to overarching governance embedded in legislation 
and codes of practice. To capture such diversity, devices representing this 
range were prioritised. 
 
The three frameworks selected meet these criteria as follows. The Best 
Value Framework forms a core component of the core local authority 
governance as an overarching objective. Local authority performance in 
securing ‘best value’ is also audited. Best Value can be considered as a 
potential instance of ‘economics in the wild’ owing to its inclusion of both 
‘cost’ and ‘quality’ concepts which spans service organisation, but also 
specifically in procurement (as explained in Section 6.2). Best Value thus has 
the potential to be implicated in the obligatory passage points of formal 
council decision making structures throughout project development stages; 
and, specifically in local energy procurement where local authorities assess 
tenders. Finally, the Best Value Framework represented a valuation device 
embedded in legislation and codes of practice which are intended to have 




The ‘business case’ is recommended by Government as the correct device 
for guiding decisions about capital investment projects like those discussed 
here (see Section 6.3). The business case is considered an instance of 
‘economics in the wild’ because it includes techno-economic appraisal of the 
costs and benefits of projects, including construction of an economic and a 
financial assessment. It is one of the critical obligatory passage points in 
energy projects involving capital expenditure. Failure to converge on 
approving the business case has potential to result in a project stalling, being 
scaled down, re-designed, or even being shelved. 
 
Public procurement is a highly economised valuation system governing 
significant areas of local authority revenue and capital budgets. It is designed 
to promote economic efficiency across the single market (as covered in 
Section 6.4). As a key obligatory passage point in energy project 
development, procurement involves the local authority configure an 
‘intelligent buyer’ to issue tenders, evaluate bidders and negotiate contracts. 
As a valuation device, procurement is varied. It depends on the nature of an 
individual procurement process, spanning the minute detail of establishing a 
price-to-quality ratio within a specification, through to the overall type of 
procurement adopted. 
 
The selected three valuation frameworks thus represent a variety of valuation 
devices at different scales and points in project development, whilst meeting 
all the essential criteria outlined above. The Best Value Framework is the 
overarching device, and both the business case, as a form of options 
appraisal, and public procurement can be used to demonstrate that the Best 
Value Framework has been applied in valuation practices (as explored in 
Chapter 7). Negotiating each valuation framework across project 
development is thus expected to have consequences for energy systems 
development. This is expected to materialise across the size and scale of 
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energy projects; their ownership and ongoing operation; and even potentially 
contributing to abandoning a local project all together. 
 
The key rules, procedures and guidelines of each valuation framework are 
now introduced in turn. Attention is paid to how rules are expected to be 
applied and what levels and types of user discretion are anticipated. Table 
6.1 summaries the key legislation, regulations and guidelines reviewed. 
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Table 6.1 Valuation framework guidelines 
Type Coverage Author Year Title Description 





UK Parliament 1999 Local Government Act 1999 (as amended) 
Legislation introducing the Best Value Framework in 
England & Wales. 
Scotland 
Scottish Parliament 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 
Legislation introducing the Best Value Framework in 
Scotland. 
Wales 
National Assembly for 
Wales 2009 Local Government (Wales) Measure Act 2009 
Legislation repealing Local Government Act 1999 in Wales, 





Local Government (Best Value) Act (Northern 
Ireland) 2002 
Legislation introducing the Best Value Framework in 
Northern Ireland. 
2014 Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 
Legislation repealing the 2002 Act, & renaming to a 




DCLG1 2011 Best Value Statutory Guidance 
Issued by UK Gov. after repealing 2008 statutory guidance. 
Emphasis on procurement & social value. 
DCLG 2015 Revised Best Value Statutory Guidance 





Scottish Executive 2004 
The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003: 
Best Value Guidance Accompanying 2003 Act on the 'Duty of Best Value'. 
Wales 
Welsh Gov. 2010 
Wales Programme for Improvement: Part 1 Local 
Government Improvement 
Accompanying 2009 Act on the 'general duty of 
Improvement' (the renaming of Best Value). 
N. Ireland 
DoE LG Policy Division2 2015 
Statutory guidance for operation of community 
planning: Local government circular 28/2015 
Accompanying guidance to the 2014 Act on the community 
planning & 'duty of continuous Improvement'. 





UK UK Treasury 
2011 The Green Book 
Main guidance for ‘5 case model’ of business case. Focus 
on cost-benefit analysis. Primarily aimed at those 
constructing business case (i.e. not decision makers). 
Mandatory in central government departments; 
recommended guidance across public sector. 
2013 
Assessing Business Cases ‘A Short Plain English 
Guide’ 
Issued to decision makers on how to appraise a business 
case to deliver 'value for money'. 
2013 Checklist for Assessment of Business Cases 
Short 'checklist' outlining key steps in constructing & 
assessing business case. 
2015 
Public Sector Business Cases Using the Five Case 
Model: Green Book Supplementary Guidance on 
Delivering Public Value from Spending 
Proposals3 
‘Step-by-step’ guide to the ‘5 case model’. Recommended 
to ‘to all who are concerned with delivering best public 
value from capital spending decisions’. 
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Type Coverage Author Year Title Description 
2015 
Valuing infrastructure spend: Supplementary 
guidance to the Green Book4 
Business case evaluation for infrastructure. Includes 
concept of 'passive provision' for district heating networks. 
England 
UK Treasury, Public 
Service 
Transformation 
Network, & New 
Economy (GMCA)5 2014 
Supporting public service transformation: cost 
benefit analysis guidance for local partnerships 
(Mandatory) guidance for LAs with devolved ‘City Deal’ 
budgets on cost-benefit analysis/business case. 
Scotland 
SFT6 on behalf of 
Scottish Gov. 2011 
Value for Money Assessment Guidance: Capital 
Programmes and Projects 
(Mandatory) guidance for evaluating business cases for all 
capital programmes & projects by Scottish public bodies. 
UK Treasury Green Book is underlying guidance of this 







Council of the 
European Union  2004 
Council directive 2004/18/EC on public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public 




Office of the European 
Union 2015 
Rules on public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts 





Ireland UK Parliament 2006 Public Contracts Regulations 2006 Statutory instrument transposing EU Directive 2004/18/EC. 
Scotland Scottish Parliament 2006 Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006  Statutory instrument transposing EU Directive 2004/18/EC. 
1 UK Department for Communities & Local Government 
2 Northern Ireland Department of the Environment Local Government Policy Division 
4,5 Documents issued as part of a series of 'supplementary' guidance on business case evaluation. 
5 Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
6 Scottish Futures Trust
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6.2 The Best Value Framework 
As introduced in Chapter 2, the Best Value Framework was a major reform of 
local government in the late 1990s focussed on improving public services. It 
formally replaced the Compulsive Competitive Tendering procurement model 
of local government, which had stipulated that councils organise local 
services on the basis of the lowest cost supplier28. A ‘duty of Best Value’ was 
brought in which opposed to lowest cost, instead prioritised securing 
‘continuous improvement’ in local services. This led to new programme of 
organisational service reviews and auditing to determine if there was a 
rationale for outsourcing. Outsourcing was only conducted when this review 
determined that there was a case for doing so. The evaluation of how 
services should be organised, and the need for public procurement (when it 
went ahead), was based on ‘cost’ and ‘quality’ criteria. Quality was defined 
by local authorities themselves in relation to social, environmental and/or 
economic values. Performance metrics were also used to audit evidence of 
‘continuous improvement’ in local services. 
 
There have been considerable changes to how Best Value is governed since 
its introduction. Statutory legislation and guidance in place at the time of data 
collection, as relevant to local energy projects,29 is detailed below. 
 
What has remained stable across the reforms and across the UK is that Best 
Value governs local authorities through statutory legislation concerned with 
‘continuous improvement’ in operation of council public services. There are 
subtle differences across UK and devolved government approaches to Best 
Value, but ‘economy’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ – i.e. the general 
concept of value for money in public spending (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3) – 
                                            
28 Beyond some minimum standards, the quality of the contractor or service they would provide was 
not considered under Compulsive Competitive Tendering. 
29 For example, reform in 2010 in England repealed issues relating to workforce matters. Issues like 
these are not reviewed here. 
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all materialise. Consistency is also given to Best Value relating both to the 
exercise of direct council services – its statutory powers and duties – such as 
education or waste management, and to the activities which support these 
functions (i.e. corporate functions), like financial management, property 
disposal and public procurement. Options appraisal through business case 
evaluation and procurement strategies are both valuation practices through 
which councils demonstrate securing ‘best value’ in local public services. The 
Best Value Duty, therefore, is a legal obligation that in principle impacts on all 
council activities and decisions, including those in energy project 
development. All councils are expected to have internal scrutiny 
arrangements for organisational governance including securing best value. 
Best Value legislation and guidance 
The ‘general duty of Best Value’ was defined in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland as: 
A best value authority must make arrangements to secure continuous improvement 
in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
Local Government Act 1999, s3(1) 
There was different legislation in Scotland, and as noted in Table 6.1, also 
since 2009 in Wales and since 2014 in Northern Ireland. In defining the 
general duty economy, efficiency and effectiveness were all maintained, and 
hence continued to bind the general duty closely to the public sector audit 
concept of value for money. In addition, there were a wider set of similar 
value concepts: equal opportunities and sustainable development in 
Scotland; and fairness, sustainability and innovation in Wales and Northern 
Ireland30. As much broader value concepts, potentially these are more 
inclusive. Whether they sufficiently diversify value away from the audit notion 
                                            
30 Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, s1; Local Government (Wales) Measure Act 2009, s2; Local 
Government Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, s84. 
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of value for money in unclear at this stage. Examining guidance provides 
some preliminary answers. 
 
In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland statutory guidance had been in 
place since 2004, 2010 and 2015 respectively (Department of the 
Environment, 2015; Scottish Executive, 2004; Welsh Government, 2010). 
These all emphasised a link to community planning and well-being. Scottish 
and Welsh guidance specifically noted contribution to ‘sustainable 
development’; as one of 10 themes of Best Value in Scottish guidance, and 
one of a series of “fundamental principles” in Welsh guidance. Scottish 
guidance notes sustainable development as having a balanced view on 
economic, environmental and social well-being “both in the shorter and 
longer term” (Scottish Executive, 2004, p. 21). Best Value reviews in 
Scotland were also required to “take account of sustainability issues and 
assess the impact of policy proposals on sustainable development” (ibid). 
Sustainable development was also integrated into procurement. The 
“fundamental principles” introduced in Welsh guidance expanded the 
definition of ‘continuous improvement’: 
This is no longer limited to economy, efficiency and effectiveness, but rather 
embraces the following: making progress towards an authority’s strategic objectives 
(as set out in its community strategy); improving the quality of services; improving 
the availability of services; improving fairness by reducing inequality in accessing or 
benefiting from services, or improving the social wellbeing of citizens and 
communities; exercising functions in ways which contribute to sustainable 
development; improving the efficiency of services and functions; innovation and 
change which contributes to any of the above objectives. 
Wales Programme for Improvement, Welsh Government, 2010, p. 6 
English Best Value Statutory Guidance (UK Department for Communities 
and Local Government (DCLG), 2011) issued in 2011 similarly reinforces the 
general duty. The entire 2008 statutory guidance Creating Strong, Safe and 
Prosperous Communities (UK Government, 2008) was repealed. The 2011 
guidance was much shorter (2 pages; whilst the previous guidance was 56 
pages). In particular, the 2011 guidance placed emphasis on social value, 
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and gave further explanation of the interpretation of social value within Best 
Value. This made the explicit linking of social value as an “additional benefit” 
of public procurement: 
Under the Duty of Best Value, therefore, authorities should consider overall value, 
including economic, environmental and social value, when reviewing service 
provision. As a concept, social value is about seeking to maximise the additional 
benefit that can be created by procuring or commissioning goods and services, 
above and beyond the benefit of merely the goods and services themselves. 
Best Value Statutory Guidance, DCLG, 2011, paragraph 2 
In 2015, further statutory guidance (DCLG, 2015) was issued. This further 
emphasised the importance of the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 in 
obligations to secure Best Value. The Social Value Act introduced a direct 
requirement for councils to pursue social value in procurement. Thus whilst 
guidance reaffirmed that ‘overall value’ should be considered under Best 
Value, reference to social value in relation to procurement was specifically 
reinforced. 
 
Statutory guidance was thus relatively light touch in England at least 
compared to previous guidance and in the rest of UK: a few pages, with a 
particular emphasis on securing social value through procurement. In 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland there was particular emphasis on a 
wider set of value concepts than social value, including sustainable 
development. 
 
There was however, an alternative view presented from Best Value 
inspections in England. These were conducted at the request of the UK 
Secretary of State, who has powers to intervene in councils where there is 
evidence that they are failing in their Best Value Duty. At the time of data 
collection, Best Value inspections were taking place in Rotherham and Tower 
Hamlets about serious failings in council governance (note these were not 
case study authorities). Commentary from UK government (Ministry of 
Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), 2020) about these 
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inspections suggested a somewhat different meaning of the Best Value Duty. 
This argued that in practice the Best Value Duty: 
…is generally taken to mean that authorities must deliver a balanced budget (Part 1 
of the Local Government Finance Act 1992), provide statutory services (including 
adult social care and children’s services) and secure value for money in spending 
decisions. 
Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government, 2020, p.13 
In contrast to the formal guidance, this interpretation focussed much less on 
ideas about social value, well-being or sustainability; or the role of 
procurement. Instead it gave priority to value for money and prudent financial 
management in delivering statutory services. From the perspective of a 
valuation practice in local energy, this implies it is possible that ‘best value’ 
has distinct meanings to different officers and councillors involved in 
developing energy projects. It could align with the principles set out in 
statutory guidance, it could be more associated with the ‘in practice’ 
interpretation discussed above, it could involve a mix of both components, or 
it could be something else locally devised within a council.  
 
The different legislation and guidance lend to considering the Best Value 
Framework as a device designed to structure organisational practices and 
decision making, rather than as a tool for directly defining the ‘best’ 
(environmental, economic and social) value. The multiple definitions are all 
broad ranging and likely to be open to interpretation. Within the bounds of 
‘improvement’, local authorities are themselves responsible for defining what 
constitutes ‘best value’ in a given situation. There are also different 
definitions concerning what ‘best value’ is in practical terms in the operation 
of the statutory duty, and how to be a ‘Best Value authority’. This opens up 
several lines of enquiry. In particular, it suggests potential for divergence in 
how officers interpret Best Value. Variation in definitions and guidance also 
suggests it is unlikely to conform to a singular narrative. For an energy 
project, this suggests decision making procedures and their documentation 
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are hence likely to be a productive empirical area of focus, rather than 
evidence of ‘best value’ per se. This investigation is taken forward in Chapter 
7. 
6.3 The Business Case 
The business case is a much more specific tool within the overarching Best 
Value Framework. Broadly it can be described as an ‘options appraisal’ 
decision making tool that intends to support public spending decisions, 
assessing the entire costs and benefits of an energy project. As introduced in 
Chapter 2, a business case evaluation is expected to be used by local 
authorities across options appraisal in a number of situations, spanning: 
review of existing policies, programmes and services including curtailing or 
ending an activity; new revenue or capital spending; when awarding major 
contracts through public procurement; new administration; and instances of 
poor performance (Audit Scotland, 2014; Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy, 2010; Scottish Futures Trust, 2011). 
 
Guidelines on how to construct and evaluate a business case span multiple 
different documents (Table 6.1). These collectively emphasise that most 
public bodies are ‘expected’ to adopt the business case options appraisal 
procedure. The business case is emphasised as crucial ‘management tool’ in 
project development (UK Treasury, 2013a); suggesting it aids decision 
making, reduces costs and time, and ensures transparency (Audit Scotland, 
2014; UK Treasury, 2015a). This would suggest sector norms, but how a 
business case is developed for an energy project is unclear. 
 
Guidelines draw from the UK Treasury Green Book business case ‘five case 




All new policies, programmes and projects, whether revenue, capital or regulatory, 
should be subject to comprehensive but proportionate assessment, wherever it is 
practicable, so as best to promote the public interest. The Green Book presents the 
techniques and issues that should be considered when carrying out assessments. 
Green Book, UK Treasury, 2011, p. 1 
Although local authorities are ‘expected’ to use a business case in many 
instances (as above), there is a mix of which guidance is ‘recommended’ and 
‘required’. For example, the Green Book model is included in the Scottish 
Futures Trust (2011) required guidance on assessing value for money in 
capital project business cases, which is issued to Scottish public bodies on 
behalf of Scottish Government. Access to capital funding made available to 
local authority energy projects through UK central government funding 
programmes is also contingent on use of the Green Book approach. One 
example is the Heat Network Investment Project which issues guidance on 
developing the business case to local authorities in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (ARUP et al., 2016; Grant Thornton et al., 2016). It is also 
required in the use of devolved funding settlements from UK Parliament, 
such as City Deal budgets (UK Treasury et al., 2014). Beyond these, the 
Green Book approach is recommended as the key assessment tool for all 
new projects and programmes (UK Treasury, 2015a). Therefore, the Green 
Book business case model could in principle shape different kinds of new 
energy projects/programmes, including those which are not primarily capital 
expenditure. Its key features are now introduced. 
The Green Book 
2011 Green Book guidance was in place at the time of data collection; this 
was the 2003 version, updated with amendments. These included: 2013 
guides for decision makers (UK Treasury, 2013b; 2013a); 2014 guidance for 
local authorities with devolved funding settlements in England, including 
combined authorities (UK Treasury et al., 2014); 2015 supplementary 
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guidance on using the five case model (UK Treasury, 2015a); and on valuing 
infrastructure (UK Treasury, 2015b), including heat networks. 
 
The overarching goal of the Green Book approach is stated as ensuring that 
before a project or programme is adopted/commenced, consideration is 
always given to the following two points: 
Are there better ways to achieve this objective? 
Are there better uses for these resources? 
Green Book, UK Treasury, 2011, p. 1 
Conducting the options appraisal to support the full consideration of these 
two points is structured as an assessment of five key types of factors. 
Guidance emphasises assessment should be completed in an iterative 
manner over three phases of project development. Guidance is issued on 
how to conduct these (UK Treasury, 2011; 2015a) as well as how decision 
makers should use the completed business case assessment (UK Treasury, 
2013a; 2013b). 
The Green Book five case model 
The basis of the Green Book method is the ‘five case model’. This involves 
constructing and assessing the strategic, economic, commercial, financial 
and management case of the proposal. 
 
The Strategic Case is the ‘case for change’, the reason, rationale and 
objectives for the new project. 
 
The Economic Case is then assessed for fit against meeting the objectives of 
the strategic case. The economic case is the costs and benefits of the 
project, which is also sometimes referred to as the option appraisal (chapter 
five of the 2011 Green Book). This component of the business case has the 
most attention in the Green Book. In particular, the economic case 
assessment forms the basis for identifying if the preferred option for the 
project offers value for money. It also feeds into the financial case and 
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commercial case and is identified as critical prior to procurement. Further 
detail follows shortly. 
 
The Commercial Case is the overall viability of the approach. This includes 
whether contractors can be secured, procurement approach and contracting 
details. Milestones for contracts with a timeline and risks should be detailed 
here. Working with the private sector is encouraged, including through 
outsourcing risk via procurement. 
 
The Financial Case is how the project will be funded, including cash flows 
and overall affordability. 
 
The Management Case details how the project will be delivered, including 
whether the project sponsor (here a local authority) has the necessary 
expertise and resources, but also detailing the project management reporting 
in place, including timelines, contingency plans, and monitoring. 
The three stages of business case development 
Guidance emphasises that the business case is a document developed 
iteratively over three distinct phases of project development: 
 
The Strategic Outline Case is developed at the beginning of a project, to 
identify a range of different options and assess these. Most emphasis at this 
stage is placed on the rationale for a new project, including how it aligns with 
strategy and goals. There is also some indication of the economic case, but 
less on financial and management aspects (UK Treasury, 2013a). 
 
The Outline Business Case is developed and approved to enable proceeding 
to procurement of the preferred option. In particular, it ensures the “preferred 
option demonstrably optimises Value for Money” (UK Treasury, 2013a, p. 3). 
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To do this, the economic case should have been constructed in line with the 
Green Book (i.e. is ‘Green Book compliant’.) 
 
The Full Business Case is refined and approved to award contracts following 
procurement and is sometimes called the ‘investment decision’ stage of 
project development (UK Treasury, 2013a, p. 3). 
 
When there is new construction and/or procurement, assessment of all five 
cases over all three phases is emphasised. Supplementary guidance is 
provided for infrastructure evaluation (covered below). Beyond this, it is 
recognised that the business case should be developed proportionate to the 
‘likely costs and benefits’ of the project. In short, this means commensurate 
to size of project/policy/programme. Thus, smaller energy projects, in capital 
expenditure terms, are likely to have less extensive business case 
development compared to larger projects. 
The role of the economic case in business case decision 
making 
The economic case is assessed using a socio-economic cost benefit analysis 
where all possible costs and benefits of a range of different options for 
delivering the project are monetised and assessed. Different options include 
a ‘do minimum’ option, with various potential options that have also been 
identified. For example, potential options for upgrading council buildings 
could include the council installing energy efficiency measures in corporate 
buildings, or using an energy performance contractor. These should be 
compared against the ‘base case’ or counterfactual (effectively ‘business as 
usual’/‘do nothing’ with no change). 
Generating net present value in socio-economic cost benefit 
analysis 
A specified method of calculating the costs and benefits is used to derive a 
‘net present value’ (NPV) figure. This is significant because NPV has the 
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status of the ideal comparable measure of value for money across different 
options in cost-benefit analysis (UK Treasury, 2011; 2013a; 2015a). As the 
proxy representation of value for money, NPV is intended to form the primary 
basis of decisions and guide decision makers on the preferred approach 
within the options appraisal. This is reiterated in the ‘how to’ guides and 
checklists developed for decision makers, “The option with the highest NPV 
is generally taken to be the preferred option” (UK Treasury, 2013a, p. 7). As 
a result of the significance afforded to NPV in decision making, guidance 
emphasises the importance of the economic case in all instances of business 
case valuations. 
 
Having selected the preferred option (via NPV), this in turn influences 
procurement. For example, influencing whether a council directly procures 
energy retrofit technologies through open competition, or procures an energy 
performance contractor through a ‘framework agreement’. As described in 
Section 6.4 and Chapter 9 these decisions have significant implications for 
the energy project. 
 
A series of calculations within the cost benefit analysis method generate 
NPV. This includes whole life costing, monetising lifetime benefits, 
distributional impacts of a proposal, and discount rates. Whole life costing 
goes beyond a simple measure of payback of capital investment by 
assessing “useful lifetime of the assets” (UK Treasury, 2011, p. 19), for 
example the lifetime of solar PV panels being installed. The purpose given 
for monetising benefits is “to consider whether an option’s benefits are worth 
its costs, and to allow alternative options to be systematically compared in 
terms of their net benefits or net costs” (UK Treasury, 2011, p. 21). Benefits 
that should be included are both those directly associated with the project but 
also those which have ‘wider effects’ on the economy31. The distributional 
                                            
31 The Green Book recognises this is a difficult area, and suggests using datasets where they are 
available, or consider commissioning research to establish the monetary value of benefit. If neither 
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impacts of a proposal attempt to consider how calculated costs and benefits 
are spread across socio-economic groups. When evaluating infrastructure 
such as heat networks, supplementary guidance (UK Treasury, 2015b, pp. 
19-21) also emphasises the ability to include ‘passive provision’, whereby 
pipe network in a first phase would be oversized. Although this would make 
phase one more expensive, it allows for network expansion. 
 
These attempt to capture all possible costs and benefits across the lifetime of 
an initiative. Discount rates are then applied. Discounting is a means of 
considering the ‘time preference’ of costs and benefits at different points in 
time. It is “based on the principle that, generally, people prefer to receive 
goods and services now rather than later” (UK Treasury, 2011, p. 26). 
Discount rates create a comparable measure of each option, NPV:  
The discount rate is used to convert all costs and benefits to ‘present values’, so that 
they can be compared. The recommended discount rate is 3.5%. Calculating the 
present value of the differences between the streams of costs and benefits provides 
the net present value (NPV) of an option. 
Green Book, UK Treasury, 2011, p. 26 	
There is however some recognition (UK Treasury, 2011, p. 38) that the NPV 
may need to be considered alongside costs and benefits which cannot be 
monetised. The guide for decision makers reiterates this: 
There may… be decisive but unquantifiable costs or benefits which although 
impossible to quantify are sufficient to override a simple highest VfM [value for 
money] result. 
UK Treasury, 2013a, p. 7 
Despite the difficulties of incorporating all the costs and benefits into the NPV 
device, this method is nevertheless emphasised as the ideal calculation to 
assess and compare different options in the business case. By contrast, 
generating an NPV from cashflows and estimated financial returns with 
                                            
of those are feasible, then a central estimate should be derived with a minimum and maximum value 
attached. 
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financial modelling methods, is considered as creating a partial picture of the 
full costs and benefits of different options (UK Treasury, 2015a, p. 51). 
 
Furthermore, guidance specifies that the payback period and internal rate of 
return (IRR) are not adequate calculations to base business case evaluation 
decisions on. The payback period calculates the number of years for capital 
costs to be recovered. The Green Book argues the payback calculation does 
not capture ‘wider impacts’, including costs and benefits after the payback 
date. As a result, the payback device “is likely to distort project choice […] 
These drawbacks mean it [payback] should not generally be used as a 
decision criterion” (UK Treasury, 2011, p. 39). IRR is typically used as a 
proxy measure of the risk of an investment in the private sector, with 
minimum hurdle rates used to determines whether a project investment is 
viable (ibid.). As a result, guidance argues that IRR “should be avoided as 
the decision criterion. Whilst it is very similar to NPV as a criterion, there are 
some circumstances in which it will provide different, and incorrect, answers” 
(ibid.). 
 
In its entirety, Green Book guidance provides a prescriptive model of 
adopting the business case according to five key elements. This is intended 
to be iteratively devised over three phases of project development, though 
guidance does note that use of the business case should be proportionate to 
the size of the project. A standardised approach for conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis is used to arrive at what is considered the optimal value for money 
assessment. Specifically metrics such as payback and IRR are discouraged 
as decision making criteria. This initially suggests little room for user 
discretion. 
 
Review of major capital projects in Scottish councils (defined as projects over 
£5 million) however, reported a different picture to guidance. In particular, 
audit on the use of a business case in these major capital projects found: 
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Many councils do not have established processes for developing and using business 
cases. Where available, business cases are often short and highly summarised and 
do not all reflect good practice. Without good-quality and realistic business cases, 
particularly at the initial approval stage, key performance information on aims, cost, 
time, scope and risk may not be clearly defined. This may make it more difficult to 
hold decision-makers to account if problems arise on a project. 
Audit Scotland, 2013, p. 21 
This would indicate that local valuation practices are likely to diverge, despite 
the standard approach put forward in guidance. This could, in principle, 
stretch as far as to no singular business case model being used across the 
cases. Chapter 8 takes this forward. 
6.4 Public Procurement 
Local authorities spend considerable sums of money via procuring goods, 
works and services. English local authorities’ 2017-18 total revenue 
expenditure was £93.1 billion: procurement expenditure was around two-
thirds of this (£61.6 billion). Capital expenditure in local infrastructure such as 
roads, housing, schools, public facilities and street lighting was about a 
quarter (£25.4 billion) (MHCLG, 2019). 
 
Public procurement has become a specialist field of knowledge and 
expertise, with evolving codes of practice, technical rules and guidance, as 
well as specialist procurement services. Within a local authority, the 
procurement department in Professional/Corporate Services are responsible 
for running compliant procurement exercises.  
 
There were two main sets of public procurement rules governing the local 
authority energy projects studied in this thesis. First were UK specific 
procurement rules, mostly associated with the Best Value Framework which 
apply to all procurement. Second, were EU Directives transposed into UK 
and Scottish ‘Public Contracts Regulations’ which only apply above certain 
threshold levels set by the EU (explained below). 
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The Best Value Framework requires local authorities consider economic, 
social and environmental value in all procurements of goods, works and 
services. It therefore applies to any type of procurement. As noted in Section 
6.2, local authorities’ procurement strategy is one contribution toward 
meeting the duty of Best Value32. In addition, there are further requirements 
which reinforce how local authorities can further economic, social and 
environmental well-being through some areas of their procurement 
activities33. 
Public Contracts Regulations 
Conversely, Public Contracts Regulations only apply above certain threshold 
levels set by the EU. The European-wide framework of procurement rules 
and regulations is designed in response to specific political objectives, 
particularly promoting economic efficiency across the single market 
(European Commission, 2011; 2016). It is formally structured as a means of 
accountability for public spending, and is embedded in EU, UK (covering 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and Scottish legislation, which are 
outlined below. Tenders above certain amounts (set every 2 years) must 
comply with EU public procurement rules, including publication through the 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU)34 to promote open 
competition.  
 
                                            
32 For example, in Scotland local authorities are required to provide an annual procurement report 
which includes details how their policies and procedures and previous year’s procurement has 
contributed to meeting ‘best value’ to the council. 
33 For example, in England the Public Services (Social Value Act) 2012, applies to pre-procucurement 
of services contracts, services plus goods or services plus works (but not goods or works only 
contracts). The intention is to ensure that a wide range of procurement options are considered 
before issuing a tender. Guidance in England emphasises that this involves focussing on “taking a 
value for money approach – not lowest cost – to assessing contracts” (Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 2). In 
Scotland by the Sustainable Procurement Duty in the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 
applies to non-works and works contracts above threshold levels (£50,000 and £2 million 
respectively). In Wales the Well-being of Future Generations Act (2015) further promotes economic, 




Principles of fair and open competition are intended to prevent fraud and 
nepotism in awarding contracts. The formal requirement for competitive 
tendering thus reflects specific ideas about efficiency in public spending: 
mimicking a market is regarded as the ‘optimum’ way to deliver cost-effective 
solutions, and ensure value for money. Suppliers must be treated fairly 
(defined in the regulations as “equally and without discrimination”) and 
contractors, here a local authority, must act in a “transparent and 
proportionate manner” (Public Contracts Regulations 2006 and Public 
Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006). Suppliers can challenge award of a 
contract if they believe market distortion has taken place, with unfair 
advantage given to another. 
 
The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 and the Public Contracts (Scotland) 
Regulations 2006 (as amended) applied to most of the energy projects 
studied in this thesis. These transposed the 2004 EU Directive (2004/18/EC) 
on public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts. During data collection these public procurement regulations were 
updated, transposing new EU Directives into UK and Scottish law. The Public 
Contacts Directive 2014 (2014/24/EU) replaced the 2004 directive and 2006 
regulations, and a new Concessions Contracts Directive 2014 (2014/23/EU) 
was introduced. They came into force at slightly different times between 2015 
and 201635. The 2006 regulations are summarised below, with a brief 
commentary about new 2016 regulations, as relevant to energy projects. 
 
The 2014 thresholds for which Public Contracts Regulations applied were: 
£172,514 for services; £4,322,012 for works; and for small lots: £66,672 for 
supplies and services, and £833,400 for works (Cabinet Office, 2013). The 
Regulations require the publishing of a ‘contract notice’ on OJEU (the official 
                                            
35 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland: the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 in February 2015 
and the Concession Contracts Regulations 2016 in April 2016; and in Scotland these were both 
brought in under Scottish legislation in April 2016. 
 151 
publication of public contracts governed by regulations), the Tenders 
Electronic Daily (TED) database and also in UK databases (such as 
Contracts Finder). Issuing a contract notice must include the award criteria 
and the relative weighting. Once a contract has been confirmed an award 
notice must also be published. 
Contract award 
Contracts are awarded on the basis of “the most economically advantageous 
tender (based on criteria such as quality, price, technical merit, after-sales 
service); or the lowest price” (EU Directive 2004/18/EC, EUR-Lex, 2015). 
The price-quality ratio forms the basis of determining the ‘most economically 
advantageous tender’. The price-to-quality ratio takes into account: “factors 
such as the overall cost effectiveness, quality, environmental and social 
aspects, trading and delivery conditions” (EUR-Lex, 2016). Both the UK and 
Scottish regulations (Section 30) describe this as using:  
criteria linked to the subject matter of the contract to determine that an offer is the 
most economically advantageous including quality, price, technical merit, aesthetic 
and functional characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, cost 
effectiveness, after sales service, technical assistance, delivery date and delivery 
period and period of completion. 
Public Contracts Regulations 2006, s30  
Local authorities use the specification to define the assessment criteria and 
weighting, and this feeds into the price-to-quality ratio. Thus, these are 
crucial dimensions to valuations in energy project procurement. 
 
There are standard criteria for rejection of bidders on the basis of ineligibility. 
This includes issues such as fraud or money laundering, but also the 
financial stability of the bidder, and their technical ability. 
 
Although public procurement is a distinctly rule governed attempt to promote 
fair competition across the single market, there are actually significant areas 
of discretion built into it. As a valuation practice, it is down to local authorities 
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to determine the scope of the contract, the tender specification, and the 
evaluation criteria. They may opt to award contracts on the basis of lowest 
price, or via a price-to-quality ratio. This can be defined in each instance of 
procurement. 
 
What remains unanswered is how officers might actually use areas of 
discretion in procurement within energy project development. Public 
procurement rules require considerable specialist knowledge and expertise 
to navigate an energy project through them. Take for example using the 
tender specification and evaluation criteria to secure a high quality supplier 
and deliver the envisaged project. This relies on having the knowledge and 
expertise to define the specification, set the right criteria, and evaluate the 
responses. Understanding how this process unfolds is taken forward in 
Chapter 9. 
Procurement routes, variations and exemptions 
Four types of procurement were allowable for regulated public procurement 
under the 2006 regulations, alongside two variations and exemptions: 
 
Open: ‘standard’ single stage open market competition where the tender 
specification is advertised and eligible contractors are invited to submit 
tenders. Any party may submit. 
 
Restricted: this involves two stage processes of 1) open competition in which 
any party may submit an interest in bidding, via a Pre-Qualification 
Questionnaire (PQQ); and 2) the local authority shortlists from stage 1 and 
selects bidders who are subsequently invited to tender in full. 
 
Negotiated: this involves directly negotiating the contract with the bidders, i.e. 
the scope of the project is partly determined through the procurement 
process rather than prior to issuing a contract notice. 
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Competitive Dialogue: this is allowable in the case of complex contracts such 
as concession contracts (which since 2016 have their own regulations Crown 
Commercial Service, 2016).This is an extended mixture of the restricted and 
negotiated procurement routes and involves a two stage process of: 1) 
issuing a contract notice which leads to a selection process whereby bidders 
suggest solutions and engage in discussion with the local authority in a 
negotiated process; and 2) following stage 1, a final invitation to tender is 
issued to those bidders the local authority wishes to take through to the final 
stage (this is usually two; and there may have only been two remaining 
anyway). Final tenders are evaluated and the preferred bidder is brought into 
contract negotiation. It can only be used where the project is deemed to 
require a “particularly complex contract”, which is applicable when a local 
authority is unable to define the technical specification of the contract and/or 
unable to define the legal or financial structure of the project (‘The 
competitive dialogue procedure’, Section 18, Public Contracts Regulations 
2006; Section 2, the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006). 
 
There are two primary exemptions to following the procurement process 
outlined: framework agreements and in-house awards. 
 
Framework Agreements: these are not directly defined as a ‘type of 
procurement’ but must be established in accordance with the main body of 
regulations and principles of fair and open competition. A framework 
agreement sets up a defined list of pre-approved suppliers who can then bid 
for work in response to an ‘invitation to mini-competition’ (ITMC) issued by a 
local authority to only that group of suppliers. They are initially established by 
a ‘central purchasing body’ (which can be a local authority themselves) who 
conducts an OJEU compliant open procurement process. Subsequent ‘call-
offs’ by local authorities are then intended to be quicker and cheaper than 
other types of public procurement with quality assessment already in place. 
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There are multiple procurement frameworks for Energy Performance 
Contracting (EPC) that have attempted to create a model which can be easily 
rolled out across the public sector estate; these include the use of standard 
contract templates and documents which can be adapted to local 
circumstances (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015). Different 
types of EPC are offered depending on which procurement framework is 
being used;36 the EPC model is outlined in more detail in Chapter 5 (Section 
5.3). 
 
In-house awards (also known as ‘Teckal exemptions’): these are contracts 
which are above the threshold for public procurement regulation, but are 
defined as being issued to an organisation which is controlled by the local 
authority. This is usually through ownership and business operations, such as 
a local authority owned district energy business which primarily serves 
council owned buildings. Where the definition is met, the organisation can be 
directly contracted by the local authority without using one of the regulated 
types of procurement. The appointed organisation must however conduct its 
own procurement in line with principles of open and fair competition. 
 
The 2016 regulations expanded on clarifying the definition of meeting the 
Teckal exemption. They also introduced further exemptions for ‘inter-authority 
cooperation’, which is where more than one local authority (or public body) 
conducts procurement together, but without setting up a new body. This 
builds on the Hamburg case where the city council procured a waste facility 
for multiple local authorities; usually this would have involved the authorities 
setting up a jointly owned entity to then procure the waste facility (similar to 
joint waste authorities across parts of the UK) (for elaboration see Pinsent 
Masons, 2015). 
                                            
36 In the partner bid for example, the project sponsor usually details some of the specification and 
the contractor then proposes the individual measures to be installed. In the target bid the project 
sponsor is responsible for making detailed requirements and the contractor completes the work 
according to the set specification. 
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Multiple procurement routes suggest some scope to shape which type of 
procurement is used, though specific tests must be met for some (such as 
competitive dialogue and the Teckal exemption). Entire new framework 
agreements can also be established, or local authorities may use an existing 
one (where one is available). Framework agreements create a bounded 
regulated space within which to engage with a sub-set of suppliers on pre-
determined types of energy projects. As this suggests, within the bounds of 
the overarching regulations that oversee spending public money and 
awarding contracts, each instance of energy project procurement could be 
tailored to the specific project. 
6.5 Discussion: navigating valuation frameworks 
in energy project development 
This chapter has set out the formal rules and regulations governing use of 
each valuation framework. This analysis has identified there are varying 
degrees of interpretative flexibility designed into each framework. Thus, 
based on the guidelines, ‘users’ might interpret the rules in developing an 
energy project differently. 
 
From the perspective of a valuation practice, the Best Value Framework is 
most wide-ranging intending to improve local services by shaping the 
organisation as a whole. There are however, unanswered questions about 
whether the Best Value model enables any material change from the lowest 
cost contracting-out model of local services, and if, so in what ways. Are local 
authorities able to enterprisingly use a management process to create areas 
of agency and discretion in energy project development? Potentially, more 
‘marginal’ projects that have lower financial returns on investment could be 
positioned as contributing to the improvement of council services. In 
principle, guidelines are supportive of this, however, it is currently unclear 
how this plays out. The conceptual model introduced in Chapter 3 also takes 
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a cautious approach as to whether the Best Value Framework reshapes 
central-local governance. Particularly, it is mindful about the degree to which, 
as part of shaping local services and provision, Best Value actually frees up 
local government to assemble non-financial value from energy projects. 
Chapter 7 investigates this. 
 
Within the overarching Best Value Framework, the Business Case model has 
no direct statutory basis. Guidance consistently recommends the business 
case tool to local authorities to support options appraisal for capital 
expenditure, such as the energy projects I examine. Guidance issued by UK 
Treasury places considerable emphasis on a standardised approach which 
prioritises calculating net present value and using it as the device for 
selecting the preferred approach of the options considered. As this suggests, 
where this model of the business case assessment is adopted, it is likely to 
play a considerable role in shaping the eventual form of an energy project. 
Payback and internal rate of return are specified in guidance as two metrics 
which, according UK Treasury, provide an incomplete picture of the ‘true’ 
costs and benefits of a project. However, it is unclear what constitutes a 
business case for energy projects; whether this guidance is adopted; and 
how, if at all, it is used to guide decision making. Chapter 8 tackles this. 
 
Lastly, as a valuation system, public procurement regulations provide a 
uniform set of rules to structure the entire process of buying goods and 
services. This goes from issuing a tender, through to awarding a contract. 
Public procurement thus governs a local authority’s interactions with 
suppliers. Competition is heavily promoted as the optimum way to secure 
value for money solutions for public bodies. However, principles of open, fair 
and transparent competition, may not in themselves aid local authorities to 
gain trust in suppliers. For instance, this assumes that high quality suppliers 
will bid for the work, but this needs investigating further. There is also little 
evidence about the potential impacts of austerity on local energy 
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procurement. Reductions to back-office functions such as procurement, may 
have reduced capacity to manage these complex processes. Cost saving 
pressures may also influence how local authorities set the price-to-quality 
ratio in evaluating tenders. As such, there is a need to understand more 
about how this highly structured valuation practice actually shapes the 
energy project. Chapter 9 explores this. 
 
In this chapter, I have explained the rationale for selecting three valuation 
frameworks for detailed investigation. Introducing the main rules and 
guidelines shaping each valuation framework has provided an overarching 
picture about how this programme of governing attempts to structure local 
energy projects at key junctures in their development. The next step is to 
explore local energy valuation practices in more detail. It is crucial to 
understand how officers actually use and interpret these frameworks in 
practice. This will progress investigating the claim that valuation frameworks 
are dependent on ‘users’ interpretations. In the next chapter I take forward 
this analysis, focusing on the Best Value Framework.  
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Having introduced the Best Value Framework in the previous chapter, here I 
aim to understand more about its meaning and interpretation within energy 
project development, and how it is negotiated in practice. The remainder of 
the Introduction brings together key points about the Best Value Framework, 
and the conceptual tools used to investigate it. What then follows is a 
qualitative examination into what happens to the negotiation of value as 
energy projects encounter ‘best value’ in council decision making. 
 
Chapter 6 argued that from the perspective of local energy valuation 
practices, the Best Value Framework is consequential as it intends to 
structure council decision making routines. Under the guise of ‘improvement’ 
in public services this spans front line services (i.e. statutory local services), 
back office ‘corporate’ support functions such as financial management and 
public procurement, along with internal scrutiny and audit of organisational 
governance. However, there are tensions between different descriptions of 
what constitutes ‘best value’. For example, the definition of ‘best value’ as 
moving beyond lowest cost contrasted with descriptions from inspections 
which prioritised ‘sound’ financial management and ‘value for money’. This 
variation implies that ‘best value’ could be enacted through multiple, 
potentially contrasting, processes of valuing. This could shift the negotiation 
of value in different directions. In addition, both development of a business 
case and procurement practices can be used to demonstrate that the Best 
Value Framework has been adhered to. How these devices are used to 
demonstrate Best Value is considered in this chapter. 
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Informed by the theoretical approach explained in Chapter 3, I conceptualise 
the development of an energy project as a process shaped by ‘valuation 
practices’ (Muniesa, 2012). This considers that value is produced through 
active material processes, rather than being inherent in any initiative. In this 
perspective, valuations are not performed by singular persons, but by an 
actor-network, a ‘socio-technical agencement’ (Callon, 2008). An 
‘agencement’ considers the agency for valuation as shaped not only by the 
agency of human actors, but by interactions between a variety of human, 
infrastructural, material, and institutional objects and practices (Callon, 1999; 
Helgesson & Muniesa, 2013). The actor-network, rather than a single 
individual, has the calculative agency required for valuations. The implication 
of this is that the Best Value Framework is considered as an active, rather 
than passive, component of valuation practices in energy project 
development. 
 
Insights from ‘programmes of governing’ (Miller, 2008; Miller & Rose, 2008), 
explains that governmental agendas are part of the active substance of 
valuation frameworks such as Best Value. This concept considers that 
governmental agendas attempt to control the actions and agency of local 
authorities through the application of valuation frameworks. Hence, valuation 
frameworks such as Best Value are conceived of as capable of exercising 
political power and control within local authority valuation practices. It is 
thought that this is permissive and pursued through attempting to shape the 
‘everyday’ work (Miller & Power, 2013) of organisational routines. 
 
Concurrently however, this perspective also reminds us that political attempts 
to structure value-making are inevitably more ambitious than what is 
achievable in practice. A programme of governing is thus incomplete. This is 
because the ability to actually structure decision making is contingent on how 
councils implement the rules set for them. Valuation frameworks for example 
rely on their interpretation by ‘users’. As I explained in Chapter 3, finitism 
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(Barnes, 1995) suggests this is because users apply judgement and meaning 
in each instance of classifying, rather than simply adopting rules and 
guidelines or using previous knowledge. As such, there is potential for 
interpretative flexibility in negotiating the Best Value Framework that can 
disrupt or obstruct attempts to exert political power. 
 
I use this theoretical perspective to consider that the value of an energy 
project is not fixed, but instead assembled and shaped by actor-networks in a 
value-making process, and is hence the result of negotiation. By trying to 
structure the terms of local authority valuation practices, I treat the Best 
Value Framework as an instance of a rule governed valuation framework, 
which encompasses political attempts to control the functioning of public 
organisations. Applying this to local energy projects leads to a focus on 
procedures for assessing value, which I treat as processes of value-in-the-
making. In Section 7.2, I explore the different meanings that local authority 
officers attached to the operationalisation of ‘best value’ in energy projects. 
Section 7.3 moves on to consider how formal reporting procedures 
operationalised the Best Value Framework. This provides an entry point into 
inquiring how this programme of governing shapes value-making 
negotiations in the everyday valuations of a local authority energy project. 
Section 7.4 discusses the impact on the energy project as it is required to fit 
within the confines of established decision making procedures. 
7.2 The meaning of ‘best value’ in local energy 
projects 
Officer accounts of the operation of what ‘best value’ means to local energy 
projects revealed three different interpretations. Explanations were 
associated with project objectives, the business case, and public 
procurement. These were not mutually exclusive. In particular, the 
affordability of the project’s business case, and market testing within public 
procurement were inter-related. As such, both the business case and 
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procurement valuations were central to the demonstration of Best Value; 
after discussing their relevance to Best Value, Chapters 8 and 9 extend the 
investigation into valuation practices associated with business case and 
public procurement devices. 
Defining ‘best value’ on a case-by-case basis: project 
objectives 
The first interpretation of ‘best value’ was associated with energy project 
objectives. Officers in Aberdeen, Derby, Edinburgh and Swansea 
emphasised that because objectives depended on the energy project in 
question, what constituted ‘best value’ also varied. This variation went 
beyond carbon or energy saving, to include social and welfare goals 
including fuel poverty amelioration, along with objectives such as wanting to 
improve the buildings that staff worked in. This illustrated a finitist application 
to value-making where ‘best value’ did not have an inherent meaning, but 
was instead defined according to the individual energy project. 
 
In Aberdeen, Martin stressed that their objective to reduce fuel poverty in 
social housing tower blocks led them to proceed with establishing an 
independent not-for-profit district energy business37, Aberdeen Heat and 
Power Ltd (AHP). AHP provided heating and hot water, and also upgraded 
the external fabric of the buildings. Martin described how, by delivering on 
the project objectives, this energy project type with its ownership and 
business structure, had created ‘best value’ to the council: 
best value work was done at the beginning as solutions to these buildings. […] 
there’s a big fuel poverty [problem] in these buildings and we’ve not seen anything 
else that’s come along to say there’s another way. In a multi[storey block] you’ll get 
affordable warmth by that type of [district] heating... and it’s working well... And this 
is the best way of achieving our targets. 
Martin, Aberdeen City Council 
                                            
37 See Chapter 5 for a description of ownership, business structures and contract models. 
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By contrast, Edinburgh’s energy project was improving the energy 
performance of ten corporate council buildings, and hence objectives 
differed. Trudy emphasised that project objectives were reducing energy 
costs, but because of the run down condition of some of the buildings, it was 
also about making a more suitable working environment. Trudy described 
that what constituted ‘best value’ in this project therefore involved 
considering value in a “wider sense”: 
out of the best value discussion, it’s about better value buildings, it’s about comfort 
levels for our staff that have to work in some really horrible buildings […] with 
overheating in some areas, cold in others… it’s about creating best value in the 
round, in the wider sense. 
Trudy, City of Edinburgh Council 
Thus, in this instance ‘best value’ also incorporated staff welfare into the 
value of the energy project. 
 
Again linking to project objectives, Sandra (Swansea) emphasised that social 
objectives, particularly skills development and local enterprise in deprived 
areas, had shaped their decision to establish Swansea Community Energy, a 
citizen owned solar energy cooperative. The council provided human and 
financial resources to set up the project38 and offered rooftops for the solar 
PV. Importantly, these locally defined objectives provided the rationale for 
initiating the project as a Community Benefit Society39. These social 
objectives were further supported by a community benefit fund created from 
the project’s long-term income streams (electricity sales and feed-in tariff) 
that pays for community-led projects. Sandra explained that this form of 
community ownership met the project objectives and therein generated ‘best 
value’ to the council: 
  
                                            
38 Including developing the project, establishing the legal structure, running the share offer, 
operating a temporary board of directors and investing capital into the project. 
39 A Community Benefit Society (a type of Industrial & Provident Society) is a not-for-profit 




[It’s] how we define best value... So the best value for us would be the social benefit 
alongside the financial benefit… and that’s where the objectives of the project 
become critical. The objectives for this project… were all around enterprise… [and] 
community benefit.[…] We were able to say that [what] we went for, provides the 
best community input and also allows for protection of the public funds. 
Sandra, City & County of Swansea 
Sandra’s account also alluded to the need to ‘protect public funds’ in the 
approach adopted, which I return to later in the chapter. 
 
The idea therefore was that ‘best value’ in practice could be flexibly moulded 
to an individual project, and defined on a case-by-case basis. In principle 
then, any type of project, ownership and business structure that met council 
objectives could be determined as ‘best value’. 
 
Officer accounts that reflected this interpretation identified that the concept of 
‘quality’, which is embedded in the Best Value Framework, was key to 
opening up this kind of interpretative flexibility in project development. John 
(Derby), noted that project objectives could respond to a variety of social, 
environmental and local economic values that motivated service 
organisation. John stated that, “It’s not all about price anymore and it 
shouldn’t be. It’s about quality and the different aspects of quality and the 
wider social agenda as well that needs to be part of that decision.” Martin 
(Aberdeen) agreed, also pointing out the move away from a sole focus on 
money or price, “you can’t always judge everything by the best business 
case. The best value should be monetary, to be held with other targets… 
sustainability, carbon reduction.” Furthering this point, Trudy (Edinburgh) 
noted that there was more balanced decision making, which in turn enabled 
projects to “deliver a better outcome”. In Edinburgh they had installed 
technologies which reduced ongoing maintenance costs (though may have 
greater upfront costs), and they had drawn on multiple council budgets to 
meet project costs. In this first interpretation, multiple forms of non-financial 
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value were thus incorporated into how a council considered whether an 
energy project could provide ‘best value’. 
Covering project borrowing costs: the ‘best value business 
case’ 
The second interpretation of ‘best value’ was associated with the energy 
project business case. Officers in Leeds and Gateshead described that a 
project which covered its borrowing costs (from the Public Works Loan 
Board, PWLB), represented ‘best value’ to the council. When a project was 
unable to cover its borrowing costs, alternative options needed to be 
considered. This included how to access grant funding to fill the gap in 
capital costs, through to the potential to outsource, or not proceed at all. 
 
In Leeds, Peter noted that they had been unable to secure private finance on 
acceptable terms for the city centre district heating network (c.£21 million 
capex). The project would take heat from the energy from waste plant at 
Cross Green, and provide social housing residents with affordable heating 
and hot water. Subsequent expansion was planned for extending the network 
to the city centre, initially connecting public buildings, but with expectation of 
further connection to a range of customers as the network grew. Unable to 
secure private finance, Peter emphasised, “It’s about demonstrating a 
business case… that can hope to generate sufficient return to cover the 
borrowing”. Andrew (Gateshead), similarly agreed, and emphasised that 
funding their district energy network (c.£18.5 million capex), primarily through 
borrowing from the PWLB, was similarly based on whether the project would 
have covered its costs: 
best value is when we as the council decide we’re going to go forward with the 
business case [… and] if we’re going to borrow from the Public Works Loan Board 
[PWLB], is there a best value business case for that? […] The reason we develop 
big capital schemes is because our potential schemes… they’re good, they can 
generate income… and that’s how we can then borrow from the PWLB. 
Andrew, Gateshead Council 
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The business case thus became the object where dimensions of what 
constituted ‘best value’ to the council had to be made commensurate. This 
narrowed down the multiple non-financial objectives identified in the first 
interpretation of ‘best value’, into a financial evaluation of whether the project 
was affordable. The valuation practice was thus re-configured to focus in on 
the financial aspects of projects. Chapter 8 further explores the role of the 
business case. 
‘Best value’: the outcome of market testing 
The third interpretation of ‘best value’ in an energy project was associated 
with procurement. Officers in multiple councils (including Aberdeenshire, 
Cambridgeshire, Camden, Edinburgh, Gateshead, Glasgow, Leeds), noted 
that securing ‘best value’ to the council was the outcome of market testing. 
This was orchestrated through public procurement, where the response from 
suppliers provided evidence about whether their proposed energy project – 
as defined in the tender specification and evaluated through the price-to-
quality ratio – could be delivered. 
 
As a valuation practice, this interpretation was thus based on a 
market/competitive exercise where suppliers’ responses constituted ‘best 
value’. Stephen (Glasgow) summarised that evaluation of bidders was, “a 
best value assessment that we do that works out whether this is the best 
approach or not”, for the individual energy project. Officers noted that this 
was not about lowest cost, but if suitable suppliers did not respond, then the 
project either did not go ahead, or it had to be revised to meet the definitions 
of value set by the ‘marketplace’ governed within public procurement. 
 
This interpretation of ‘best value’ was contingent on the ability to emulate a 
competitive market within local energy procurement. Stephen (Glasgow) 
emphasised that, “normally we’d go out… and assess best value through the 
market”. Whilst Melissa (Camden) highlighted that tendering, “is ensuring the 
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best value because of the competitive element”. Similarly, James 
(Aberdeenshire) discussed how projects, “would all be tendered to 
demonstrate best value”. Creating market interest from suppliers by 
comparing bids was hence a necessary step in this interpretation of ‘best 
value’. 
 
Retaining control over value within procurement required carefully scripting 
the tender specification and setting the award criteria. Even in these 
standardised elements of the valuation practice, there was considerable 
scope for interpretative flexibility. Guidance (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4) 
does not stipulate how to set the price-to-quality ratio, this is left to the 
contracting authority. However, where the price-to-quality ratio is used, the 
contract must be awarded to the bidder with the highest combined score. 
 
Sharon (Cambridgeshire) elaborated, discussing procurement of their energy 
performance contracting (EPC) project which targeted county council owned 
buildings, particularly the schools estate. Sharon noted that because the 
contract relies on a “partnership approach” with the energy services 
contractor40, ‘best value’ was defined in terms of how the partner would 
approach working with them. Specifically, the nature of the project – mostly 
installing retrofit measures in schools – meant price alone was not a helpful 
indicator of value in this energy project. Instead expertise and work ethic of 
the contractor as well as how they would work with individual headteachers 
were prioritised as the valuable elements: 
  
                                            
40 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for description of the contract model. 
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the challenge… with developing best value on a partnership approach is that you 
can’t say that you’ve got the cheapest price. So [we’re] saying, ‘well, what is it we 
value here?’ We know [the] schools… don’t have any technical [energy] expertise 
[…] So we needed to assure ourselves… that we were bringing partners in who 
were going to have the skillsets, have the customer responses that were needed. 
And we have tested them out on the price, it’s just not the cheapest price for an 
individual building. But on balance, we thought that all the other parts would add up 
to value. 
Sharon, Cambridgeshire County Council 
Moulding interactions with suppliers to the individual project included tailoring 
the price-to-quality ratio on a case by case basis. Officers thus emphasised 
that setting the ratio was dependent on the project in question. James 
(Aberdeenshire Council) noted that it, “varies from project to project”, whilst 
Trudy (Edinburgh) commented that focussing more on quality or price was, 
“a judgement that each council will make”. The ratio was therefore a 
substantive way for local authorities to attempt to control value within public 
procurement: allowing them to exert judgements and malleably tailor 
procurement in each case to shape evaluation toward price or quality. 
Adaptation of the price-to-quality ratio is depicted in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 Interpretative flexibility in setting the price-to-quality 
ratio 
 
1 Feasibility study. Ratio set at 35/60/5 price/quality/working practices. 
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In the sample, the ratio ranged from 10:90 (price:quality) in Edinburgh’s 
evaluation of tenders for their energy performance contracting project of nine 
public buildings, through to 75:25 (price:quality) in Exeter Council’s solar PV 
programme. Despite huge variation for some specific instances, officers 
reported that a middle ground of 60:40 – 70:30 (price:quality) was fairly 
normal. These middle ground cases showed evidence of sector norms 
embedded into a local standard approach. For example, Phil (Bridgend) said 
that “we tend to have a heavy weighting on price… 60:40, 70:30 
[price:quality], there’s a little flexibility around that but I would always expect 
price to generally be about 50%” .  
 
In turn, the supplier with the highest score reflected the ‘best value’ that could 
be delivered through the marketplace. As Stephen (Glasgow) put it, when 
evaluating the tenders, “you’re assessing value and best value is evidenced 
by how it’s scored”. Chapter 9 explores this navigation of public procurement 
in more detail. 
 
In an iterative process, this procurement valuation then fed back into the 
interpretation of ‘best value’ as the energy project business case. Andrew 
(Gateshead) and Peter (Leeds) both elaborated on how the procurement 
process provided evidence about the affordability of the project and thus 
shaped the ‘best value business case’. As Andrew explained: 
the best value judgement comes in when you get your prices back. You update your 
financial model, if it still stacks up it’s best value, if it doesn’t you don’t go forwards 
and you’ve wasted half a million quid’s [pound’s] worth of procurement but at least 
you haven’t committed yourself to a scheme that’s going to lose money. So that’s 
the challenge really. 
Andrew, Gateshead Council 
Across these cases, officers employed different, non-mutually exclusive 
meanings of what constituted ‘best value’ in energy project development. 
This revealed a number of insights. As a valuation practice, this illustrated a 
finitist interpretation of rules, which spanned diffused and varied notions of 
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value associated with numerous project objectives. This extended valuations 
beyond economistic terms, incorporating social value and welfare into the 
justification for a particular project’s scope, ownership and business 
structure. At the same time however, there were also narrower associations 
on how to finance a project, and secure suppliers. Nevertheless, officers 
used the flexibility within the price to quality ratio to attempt to secure 
suppliers that could deliver the project as envisaged by the council. 
Combined, this shows that the operationalisation of ‘best value’ resists 
conforming to a singular definition. 
 
To varying degrees, the process of making ‘best value’ meaningful was also 
muddled amongst the programme governing local authority spending. 
Examples were the intermingling of the business case and public 
procurement as the loci of how to determine what ‘best value’ amounted to in 
an energy project. 
 
This has revealed that ‘best value’ means distinct things within different 
energy projects. However, beyond the specifics of the price-to-quality ratio in 
public procurement, it tells us less about the material influence of the Best 
Value Framework in actual project development. For example, it is unclear, 
how, if at all, this kind of interpretative flexibility was actually a meaningful 
route to exert influence within energy project valuation practices and capture 
local forms of value. At least in the stages prior to procurement, there is 
limited evidence supporting this. For instance, it is not yet possible to say 
whether the Best Value Framework per se, played a strong role in adopting a 
specific ownership structure. To explore this further, the next section 
uncovers what happened to the negotiation of ‘best value’ as the energy 
project journeyed through council decision making apparatus. 
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7.3 From best value to value for money: 
procedural accountability in council decision 
making 
any money, any project, we have to demonstrate best value and that we’ve done 
due diligence on it. And that we’ve measured and assessed what the risks are 
associated with the project. So whatever project, it doesn’t matter what it is, we still 
have to go through that process. 
Sandra, City & County of Swansea 
Internal decision making and reporting procedures operationalised the Best 
Value Framework into the everyday work of council business. As Sandra 
explained above, energy project valuations were in turn configured in 
response to the requirements of these standardised decision processes. 
Across all cases, these procedures involved compiling a report about the 
energy project that fulfilled pre-set requirements for submission. The report 
was the basis upon which decisions by Council Executive or a specific 
Committee were made41. As part of the local democratic process, councils 
are also expected to have internal scrutiny arrangements in place. This 
includes holding decision makers accountable via transparent review, audit 
and financial management. The task of ensuring that the council meets 
obligations set out in the Best Value Framework about council performance 
and securing value for money falls within the remit of the internal Scrutiny 
Committee. Internal Scrutiny Committees reviewed decisions which they 
determined needed further examination. Combined, this represented the 
system of accountability that enacts the programme of governing of local 
authorities. It underpinned council decision making, and in turn presided over 
formal valuations of energy projects. 
Shifting the terms of valuations 
The earlier interpretations of ‘best value’ in an energy project (Section 7.2) 
were reframed as it filtered through this system of accountability. Concern 
                                            
41 See Appendix II for overview of Executive and Committee Structures. 
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over ‘demonstrating’ value for money in the use of public resources was a 
particularly influential requirement that entered this valuation practice. 
Formally, value for money specifically encompasses economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in the public sector (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Although 
value for money also operates outside its formalities, as introduced in 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.2) the Best Value Framework, is actually one of the 
ways it is enacted within local government. When discussing formal council 
procedures, officers discussed ‘best value’ and ‘value for money’ 
interchangeably. This makes them difficult to disentangle within this valuation 
practice and suggests that the concept of Best Value has not successfully 
repositioned council decision making beyond narrower definitions of value for 
money. 
 
Crucially however, the parameters of the valuation practice shifted as the 
measures for demonstrating public accountability and value for money came 
into play. The notions of ‘creating’ varied forms of value in relation to 
delivering on project objectives (Section 7.2) faded into the background. In its 
place, was a move toward ‘demonstrating’ that the council had developed an 
energy project that could defensibly be argued to provide ‘best value for 
money’. Although the shift might appear subtle, a transformation in the 
assembly of value was underway; from ‘creating’ – making value from a 
project, in a material sense – to ‘demonstrating’ – substantiating that 
principles of value for money underpinned decision making. The embedded 
assumption, is that the latter produces the optimum outcome for the energy 
project. From the perspective of a valuation practice, this programme of 
governing attempts to control the procedure, whilst remaining agnostic to the 
outcome of these decisions. 
 
In providing the demonstration of ‘best value’, the specific choices, such as 
an energy project’s ownership structure, were less significant than the 
process used to underpin the decision. Comparative options appraisal and 
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due diligence were routinely emphasised by interviewees as necessary to 
verify that value for money was the foundation upon which energy projects 
were assessed. Sandra (Swansea) elaborated, noting that from an audit 
perspective, value for money tests were satisfied by showing that they had 
examined potential options for delivering the solar project (Swansea 
Community Energy), and investigated the risks associated with the 
investment: 
We’ve been able to justify through the due diligence that this is the best value 
approach for us and that we’ve done comparisons against different technologies, 
different business models. […] As long as [our decision makers] can show our audit 
committees and our auditors… that the rate of return on the financial investment is 
sound. And that we are confident we’ve done enough due diligence on the business 
structure […] that that money is a safe investment. 
Sandra, City & County of Swansea 
Simon (Birmingham) agreed, and envisaged that the potential extension to 
district energy provision in the city would be called in for review over the 
value for money by the Scrutiny Committee covering transportation, waste 
and sustainability. The potential expansion represented a major extension to 
the existing district heating scheme and would, if pursued, connect to heat 
sources at Tyseley Energy Park42 (3-4 miles from the city centre). This 
included a proposed new energy from waste facility, as the replacement for a 
council owned waste incinerator the contract for which was due to expire in 
2019. There was also potential to utilise heat produced from 10 MW waste 
wood biomass power plant which supplied manufacturing on the Tyseley site. 
How, if at all, this proposed extension would integrate with the existing city 
centre networks (operated under a long term concession contract with Engie 
Ltd) had not been resolved at the time of our interview. However, Simon 
emphasised that a review of a project of this scale was to be expected: 
  
                                            
42 Tyseley Energy Park was a relatively new renewal of an old industrial area. 
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you’d expect that we’d be called in and scrutinised and told to explain exactly why 
these things are a good idea. When we go we expect that they’ll be looking at the 
minutiae to the big overarching outcomes. […] They always like to scrutinise the 
financial, the legal and commercial. 
Simon, Birmingham City Council 
As Simon pointed out, the focus on the review would be about the financial, 
legal and commercial issues. Conversely, carbon saving or clean energy 
were not noted as significant. Hannah (Bath) agreed, but expanded that the 
internal Scrutiny Committee ‘called in’ projects for different reasons. Hannah 
explained that following a change in administration from Liberal Democrat to 
Conservative, the Scrutiny Committee reviewed the decision to co-finance 
the 2.34 MW Wilmington Solar Farm (alongside a member share offer) 
through a loan to Bath and West Community Energy, a community benefit 
society. The review considered whether onward lending represented value 
for money, as well as dealing with queries about State Aid43. But it also 
provided a route to discharge political opposition to the solar farm. In 
particular, the new Scrutiny Committee included opponents to onshore 
renewables in rural Bath and North East Somerset. Thus, although the 
energy project had represented ‘best value’ to the council under one political 
party, this was not set in stone. Within formal channels that were notionally 
about ensuring councils incorporated the Best Value Framework, the 
incoming administration had the opportunity to attempt to destabilise 
subsequent development of the energy project under the same procedure. 
This provides an example of the potential destructiveness of such a fluid and 
slippery boundary object as Best Value; there was scope to attempt to 
disassemble the value of the energy project. 
Preparing the report: negotiation and translation 
The programme of governing built around the Best Value Framework in the 
council system of accountability is enacted through Executive and Committee 
meetings and formal reports which are submitted for approval. These reports 
                                            
43 State Aid is where there is potential for public funds to distort market competition. 
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varied, depending on the stage of the project, but they explain what decision 
is being made, why and detail the relevant underpinning evidence. For 
example, a report could be detailing the resources needed to further develop 
a project, an update/review on progress, approval of capital investment, 
approval of a formal business case, or award of a major procurement 
contract (sometimes with the status of a Key Decision, see Chapter 5). 
Council decision making which these reports feed into, and the review and 
scrutiny function described above, form an important element in satisfying 
the requirement that councils ensure decisions are underpinned by Best 
Value procedures. Small areas of interpretative flexibility existed within the 
preparation of these reports for submission. Officers attempted to exploit 
these opportunities to progress energy projects through this formalised 
process. 
 
The standardised process entailed completing a formal report template. 
Where the project was at a stage involving allocation of resources, the 
evidence used included assessing different options for the energy project, 
such as different business and ownership models against a do-nothing 
situation. A preferred option needed to be presented, and justified as to how 
it met project objectives. Options appraisal and financial due diligence 
emerged as particularly significant to demonstrating this. Some form of 
options appraisal or business case evaluation was typically used to meet this 
requirement. 
 
Officers accounts revealed that considerable negotiation and ‘translating’ 
work was fundamental to the procedural system that governed report 
preparation. A formal step here was securing sign-off from various council 
departments on the content of the document. Officers in Derby, Fife, 
Leicester and Swansea explained how different departments were 
responsible for documenting the expected ‘implications’ arising from the 
project proposal. As Chris (Leicester) put it, “there’s a range of people that 
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would feed into these [reports …] There’ll be comments on finance… from 
legal… there will be any other implications which pull in a range of comments 
on that particular scheme.” ‘Implications’ were grouped into sub-sections 
spanning finance, legal, personnel, equalities, ICT, health and safety, and in 
some cases environmental sustainability (with slight variation depending on 
the council/project). Each sub-section was completed and signed off by the 
department responsible. Sandra (Swansea) made the point that this was “a 
standard process” that applied to every report. 
 
To progress the report through decision making channels, different actors 
across the council therefore needed to converge. The interactions between 
project officers, and Finance and Legal teams in this valuation practice were 
pivotal. Sign-off from these teams was a fixed requirement, with little 
flexibility or option for divergence. As John (Derby) stated, “So on that report 
[for Ram Energy] you have to see that Legal have signed it off for it to go 
through”. Charles (Fife) similarly noted the significance of Finance 
colleagues, “the finance professional has to say, ‘I believe this will work.’ So 
they have to trust what they see in front of them”. Within the confines of this 
valuation practice, constituting that the energy project demonstrated ‘best 
value’ was dependent on the success of this specific internal collaboration. 
“For a report to go through for consideration [by Council Cabinet], there won’t 
be any disagreement. The disagreement will happen before it goes through” 
(John, Derby). Legal and Finance teams were thus key gatekeepers in 
defining that an energy project provided ‘best value’ to the council. 
 
Although securing sign-off from Legal and Finance departments was a 
standard step, it was not straightforward or predictable. Interviewees’ 
accounts (including in Cambridgeshire, Derby, Hull, Fife, Leeds and a Welsh 
intermediary agency) illustrated that this process of value-making was reliant 
on relationships across council departments, and officers’ interpersonal skills. 
However, this also depended on the level of knowledge about local energy 
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among colleagues in Legal and Finance teams, and their preconceptions 
about the value of a local authority energy project. The lack of direct statutory 
function meant local energy had no central legitimacy, and as a result, Legal 
and Finance departments were typically not familiar with the intricacies of 
energy initiatives. 
 
Securing commitment from Finance and Legal involved answering questions, 
considering their comments, and revising the proposal iteratively before the 
final sign-off. At each stage, the energy project and how it demonstrated 
‘best value’ was open to negotiation and change. A key aspect was 
understanding why the specified recommendation was being made. 
Depending on the outcome of these negotiations, proposals either 
incorporated comments and were submitted, or required revision to secure 
sign-off. Where this valuation practice failed, energy projects were prevented 
from going forward in their development. In this way, energy projects were 
shaped by the cross-council assembly of formal valuations. 
 
Energy officers therefore needed to ensure there was enough ‘translation’ so 
that Finance colleagues understood the value of the energy project. Issues 
were particularly acute in unfamiliar or ‘novel’ projects. A specific area of 
tension in energy performance contracting projects was the ‘guaranteed 
savings’ contract structure. This is a core aspect of the council contract with 
the energy services company that underwrites a specified level of savings 
from retrofit of council buildings (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Darren (Hull) 
and Daniel (Cardiff) both identified that Finance colleagues were unfamiliar 
with this contract structure. A key task to securing sign-off on the report was 
to spend time explaining how the contract worked in more detail: 
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Politically there was a buy in to Re:fit [the energy performance contract] but… some 
parts of Finance wanted more reassurance that we actually were going to be able to 
deliver the energy savings that were guaranteed. […] So we’ve had to work quite 
hard in terms of showing how the [contract] works. That the guarantee is a solid 
thing. 
Darren, Kingston upon Hull City Council 
All the energy performance contracting projects in this sample were a first for 
the respective councils. Prior knowledge, or lack thereof, was thus at least 
part of the explanation for the understandable lack of knowledge about the 
financial and legal arrangements. This is explored further in Chapter 9. 
 
Similarly this applied to other types of projects that were new to individual 
councils. John (Derby) for instance emphasised there was initial uncertainty 
from Legal colleagues over supporting Ram Energy, which was a project to 
set up a local energy tariff. Having researched different options, John 
recommended in the report the use of a white label approach that partnered 
with a not-for-profit municipal energy supplier (Robin Hood Energy Ltd). 
Under a white label arrangement, a local tariff is offered to a specified area 
(i.e. Derbyshire) or group of people (such as social housing tenants) and an 
existing licensed energy retail company is used to provide the back office 
functions and comply with licensed energy supply regulations. Being 
unfamiliar with the regulatory differences between types of energy tariffs and 
supply companies, Legal colleagues originally thought the council would 
need to obtain licenses from Ofgem and were unsure about supporting the 
proposal. Following some discussion between John and his colleague, and 
confirmation from Robin Hood Energy that they had the necessary licenses 
and regulatory approval, the Legal team signed off on the report and it was 
submitted. Securing collective agreement on the recommended approach, 
here a white label initiative, was thus significant to material development of 
the project. The recommendation which is supported as a demonstration of 
‘best value’ to the council, simultaneously represents a judgement about 
which local energy governance and organisation model is most suitable.   
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Where the concerns of Finance and Legal teams were unresolved and they 
decided not to support the proposal, this stopped the valuation practice, and 
the project, all together. As Sandra (Swansea) stated, “if they feel that the 
risk is too great, they won’t move it forward”. The entire internal procedure 
intended to ensure that ‘best value’ is secured to the council could therefore 
by default prevent energy projects ever getting beyond initial development 
stages. 
 
The process prior to submission was hence a crucial point which aimed to 
establish consensus on the direction of the project. Rob (Calderdale) 
emphasised that, given the lack of a ‘corporate agenda’ for local energy, he 
could not “necessarily expect” legal personnel to assist in developing project 
proposals or documentation for formal valuations. Grace, who worked in an 
intermediary role supporting Welsh local authorities to develop energy 
programmes on their own estates, elaborated. Grace noted that Finance 
Departments she worked with had limited reference points over the value of 
local authority involvement, and were generally not familiar with reviewing 
energy project proposals. Insufficient ‘translation’ work had been done to 
overcome this and make opportunities more acceptable to Finance teams. 
Council [X] could be saving £2million [on the corporate estate through energy retrofit 
[…] We identified the asset savings, and they still haven’t managed to implement it 
yet [...] They have a risk averse Finance team because people haven’t understood 
the opportunity. No one has translated the report into something that Finance can 
understand. 
Grace, Welsh Intermediary Agency 
As a result, instead of developing the report provided by Grace’s organisation 
into a formal document for approval, progress on the entire project of 
upgrading council buildings had stalled. The programme of governing built 
around the Best Value Framework can thwart an energy project from going 
ahead. The justificatory activity involved in demonstrating ‘best value’ 
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through formal valuation channels was demanding for an energy project, 
given the lack of necessary expertise in the council. 
Preparing the report: co-creation and collaboration 
Securing the support of other departments thus involved a degree of creative 
thinking. Progressing through this critical juncture was often reliant on a 
willingness to adopt a collaborative approach between project officers and 
Finance teams. The cases of Leeds, Fife and Cambridgeshire exemplify how 
the combined authority of the respective specialisms underpinned the 
preferred approach for the energy project recommended in the report. 
 
In Leeds, the team responsible for leading development of the city centre 
heat network was located within the Projects, Programmes and Procurement 
Unit that developed major capital schemes. For the heat network, skills and 
knowledge within the Unit included technical energy expertise, but also 
project accountants and solicitors experienced in large scale private finance 
initiatives, financial modelling, contractual issues and risk mitigation. The 
heat network business case was based on council ownership and part-
financing through prudential borrowing, alongside grant and housing revenue 
account budget. 
 
Approval needed to be secured from the Executive Board to access around 
£14 million of prudential borrowing from the PWLB. For this, the Unit relied 
on expertise in Corporate Finance, who emerged as a particularly critical 
actor. Peter emphasised that Corporate Finance’s experience in capital 
borrowing provided a reference point for financing the heat network which 
translated the ‘novel’ heat network project into something more familiar. The 
Corporate Finance team had “been surprisingly relaxed, even when we 
highlighted all the risks” (Peter, Leeds). In turn, the Corporate Finance team 
helped Peter with the crucial tasks of building the business case and 
preparing the report. Peter stated that, “they’ve been very able to help us to 
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get the paper to the Executive Board to get the borrowing approved [… they] 
help[ed] build the business case in the right way to secure prudential 
borrowing”. The skills, expertise and willingness of finance officers were thus 
critical to demonstrating that the heat network project could be evaluated 
within the formal confines of the procedures governing the operation of the 
Best Value Framework in council decision making. 
 
In Fife, to secure sign-off from Finance and in turn senior management, 
energy officers started working more closely with finance colleagues on 
preparing the reports. This first emerged because the Energy team had 
exhausted most of the ‘easier’ energy projects (these were routinely included 
for approval as part of the capital expenditure programme, with a payback of 
under five years). Projects no longer fitted this criterion and the Energy 
team’s request for capital funds faced opposition from Finance, who operated 
as gatekeepers. 
 
Charles’ (Fife) account emphasised that the Energy team’s limited ability to 
write the report in “finance speak” prevented projects moving forward. Thus, 
the problem was not the energy projects per se, but rather the associated 
material that was not interpretable to Finance. In response, the Energy team 
devised a valuation practice which included a collaborative process of 
‘translation’. This involved co-producing the documentation with an 
accountant, Sally, to ensure that the material would be convincing to the 
Finance approval group. 
 
Charles noted that this process sought to share ownership of the project 
across Energy, Finance and Management. Importantly, this collaborative 
process created a route for the Finance team to understand the value of the 
Energy team (as opposed to the project per se), and their expertise in local 
energy. Charles (Fife) described this as helping the accountant understand 
that energy projects were underpinned by the “skills and profession… and 
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expertise” of Ed, the Energy Manager. This assured Sally, the finance expert, 
that Ed, the energy expert, “understand[s] what the measures [a]re and 
understand[s] the risks in that process” (Charles, Fife). With an improved 
understanding about the energy knowledge and expertise that underpinned 
the projects being proposed, Sally then translated this into the report and 
explained it to Finance managers. In turn, this provided Finance with 
confidence that the proposals and associated risks had been fully understood 
and evaluated by the Energy team. Critically, without this translation work, it 
was not possible to assemble the value of energy projects within the 
formalised system of approval.  
 
In Cambridgeshire, the council’s Mobilising Local Energy Investment project 
(MLEI, 2012-2016) was funded through Intelligent Energy Europe. As part of 
this, the council was awarded a ‘technical assistance’ grant to fund an in-
house team to deliver a programme of local energy investment44. This had a 
minimum capital expenditure value of £15 million. Cambridgeshire had 
chosen to develop a large scale 12 MW solar farm and retrofit county council 
buildings through an EPC. PWLB borrowing financed the individual projects. 
Approval required preparing documentation for the Finances and Resources 
Committee. Sharon, who led the team was, like Charles (Fife) above, reliant 
on the expertise of a council accountant to help prepare the documentation.  
 
However, the first attempt at the necessary inter-departmental collaboration 
was a failure. This prevented development of the funding model that would 
allow the efficiency improvements to be made on the corporate estate. 
Subsequently, the Finance Director agreed to change the accountant 
working with Sharon. The new accountant, Thomas, created a cash flow 
model over a 15 year loan that would enable the EPC project to be rolled out 
                                            
44 The programme in Oxford was funded under the same MLEI programme; in the sample, larger 
programmes were delivered in Bristol and Manchester as part of the Elena programme delivered 
through the European Investment Bank (see Tingey & Webb, 2020b). 
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across the schools estate. They also worked on an off-balance sheet to 
satisfy the funding conditions of academy schools in England. Similar to the 
Fife case, Thomas was able use his relationships within Finance to gauge 
support from the Director for the financing structure that was being 
developed. He also directly helped prepare the formal report for the 
Committee. Sharon explained how this opened up a route to ensuring the 
energy project report conformed to the decision making process: 
the Finance Director helped by moving in a group accountant [Thomas] who was, 
‘we can do this, this is how we do it. OK, there’s a bit of risk, let’s manage that.’ And 
[that] just transformed how we could all bring in the multi-disciplinary set of skills to 
make it happen and do it. 
Sharon, Cambridgeshire County Council 
In a further step, both Sharon and Thomas attended the Finance and 
Resources Committee together, and respectively answered questions about 
the project and its funding. Significantly, this demonstrated the authority and 
expertise behind the energy proposal. As Sharon’s words explain: 
when you’re leading a project you can’t be expert in everything […] one of the best 
things is when an expert is willing to put themselves next to you. [… Thomas]… sat 
with me [at the committee meeting] and when people were giving finance questions 
[…] he took them. And he came across with authority… If I’d been on my own […] I 
don’t know how I would have dealt with [those questions], which might have put an 
uncertainty in member’s minds. 
Sharon, Cambridgeshire County Council 
Collaboration within this formal valuation system was thus a critical juncture 
that secured the sign-off of the borrowing and the overall project structure. 
The report’s function satisfied the requirement that councils underpin 
decisions with Best Value procedures. Without this, the pipeline of project 
investments being developed by the energy team would have stopped, at 
least until an alternative funding route was found, but potentially all together. 
As this case in particular emphasises, the willingness of an individual officer 
– here an accountant – to understand a novel energy initiative and help 
create a solution was critical to the project successfully getting through the 
decision making procedures in the council. This case also highlighted that 
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this was down to chance; the first attempt failed, and it was dependent on the 
availability of a second accountant to step into this joint valuation practice. 
The ability for an energy project to be made commensurate within the report 
thus relied on a high degree of serendipity. As such, this suggests it is 
unlikely that energy projects are routinely translated into the formal 
requirement to demonstrate ‘best value’ in procedural terms. 
7.4 Conclusion: making sense of the Best Value 
Framework and local energy 
In this chapter, I aimed to uncover what happened to the negotiation of value 
as the energy project was made the subject of the Best Value Framework. 
The analysis was built on the conjecture that local authorities’ routine and 
everyday ‘valuation practices’ are developed around, and in response to, a 
‘programme of governing’. The Best Value Framework is one such attempt 
within this programme of governing to control the actions and agency of local 
authorities. 
 
Guidelines discussed in Chapter 6 explain that council duties for securing 
‘best value’ in local services combine an uneasy mix of both narrower value 
for money concepts associated with public sector efficiency, and broader 
notions of social value, environment and sustainability. As a valuation 
practice, findings reveal much of what was practiced in relation to the Best 
Value Framework was narrowly constituted as procedural accountability: the 
mechanisms in place that enabled a local authority to demonstrate that their 
decision making processes were aligned with ‘value for money’. Within 
procedural accountability, the broader value concepts of social and 
environmental value were not routinely stabilised. 
 
These findings provide new depth about the extension of a programme of 
neo-liberal governing through formal tools and procedures, and its effects on 
local energy. First, findings illustrate that as a framing device, the entire 
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decision making process in local government that this chapter examined – 
the preparation of reports, the sign-off from different council departments, 
formal approval from decision making bodies, audit and scrutiny of decisions 
– pursued a restricted enactment of the Best Value Framework, closely tied 
to the extension of value for money. The energy project in turn needed to be 
made calculable and representable within these valuation practices. This 
translated the assembly of value in an energy project primarily into a 
technocratic process which functioned to show ‘correct’ decision making 
principles had been incorporated, in particular options appraisal and financial 
due diligence. 
 
This provides evidence in support of the argument that such procedural 
accountability enacts and extends “historically specific modes of power” 
(Miller, 2008, p. 57). In this instance, they brought into being notions of value 
for money in public spending, rather than the material substance of the 
project in terms of energy or carbon saving, or the wider value concepts 
which the Best Value Framework supposedly includes. Despite the fact that 
some officers interpreted project objectives about energy, carbon and social 
values in relation to what constituted ‘best value’, energy and carbon saving 
were essentially irrelevant to this procedural valuation practice. The valuation 
practices that satisfied the Best Value Framework were not, therefore, those 
which delivered carbon saving or clean energy. Consequently, it is important 
to question the suitability of framing devices such as Best Value for delivering 
local energy projects. 
 
Nevertheless, findings illustrated officers’ subtle and complex understandings 
of the value for money concept. It was interpreted in relation to the energy 
project in hand, and the skills, expertise and capacity to deliver it. 
Particularly, this related to the diversion of limited resources to more 
complex, large scale and multi-actor energy projects. This was often at the 
expense of progressing on more manageable and deliverable small scale 
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corporate estate projects. Furthermore, the lack of necessary legal and 
financing expertise for energy projects was raised. This suggested limited 
capacity for councils to pursue more complex energy projects with unfamiliar 
political, technical and financial risks. Discussions focussed on whether 
devoting officer time and council resources to such developments were good 
uses of public money. The lack of a statutory mandate for energy and the 
mounting pressures of austerity exacerbated these issues. 
 
Additionally, findings provide new evidence about the status of expertise and 
the necessary cross-council collaboration required to underpin energy project 
valuations. It was critical that valuations could defend that multiple voices 
across the council – notably, Legal and Finance teams – had been consulted 
and agreed on the proposed approach for the energy project. These teams 
were integral elements to showing the authority of knowledge and expertise 
that sat behind the energy project. If the energy project could not fit and 
conform to these established procedures, evidence showed they could stall 
at this juncture. ‘Co-producing’ energy projects with Finance teams emerged 
as a successful tactic which officers deployed to assemble the actor-network 
required. The status of expertise, or types of knowledge, therefore matters to 
valuations. Importantly, not all forms of expertise appear equal. Energy 
expertise, on its own, did not appear sufficient to progress an energy project 
through the formal decision making procedures. 
 
This chapter has tracked the energy project as it became entangled with the 
Best Value Framework. Formal decision making procedures which enact this 
were primarily focussed on the public sector concept of value for money. This 
was generally reduced to financial value within the procedural system of 
decision making (although some officers had more nuanced views), and 
largely edited energy and carbon saving out of valuation practices. Beyond 
these formalised procedures, this chapter also reported findings about how 
officers actually interpreted ‘best value’ in a local energy project. This 
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concluded that some officers linked what constituted ‘best value’ in an energy 
project in relation to its business case, especially financial affordability and 
whether a project could cover borrowing costs. Additionally, what 
substantiated ‘best value’ was determined through public procurement and 
the responses from bidders. The next two chapters respectively build on 
each of these points. Chapter 8, which directly follows, considers the 
‘business case’ in more detail. Analysis asks what this object is, examines 
the influence of financial value in shaping investment decisions, and 






8 The Business Case and Assembling the 
Value of Local Energy 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified that some form of ‘business case’ was 
variously implicated in satisfying the procedural requirements of the Best 
Value Framework. Building on that, my aims in this chapter are to examine 
how local authorities are assessing options for energy investment through 
development of a business case, and explore the contested valuation 
practices surrounding it. The remainder of the Introduction reprises key 
points about the business case model depicted in guidelines. I also elaborate 
on the concept of economisation, which plays a more prominent role in the 
analysis of energy project valuation practices in this chapter. What follows is 
a qualitative examination into negotiating value, as the business case is 
brought into being and the energy project is made commensurate with it. 
 
Chapter 6 argued that the business case is a significant and consequential 
valuation framework. Across guidelines, the business case is recommended 
as the ‘correct’ options appraisal tool for assessing new programmes and 
projects, including capital investment projects. The UK Treasury’s Green 
Book develops the ‘five case model’, which involves constructing and 
assessing the strategic, economic, commercial, financial and management 
case. This is proposed to take place over three phases of project 
development: at scoping stage (strategic business case), prior to 
procurement (outline business case), and prior to awarding contracts (full 
business case). 
 
Of particular relevance to this chapter is the Green Book’s method for 
constructing the economic case. This involves calculating ‘net present value’, 
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which intends to assess the socio-economic value of options in relation to 
their net benefits to society. Guidelines argue calculating a net present value 
figure is the optimal way of measuring benefits to society. Consequently, 
guidelines strongly advocate that decision makers use the highest net 
present value figure to decide how to proceed. By attempting to standardise 
the representation of value, the business case therefore has considerable 
potential to influence decisions about whether to proceed with an energy 
project, its structure and finance. However, evaluation of the actual use of the 
business case reported mixed findings in how it was adopted among local 
authorities (see Chapter 6). This invites an investigation into what assembly 
of the business case actually entails. 
 
To explore this further, in this chapter I draw more centrally on the concept of 
‘economisation’ (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009; 2010) to conceptualise the 
business case as a valuation practice. Economisation suggests a particular 
pervasiveness of economistic rationales in valuations using frameworks such 
as the business case. Callon (2007) uses the term ‘economics in the wild’, to 
denote valuation frameworks in a broad range of different settings and 
contexts that are involved in the calculation and rendering of economic value. 
In a local authority context, the calculation and measurements associated 
with the business case are a form of economics in the wild. It is not a setting 
of economic science, or the formal application of a finance theory, but rather 
an organisational context drawing on a set of tools to create an assessment 
of an energy project’s value. According to this perspective, business case 
assessments are likely to conform to economistic definitions.  
 
I use this to interrogate how forms of economic and financial value shape the 
assessment of options for investing in a local energy project, and how this 
restricts other forms of social and environmental value, and public goods. In 
Section 8.2, I explore the construction of the energy project business case, 
emphasising how contra to guidelines, it resists conforming to a single stable 
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definition. Section 8.3 considers how the energy project business case is 
actually assessed. This explores the influence of wider organisational 
pressures in restricting the inclusion of socio-economic and low carbon 
values in business case valuations. Section 8.4 explores how short-term 
financial pressures were mediated and contested. This identifies how some 
local officials have wrestled with these tensions and attempted to 
institutionalise local energy through the creative use of the business case. 
Section 8.5 discusses the struggles in translating the value of local energy 
initiatives into a ‘viable’ business case for investment. 
8.2 Constructing an energy project business case 
In contrast to the standardised object described in the guidelines, this 
empirical investigation into the process of constructing a business case 
revealed a variety of approaches. Reflecting a high degree of interpretative 
flexibility, I observed seven different energy project business case assembly 
processes. Practices spanned instances when no formal business case was 
put together, through to extensive business case development. The influence 
of local standards and norms, and specific tailored approaches that 
responded to the financial arrangements of an individual energy project were 
key themes. Table 8.1 summarises the seven approaches. 
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Table 8.1 Seven different business case assembly processes 
Projects subject to business case formalities 
Business Case 
Assembly Process Description 
Energy projects & 
capex range 
Akin to 5 case 
model 
Assembly process follows iterations of 
techno-economic feasibility studies & 
business case development, generally 
following outline, strategic to full business 
case1. Process can take several years for 
large scale projects. Often to draws on 
external consultancy and legal expertise.  




Similar to above, with additional 
requirements: IEE MLEI & EIB Elena 
programmes2 investment targets requiring 
extensive business case development & 
monitoring for individual projects to 
ensure the investment target is met. 









Devised approaches prioritise different 
elements of the financial case of a project, 
such as cash flow models. 
LED street lighting, 




Project involves onward lending &/or 
investing directly in community owned 
scheme. Due diligence & compliance with 
State Aid shape extensive scrutiny of 
financial case within business case 
evaluation & use of legal expertise.  




Individual business cases which assess 
factors such as payback, KPIs & carbon 
reduction. Projects funded through spend-
to-save criteria from internal climate 
change budgets. 
Corporate estate EE 
& onsite gen, under 
£1m 
Projects largely avoiding business case formalities 
Light touch model 
Similar to Carbon reduction plan model in 
terms of using spend-to-save criteria of 
capital cost & payback as main evaluation 
factors, but distinct in that officers 
specifically noted that this was not a 
business case evaluation. 
Corporate estate EE 
& onsite gen, under 
£1m 
No direct business 
case model per se 
Energy projects reported under different 
functions without formal use of business 
case. 
Domestic retrofit, 
district energy, CHP, 




1 May not include all 5 cases, or all 3 stages. 
2 These were European technical assistance ‘Elena’ and ‘MLEI’ programmes where an investment 
target must be met. 
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As Table 8.1 shows, district energy projects in particular shared much more 
extensive, and often iterative techno-economic feasibility studies and 
business case development. The latter sometimes took place over several 
years with multiple iterations following the more prescriptive progression 
through strategic, outline and full business case processes associated with 
the recommended ‘five case model’, such as in Enfield. For instance, 
calculation of net present value was commonly included.  
 
The ‘five case model’ however emerged as a narrow definition of what 
constituted a business case assembly process. The six alternative valuation 
practices (identified in Table 8.1) illustrated quite extreme levels of 
interpretative flexibility. In the technical assistance model, grant funding paid 
for a ‘project development unit’ in the local authority to develop a pipeline of 
local energy projects. Grant conditions required meeting a specified 
investment target (in Bristol, Cambridgeshire, Manchester, Oxford). If the 
target is missed, the local authority is liable to repay some of the grant. In 
response, there was a high level of business case development for the 
project pipelines to meet the target. Sometimes, but not always, this involved 
calculating a net present value; for example, in energy performance 
contracting it was typical to consider costs and payback, but not generate a 
net present value. In contrast to both of these approaches, the finance 
department-led model had more focus on structuring project financing to 
cover borrowing and secure cash flows. For example, street lighting and 
corporate estate projects in Warrington and Peterborough used different 
accounting devices to manage this. This is explored further in Section 8.4. 
Hence assembly of the business case was shaped by project specific factors 
and did not conform to the narrower definitions set out in guidelines. 
 
Illustrating further interpretative flexibility, projects involving onward lending 
required that the business case incorporate due diligence and demonstration 
of compliance with State Aid. For example, in Bath and North East Somerset 
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Council, the business case process for the Wilmington Farm solar project 
had additional requirements because it involved onward lending to Bath and 
West Community Energy (BWCE) who were the official project owner. As a 
result of having established a cooperation agreement with BWCE, the 
Council intended to provide a £500,000 loan from their Green Investment 
and Jobs Fund, as partial financing alongside a member share offer. This led 
to a series of tailored valuation practices in assembly of the business case. 
First, the sustainability team “had to really demonstrate that the finances 
stacked up” (Hannah, Bath), which led to a greater degree of coordination 
with finance than normal, as well as presenting the business case to senior 
managers. Second, compliance with State Aid meant the business case 
represented what Hannah termed “a whole burden of proof”, that resulted in 
a back-and-forth process with external financial and legal advisors in order to 
understand how to meet the requirements. 
on the State Aid question, we went round on that for a little while, thinking that we 
didn’t need to worry about it, then finding that we did. That was, ‘Are we offering a 
market advantage in terms of offering a particularly low interest rate?’ We had to 
demonstrate that the rate we were offering, which I believe was 6% was comparable 
to the market. That is a hard case to make because the case we made for giving 
them a loan in the first place was that they couldn’t get this sort of money from the 
bank. 
Hannah, Bath & North East Somerset Council 
Hannah characterised this complex procedure as “much more formal as a 
process” than for many other projects undertaken by the sustainability team. 
For most energy projects “saying business case maybe makes it a bit more 
formal than it is. It’s more like we would put a case, so we would make the 
argument”. It thus went beyond the more informal development which 
characterised many other energy initiatives Hannah’s team worked on, and 
illustrates how the business case in practice is much more open to 
interpretation than suggested by guidelines. 
 
Less extensive business case assembly processes were associated with the 
carbon reduction plan model, whilst the light touch and no direct business 
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case models both largely avoided the formalities of business case assembly 
altogether. Generally, but not exclusively, these were all associated with 
smaller scale corporate estate energy projects funded through internal 
climate change or carbon reduction funds of around £1 million. These funded 
projects were on a ‘spend-to-save’ basis where financial saving and/or 
income generation accrued from the project covers or exceeds its capital 
outlay. 
 
In the carbon reduction plan model the construction of a business case was 
used for individual projects. For example, an internal revolving Climate 
Change Fund (around £1 million) in Cambridge City Council was used for 
corporate estate carbon reduction projects. Rebecca noted the key aspects 
that the individual business cases focussed on, stating, “[Projects] were all 
put forward and the business cases were developed for each of the projects 
that started to identify some of those key performance measures and the 
payback and the carbon reduction.” Depending on the complexity of the 
project and the amount of Climate Change Fund budget a project would 
require, business case assessment also variously incorporated initial desktop 
assessment (i.e. small feasibility studies), risk registers, and named project 
leads. 
 
In the light touch model there were some similarities, namely the use of 
examining costs and payback. The main difference was that these valuation 
practices were not reliant on the use of a business case for individual 
corporate estate energy projects. As a result, even projects with similar 
characteristics were developed with different valuation practices. For 
instance, Chris (Leicester) highlighted this lighter touch approach, noting key 
questions about financial costs and carbon saving for individual projects, 
“does it stack up financially, does it reduce carbon? You know, it ticks those 
particular boxes so go ahead and invest in it. I don’t think there’s anything 
more that really features”. This light touch model was thus a relatively 
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straightforward approval process for small scale carbon reduction projects on 
the corporate estate. After a small assessment these could go ahead, as 
long as they were within budget. 
 
Finally some established procedures negated the use of formalised business 
cases of any kind. This was for councils’ carbon management plan projects, 
which also used internal carbon and climate change budgets (i.e. same 
funding approach as previous two models discussed), and for grant funded 
domestic energy efficiency and district heating. An example of the former 
comes from Jason (Aberdeenshire), who emphasised that because the 
annual Carbon Reduction Budget (around £500,000 – £1million per annum) 
was already established, projects were reported against the budget, rather 
than undergoing individual business case assessment. James stated, “There 
isn’t a business case to develop [for these projects] because they’re just 
reported to committee as the delivery of that budget”. Again, this reinforces 
that projects with similar characteristics were subjected to different business 
case assembly processes. 
 
Dundee’s council-owned and operated district heating network and external 
insulation project also fell within established procedures, here reporting to the 
Housing Committee. The heat network served c.1,100 social housing 
properties (primarily multi-storey with some low risk blocks) and was mostly 
externally funded from Energy Company Obligation financing (via British 
Gas), with limited Council capital investment from the housing programme 
and a government grant. 
 
The Dundee case serves to further illustrate the high level of interpretative 
flexibility in how to apply the business case device, if at all. Dundee adopted 
an “opportunistic” and “evolving” (Alison, Dundee) process of project 
development without a ‘formal’ business case evaluation. Scottish Quality 
Housing Standards and alleviating fuel poverty initially drove Dundee’s 
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exploration of different funding routes suited to district heating and insulation 
measures, which were preferred to straight renewal of electric storage 
heating. Alison described this process as the “opportunistic grabbing of 
available external funding [… to] put multiple measures in”, where identifying 
an energy supplier who was willing to work with them “almost evolved to a 
conversation of, ‘This is the stock we’ve got, we don’t know what to do. On 
their side this is the funding they’ve got, what can we do?’” Having identified 
the potential partnership with a willing supplier, a report, but not a business 
case, was provided to the Housing Committee because there was some 
financial input from the Council’s housing budget. 
there’s was no formal VFM [value for money] exercise or anything like that […] if we 
were going to a more formal procurement route those sort of considerations would 
come into it, and these kind of [business case] exercises, a bit more formal, financial 
modelling and such like. But no… although it was a multi-million pound contract, it 
was slightly more informal. 
Alison, Dundee City Council 
In Alison’s own words this process was “more informal” than it might be in 
other energy projects. Under the surface this emphasises the adaptability of 
the business case ‘stage’ in an energy project. Alison’s account also alludes 
to the relationship between demonstration of value for money – a key issue 
to local authority valuations raised in Chapter 7 – and procurement. This is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 9. 
 
Starting with the energy project and not the guidelines uncovers considerable 
diversity in what actually constitutes the business case. What is shown most 
clearly is that the ‘five case model’ promoted in government guidelines fails 
to capture the diversity of what ‘users’ of the business case device actually 
do. 
 
Generally business case development, of any type observed, was more 
prominent in larger projects. But as we have seen, what this amounted to 
was noticeably varied. The business case device was thus not clear cut, 
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having no stable form across the local authorities. Instead, as a valuation 
practice, the process of constructing the business case was open to 
customisation and resisted conforming to a single definition. As a result of 
this, despite efforts to govern decision making, council valuation practices 
resist conforming. This serves to illustrate the limits of the programme of 
governing, as exercised through this valuation framework. 
 
In particular, business case valuations illustrated finitism in the interpretation 
of rules. They relied on high levels of user discretion and interpretation. 
Examples of this included the seven different types of business case 
assembly process, as well as the fact that officers noted nuanced 
modifications to their own established business case development processes 
for individual projects. The process was open to a high degree of tailoring for 
the project in question and depended on user discretion and judgement. 
 
Taking assembly of the business case as a valuation practice therefore leads 
to considerable problematisation of what constitutes the ‘business case’ in an 
energy project. It strongly implies the ‘stage’ of a business case in the energy 
project is more complicated than it first appears, and that this is poorly 
captured in guidelines. Given these findings, it also suggests that 
assessment of the business case is unlikely to utilise the NPV approach 
recommended in ‘five case model’ guidelines. The next section considers 
how decision makers actually assess the energy project ‘business case’, 
however it has been assembled. 
8.3 Assessing the energy project business case: 
money talks 
The narratives presented in guidelines concerning both the business case 
and the Best Value Framework promote the idea that councils should be able 
to incorporate multiple forms of value when assessing energy projects. 
Asking officers about investment decisions showed that reality contrasted 
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with the suggested implementation of the business case device. A central 
theme was a continual marginalisation of non-financial objectives at the point 
of the business case investment decision. This is an instance of 
economisation: despite the prominence of carbon saving, environmental and 
socio-economic objectives in shaping the original rationale, non-financial 
value was squeezed out of decision making.  
 
Both questionnaire and interview data identified a variety of social, 
environmental and local economic values that motivated development of 
energy initiatives. In the questionnaire, 36 respondents answered a multiple 
choice question about energy project objectives. The most frequently 
selected objectives, where over half of respondents chose these options, 
were carbon reduction (29 responses), energy resilience (23), reducing 
energy demand and affordable warmth (both 19). Officers consistently 
reinforced and elaborated on this during interview, describing numerous non-
financial objectives and benefits across multiple types of projects. For 
example, for the phased development of the Energetik district energy 
network, William (Enfield) raised multiple benefits which were expected to 
accrue locally: 
there’s some huge benefits, fuel poverty, local air quality – especially in London 
which is a huge issue – so at Meridian Water [the new housing development] you 
won’t be needing any individual gas boilers. […]. Obviously the carbon reduction, the 
regeneration and investment […] certainly the feeling is that there’s so much local 
benefit to be had that it’s well worth doing [... And] there’ll be certain jobs that could 
definitely match capabilities. I think, well, harness that. 
William, London Borough of Enfield 
Energy projects were thus commonly framed in terms of ‘multiple benefits’ 
(including fuel poverty, carbon reduction, air quality and local economic 
activity). For example, Andrew (Gateshead) raised how multiple local 
economic objectives shaped the council’s interest in pursuing energy 
projects, particularly regeneration, local business activity and supporting 
developers. Similarly, Rebecca (Bath) emphasised the contribution to 
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improved health, amelioration of fuel poverty, community resilience and 
carbon saving. Ben (Manchester) described the inter-connections between 
local energy and the overall health, well-being and prosperity of local 
residents. Paul (Greater Manchester Combined Authority) emphasised that 
as a public sector organisation, financial value was not the primary objective. 
He stated, “with a public sector outlook as opposed to a private sector 
outlook […] it’s about why there’s a benefit to GM [Greater Manchester], the 
community, the workforce… rather than, ‘How much money can you make 
me and how much money can you bring in?’” This opinion was shared by 
others, such as David (Newcastle) who pointed toward fairness and equity. 
 
Affordable heat was important to many councils developing heat networks 
that serve local residents (such as Aberdeen, Camden, Dundee, Enfield, 
Leeds and Islington). For example, Emily (Islington) discussed social value in 
terms of securing an affordable heat price for their social housing residents. 
This was one of the central purposes of the local authority owned and run 
Bunhill district energy network.  
the heat price for our residents is the overall objective. […] We are delivering 
cheaper heat than large-scale gas boilers on a commercial tariff. [… Now] it’s about 
trying to expand it [to other residents] to provide that benefit. The administration has 
a very clear objective around fairness, particularly for the most vulnerable, the 
poorest residents. 
Emily, London Borough of Islington 
Expanding the heat network was thus a key priority in order to benefit a 
greater number of residents. Action on climate change also emerged as 
significant. John (Derby) pointed out that the council’s climate change 
programme in the mid 2000s was the central rationale for developing their 
hydropower project on the River Derwent, stating, “the whole premise of the 
hydro was really clearly justified by being part and parcel of the council’s 
climate change agenda.”  
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However, business case investment decisions were not at all adept at 
incorporating these wide ranging motivations. Instead, there was a narrowing 
toward financial value, where questions of affordability were heavily 
prioritised. This was particularly associated with austerity budgets and cost 
pressures. 
 
 John (Derby) for example, noted that climate change and carbon saving 
objectives “just don’t register anymore [… and] really would not carry much 
weight at all now”. Angela (Bristol), Daniel (Cardiff), Karen (Exeter) and 
Andrew (Gateshead) all agreed. Andrew explained the shift toward financial 
value, “being honest, the financial case is the driver […] five years ago it was 
a very different place in public sector and it was all about the environmental 
and the carbon saving […] finance and income is key now”. Andrew’s 
account emphasised that austerity was a key factor that had changed how 
energy project business cases were assessed. Andrew explained that there 
had been some scope for energy projects to receive cross-subsidisation from 
council budgets prior to about 2010. Subsequently, projects’ business cases 
were required to stand as an independent financial case capable of covering 
borrowing costs, and preferably also generating a surplus income. 
 
This was a shared perspective across the cases, with interviewees 
consistently noting that cost pressures meant decision makers were zeroing 
in on affordability criteria in assessment of the business case. As captured by 
Jason (Aberdeenshire) who explained that, “Councils have now got cuts to 
make and savings to make and other issues. […] In reality it will come down 
to what the council feel they can afford to do”. Questions of affordability also 
emerged in the form of general risk aversion: 
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Because of the resource issue that we’ve got in the council, there’s risk adversity, 
there’s all sort of debates about, ‘Can we actually afford to do this in the first place?’  
Daniel, City of Cardiff Council 
[We’re] becoming increasingly risk averse because of the financial difficulties that 
we’ve got. […] a lot of projects are being heavily scrutinised and […] I think it’s just in 
general indicative of the way the councils are going, kind of what their appetite for 
risk is. 
Simon, Birmingham City Council 
As a valuation framework, the business case could thus be reduced to a 
financial decision making tool. Council decision makers were a critical ‘user’ 
of the energy project business case, and were negotiating investment options 
in the context of considerable budget pressures and competing priorities. As 
this shows, tensions stemming from austerity were influencing these 
instances of economisation.  
 
However, how this form of economisation unfolded varied. Reliance on 
financial valuation materialised along a continuum, as the following examples 
illustrate. For some, there was a prioritisation of cost but not at the total 
exclusion of carbon saving. “Mostly the council would look at it from the 
financial aspect of it but secondarily maybe they’d look at it from the carbon 
aspect. Maybe that’s the wrong way to do it but obviously cost is more 
important to the council” (Colin, Derry City and Strabane). Colin’s discussion 
of cost as “obviously… more important” illustrates how carbon saving was 
poorly integrated into the business case evaluation by comparison. 
 
This was further reinforced by Sophie (Leicestershire) who described how 
financial calculations in the business case formed the basis of decisions, “I’d 
say generally it’s looked at from the [financial] savings and the rate of return 
on the project”. Ben (Manchester) agreed, noting that despite recognition of 
inter-connecting objectives which local energy served (above), the decision 
to approve the city centre heat network was based on the project’s economic, 
rather than carbon case: 
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The decision to go ahead with the project was based purely on the economics of it. 
The carbon didn’t have a lot to do with it [ …] the fact that there will be a carbon 
saving project is great. But a project that saves carbon but runs at a loss isn’t going 
to get anywhere […] You can touch on stuff like equity and things… but it’s definitely 
commercially led. 
Ben, Manchester City Council 
In practice, assessment of the business case allows for varying levels in the 
marginalisation of non-financial value. 
 
Going further, Angela (Bristol), Tony (Warrington) and Mark (Peterborough) 
described how localised approaches to financial assessment were applied to 
energy projects as the valuation method for determining whether projects 
went ahead. For Angela, projects had to meet financial parameters set by the 
council, stating, “if a project hits the parameters then it can go ahead. It’s as 
simple as that”. Whilst Tony and Mark, both in finance roles themselves, 
emphasised that income generation was the priority in their councils, 
mediated by financial criteria. In turn, business case valuations could be 
moulded to deliver on income, rather than diversify value: 
I look at the financial models in great detail, come up with a funding plan … I will 
then take that to my finance director, and if it doesn’t make money I won’t even 
bother with it. 
Tony, Warrington Borough Council 
[The Council’s] invest to save pot, [was] about £100m at the time I was doing the 
energy unit. […] The criteria [for accessing the pot] is, ‘Does it make a profit?’ Yeah, 
you’ll play the risk profile on it, but the simple answer is if it’s going to make a profit 
it’s going to make a profit. 
Mark, Peterborough City Council 
Following the energy project business case into decision making valuations 
has shown that clean energy, climate protection, social and local economic 
objectives were all in tension with financial value. Although guidelines 
suggest ideas about decision making balancing financial and non-financial 
value this did not materialise. Instead, councils largely applied tighter 
questioning of affordability, covering costs together with income generation, 
to business case investment decisions. 
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Thus, the ‘viable’ energy project business case was one which satisfied the 
challenges of affordability. Austerity was strongly emphasised as a key factor 
influencing greater attention to financial value during assessment of the 
business case. Critically, environmental objectives were no longer compelling 
reasons for pursuing energy initiatives. However, there was some evidence 
that this was an exaggeration to existing economising trends already taking 
place in the programme of governing for local councils. Ben (Manchester) 
and Melissa (Camden) for example, emphasised that the financial, economic 
and commercial case was already a significant requirement to the energy 
project business case evaluation, but had intensified. Rhys (West Yorkshire 
Combined Authority), agreed when he explained that as a general rule of 
thumb “carbon on its own doesn’t get a project moving really” and was not 
sufficient to secure a project’s progression through the business case 
assessment process. Rhys also went on to say that he didn’t think that 
business case assessment practices would change until something like ‘hard 
hitting’ carbon taxation was introduced. 
 
From a value-making perspective, these interviews all illustrated the 
significance of the financial aspects of the business case. Although subtle 
distinctions were apparent, processes edited out social, carbon and local 
economic value at the point of an investment decision, despite these being 
core project objectives. At least in the ‘wild’ (Callon, 2007) of austerity 
pressures, the business case was not a tool for incorporating financial and 
non-financial value. Instead, local authorities were pushed down a route 
which marginalised forms of non-financial value. The next section explores 
the different valuation strategies that officers devised to negotiate this 
general process of economisation, and push the energy project through the 
confines of the business case framework. 
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8.4 Contesting and resisting business case 
valuations 
Short-term financial planning was the form of economisation which emerged 
from austerity pressures in many councils. This had specific impacts on how 
the payback period – a financial device within a project’s business case that 
calculates the number of years to recover capital costs – meditated 
valuations of local energy. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3), there are a series of related 
calculations in the economic case of Treasury’s ‘five case model’. The advice 
here strongly encourages using NPV as the main decision making metric in 
the business case assessment. Conversely, whilst the payback period is a 
formalised element of calculations, it is specifically discouraged as the device 
on which base decisions (UK Treasury, 2011, p. 39; 2015a). 
 
However, the guidelines fail to acknowledge that the business case 
framework is not isolated from wider organisational pressures. First, as 
Section 8.2 illustrated, the variation in assembly of the energy project 
business case meant that full economic assessment was not always 
conducted. Therefore, the NPV device was not available to use in all 
business cases: sometimes it did not exist. Second, irrespective of whether 
there was NPV, other metrics were sometimes more compelling to decision 
makers. Namely, in the context of a prioritisation of short-term financial 
planning, the payback device was a convenient and appealing measure of 
value. 
 
Officers reported that even though long-term investments were previously 
considered, this was no longer possible. “We struggled to get the go ahead 
for ten years [… and] in this day and age, to try and get them approved for 
something that’s got a 30, 40, 50 year pay back, you’re wasting your time 
even asking the question” (Ed, Fife Council). John (Derby) elaborated, 
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emphasising how the Council had previously made long-term, 25 year 
investments, including into the 230kW hydropower scheme on the River 
Derwent which provided renewable electricity to the main council building 
and exported excess electricity to the grid. Critically, the hydro project was 
developed in the mid-2000s when the council had been comfortable to 
proceed with prudential borrowing for projects paying back over 25 year 
periods. Now the basis of valuations had changed, meaning John was 
unable to pursue projects which had longer payback periods like the hydro 
scheme. 
the finance people were comfortable with… the payback, after 25 years, the thing’s 
in profit and significantly in profit as well. So it was looked at as a long term 
investment. […] There’s no way we’d get away with that payback now. […] we are a 
single authority now, we are all about the bottom line. 
John, Derby City Council 
This move towards shorter-term financial planning was thus a considerable 
stumbling block for energy projects with a business case entailing longer 
payback periods. 
 
As a result, some energy projects were not even brought to the table for 
consideration, particularly if they paid back in excess of 5-7 years. “Beyond 
seven years we don’t even consider it. It’s too long a payback period in the 
current climate” (Darren, Hull). Colin (Derry City and Strabane) agreed, 
explaining that it was only exceptional instances when the council would 
approve a business case that paid back in over five years, stating, 
“generally… anything more than five years is highly unlikely unless it’s very 
good technology, so it has all benefits to the council. But generally over five 
years it wouldn’t go at all.” Sometimes this was extended to ten years, but 
that was described as, “the absolute maximum that we want to be looking at” 
(Melissa, Camden). In Camden there remained a preference for payback 




Narrowly structuring the economisation of valuations on the basis of a limit to 
payback period in the business case was not necessarily a formal restriction 
articulated in a local authority policy. However, it was often incorporated as a 
local norm in business case assessment. “It’s not written down, but there’s 
an unwritten rule [...] that you know what’s going to be approved [...] you 
know it’s just so far out [for some projects] that there’s just not any point in 
them” (Colin, Derry City and Strabane). This informal approach by default 
excluded certain local energy infrastructure which exceeded borrowing 
payback limits, “There is a kind of golden decision somewhere that if you go 
over that you’ve got a flashing red light above your head. So it doesn’t matter 
how good the project is, you just can’t borrow anymore” (Daniel, Cardiff). 
 
Irrespective of whether restrictions on borrowing were formally or informally 
mediated via the payback calculation, the payback period intersected with 
debates over estate rationalisation and prevented investment in otherwise 
‘viable’ local projects. Although council buildings are a prime target from an 
energy and carbon saving perspective, uncertainty over which buildings were 
being retained or sold delayed investment: 
this building is a perfect example, it’s a real gas guzzler, by far… the biggest 
component of our energy bill. But there’s constant debate about whether we should 
even be in here, should we sell it and move? […] So we’ve been prevented from 
doing work on this building. Even though, here we are two years later and no sign of 
[selling]. 
Daniel, City of Cardiff Council 
Uncertainties surrounding the future of the building stock for cost saving 
reasons thus created doubt about the value of investing in certain buildings. 
Even business case proposals that met shorter paybacks of five years were 
held back in some councils: 
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we’re coming up with a proposal that will reduce running costs, reduce carbon 
emissions […within] a five year period, but at the moment we’re scrutinising all of our 
buildings.[…] And that’s one of our frustrations… this delay of options as to what’s 
the future use of those buildings? Are we going to retain them? 
Chris, Leicester City Council 
In the context of short-term financial planning, buildings were translated into 
assets, and business case valuations were subject to trade-offs between cost 
saving from estate rationalisation and cost saving from investing in energy 
performance. 
 
Mediating business case decisions through the payback device also 
restricted district heating projects. Although the infrastructure is long lasting 
(for example pipes typically last 40 years), district heating projects have 
relatively high capital expenditure costs and a long payback term. As a result, 
it was difficult for officers to construct the case for this longer-term system 
infrastructure compared to shorter-term renewal and upgrades of individual 
boilers. Emphasis on the payback device was thus criticised by some officers 
who perceived that this limited their options. 
If you’re just doing a straightforward boiler replacement it may be cheaper than 
connecting to district heating, but [that’s] in the short term, and this is the short term 
capital budget pressures that you have to argue against... The capital cost will be a 
bit more long-term [for district heating] but it’s a better approach. 
Martin, Aberdeen City Council 
Charles’ (Fife) account furthered this point and emphasised that the payback 
device failed to adequately represent what he perceived as the genuine 
financial and risk parameters of district heating infrastructure. Short-termism 
was perceived to lead to false economies. 
We need to open up the discussion about long-term paybacks. The interesting thing 
[when I asked the energy consultants working for us], ‘What is the energy price for 
district heat for that model over a 40 year and a 10 year payback?’, [is that a] 40 
year payback is two pence a unit, 10 year payback, eight pence a unit… District 
energy has a short early risk period and a very stable future period. 
Charles, Fife Council 
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Using payback as the primary valuation metric therefore obfuscated the 
value of certain energy projects. As Charles pointed out (above), the 
relationship to the unit cost of energy is not itself apparent through the 
payback calculation and it fails to account for the cost of bills. Others such as 
Angela (Bristol), agreed noting that with the payback device “it’s not going to 
give you the full picture”. The metric is hence only one representation of 
(financial) value which excludes other (financial) costs. 
 
In this type of economisation – which was largely tied up in short-term 
financial value – the status of the payback device transformed into a clearly 
appealing device in business case decision making. Guidelines suggested 
individual financial devices in the business case have designated roles that 
should not be changed. Interviewees noted the deficiencies of reliance on the 
payback device. Despite this, accounts illustrated how the payback device 
was almost invited to take on a life of its own. A new, or at least more central 
role was established for the payback device in these economistic valuation 
practices associated with short-term financial planning. Critically, the effects 
of such a focus on the payback device in this valuation practice were the 
restriction and exclusion of energy efficiency upgrades to the corporate 
estate, and more complex long term projects, where the business case 
coupled longer payback periods with higher upfront capital costs. Energy and 
carbon savings were further marginalised in these business case valuations 
that prioritised short-term financial value. 
Negotiating longer-term borrowing in the payback device 
Breaking out of the mould of normative limits on payback in the business 
case assessment was nevertheless variously tackled by officers. The 
success of previous projects was one route used to make the case for 
modifying and changing local valuation practices. In particular, success in 
small schemes was a means to gain ‘hands-on’ experience and knowledge 
about other energy opportunities and confidence to proceed. This allowed 
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officers to make the case for adapting payback limits, as illustrated by 
Cambridge, Exeter and Gateshead. 
 
Building on the success of earlier more ‘straightforward’ projects within their 
revolving Climate Change Fund, Cambridge City Council recognised the 
need to shift priorities. This included focussing on bigger energy users within 
the council, which they recognised “may mean that projects have a longer 
payback period” (Rebecca, Cambridge). In particular, Rebecca noted that 
this could mean that a large scale (c.£24 million) city centre district heating 
proposal which had previously been abandoned might actually resurface 
again, though probably in a revised form. 
 
Equally in Exeter, there was a modified approach to evaluating the business 
case following initial success in their solar programme. Karen described how 
the early projects acted as frontrunners, and this enabled extending the 
payback limit to around 10 years. 
[Evaluating the business case is] just really payback, nothing more. […] Initially five 
years was a safe amount of time considered to be the acceptable level. But as 
projects grew and support grew, we were able to push that... For projects where 
there was a greater return… we’ve had support for projects that have [a] ten, eleven, 
year payback. 
Karen, Exeter City Council 
As Karen noted however, this extension of the payback limit to the business 
case assessment was restricted to those projects which provided a greater 
return. 
 
Payback of around ten years also falls short of including the full range of 
local energy projects (small scale hydropower and district heating both 
typically extended this in my sample). However, these cases illustrated how 
earlier projects created routes to institutionalising a broader range of energy 
projects within the council and created opportunities to modify business case 
valuations, particularly extending payback limits. This illustrated how the 
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intersecting processes of short-term financial planning and the payback 
period were not set in stone. 
 
The potential for wider organisational change is well illustrated by Gateshead 
where the longer-term character of energy projects pushed the Council’s 
capital investment programme to take a longer-term view: 
We’ve always had a capital bidding process, [but] what we’ve found is energy 
projects are having to look at that 20, 30 year life anyway, so probably the 
improvements we’ve seen in that [are] overall at the Council. I like to think the 
energy work has pushed them in that direction to be more whole life. 
Andrew, Gateshead Council 
This emphasised that a council’s energy valuation practice is not entirely 
fixed, and the ability to respond adaptively to changing timelines prevented 
opportunities from being missed. 
Structuring capital cost borrowing in the business case 
In a further development, creatively structuring the repayment profile of 
capital costs was central to escaping short-term financial planning in the 
business case assessment. As exemplified by two different approaches in 
Calderdale and Warrington, this enabled modified valuation practices for 
producing the financial model. Critically, these actions helped in navigating 
the energy project through the business case assessment.  
 
In Calderdale the process of constructing the financial model needed to be 
presented in such a way that, within existing budgets, the business case 
showed it was solving a problem. As Rob explained, “If you’ve got a solution 
that says we can pay it back, then you’ve got a much easier ride through”. 
For their £22 million LED street lighting and column replacement project this 
involved demonstrating how, unlike the existing street lights, the new lights 
and columns required less withdrawal from the maintenance budget. The 
business case then proposed that, instead of drawing on the maintenance 
budget each year, the project would access an equivalent amount upfront 
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(equal to four years maintenance budget), as a source for some capital 
costs. 
 
Using the maintenance budget upfront needed to be combined with multiple 
sources of finance and structured accordingly. This included £5 million of 
Salix interest free finance (government lending), which needed repaying first, 
within five years, and prudential borrowing (low cost government lending), 
which would be paid back within 15 years. “The continued saving on energy 
and maintenance cost of the next 15 years is going to be so much less, this 
will pay for the project overall” (Rob, Calderdale). This provided key 
audiences within the council with a business case ‘solution’ by showing that 
borrowing repayments were covered by reductions in energy bills and 
reduced ongoing maintenance costs without ‘additional’ council resources. 
 
In Warrington, Corporate Finance was directly involved in developing the 
business case for energy projects. In Warrington’s LED street lighting 
replacement, Tony (a capital accountant) took building the financial model in 
the business case a step further than Calderdale’s use of maintenance 
budgets. Tony developed a bespoke approach, focussing attention toward 
structuring borrowing to minimise interest and maximise cash flow within the 
early years of a project. This structured borrowing for the £25 million capital 
expenditure costs according to the payback periods of different aspects of 
the investment (i.e. bulbs, cabling and columns).  
You borrow the money, you make the payment every year. But I decided because of 
that, you’re limited then to the shortest period of payback. But I thought, ‘Well, hold 
on a minute, we’re doing lights and we’re doing columns. It’s a piece of concrete or a 
piece of steel. Why do I want to pay the same amount of time for a bulb?’ 
Tony, Warrington Borough Council 
This was identified as a more cost effective way of putting together the 




Since then, new accounting rules also allowed the council to structure 
payback by deferring loan and interest repayments in the initial years of a 
project. In Tony’s view this was, “effectively... free money for the first few 
years”, making the financial case even more attractive because the financial 
savings are greater in initial years which shows the project is more cash 
positive. Debt repayments are then met from energy savings and reduced 
maintenance costs. 
 
Importantly this more creative use of new financial and accountancy methods 
within the business case enabled ‘de-risking’ the construction phase and 
initial period of operational projects. Louise, who worked in bringing forward 
energy projects was convinced that Tony’s approach to structuring capital 
costs, borrowing and repayments was unusual within local government. As 
was raised in Chapter 7, finance personnel in councils tended to be 
experienced in revenue budget management, but not in larger capital budget 
risk management. 
it’s not terribly sophisticated, it’s just looking at it in a bit more of a creative way… 
From talking to other local authority officers, they often have... revenue managers so 
they’re not used to working with capital... to borrowing big sums of money and, the 
risk profile appears very different to them. 
Louise, Warrington Borough Council 
By contrast, Warrington’s more creative structuring of the financial case 
allowed what Louise perceived to be a more accurate representation of the 
financial risk parameters of energy projects: 
if we borrow into the principle repayments to year four, then we’ll have built up 
sufficient funding and the early defects period and the risk will have been taken out 
of it [...] projects are at their riskiest during construction and in the first couple of 
years. And after that really any revenue income you can pretty much rely on. 
Louise, Warrington Borough Council 
With support from the Finance Director described as, “exceptionally forward 
thinking… very open to new ideas” (Louise, Warrington), and Senior 
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Management, this ‘successful’ business case served to raise the profile of 
energy across the Council. Crucially this was helping to institutionalise the 
value of energy projects across organisational siloes. “The head of our 
regen[eration] scheme… now says in meetings, ‘Can we put solar panels on 
these buildings?’ Is that not a victory?” (Tony, Warrington). 
 
These cases illustrated the creative and improvisational aspects of using the 
business case device. One of the effects of these adaptive business case 
valuations was securing direct long-term council investment in energy 
projects. As was well illustrated in the case of Warrington, buy-in of financial 
personnel and ‘know how’ was essential for localised business case 
valuations to go against the local authority norms which have resisted energy 
projects in other cases. 
Moving away from the payback device: whole life costing 
Given the limitations of the payback device in mediating business case 
valuations, officers also argued that the basis of these should change. In 
particular, greater use of whole life costing, which calculates the lifetime 
costs of a project, rather than only initial capital expenditure (payback), was 
suggested as essential for district heating projects.  
 
Whole life costing is one component of the assessment recommended in 
guidelines. But as is clear by now, scripting business case valuations in line 
with the advocated approach was not routinely possible for councils. Emily 
(Islington) for example, was frustrated with reliance on the payback 
calculation and strongly made the case for using whole life costing, which 
includes factors such as operation and maintenance costs: 
one thing that I’ve always banged on about with anything to do with investment in 
energy and heat and heating is the day-to-day delivery of heat. [...] Our housing 
colleagues have an asset management plan, they know how old boilers are and 
really their thinking is, ‘we’re going to need to put new heat in’, but they just replace 
the boilers… [because] they’re not required to do any whole life costing. 
Emily, London Borough of Islington 
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Whole life costing was therefore perceived by some officers as a calculation 
which balances financial, social and carbon values. For example, whole life 
costing can include factors such as the reduced boiler maintenance costs 
from a centralised plant, which are ignored in other metrics. But as Emily 
explained, the Housing department were not routinely using whole life 
costing in their business case development process. Critically in the absence 
of whole life costing, the Bunhill energy centre and heat network business 
case in Islington didn’t ‘stack-up’ on payback figures alone and would not 
recoup capital expenditure costs. Consequently, Emily was required to 
develop the business case primarily on the basis of securing grant funding. 
 
Although there was no local norm for using whole life costing in Islington, it 
had become a standard practice in Gateshead. Here, the Energy Services 
Team had developed an in-house specialism to create energy project 
business cases that used whole life costing, alongside other metrics. “We do 
the whole life costing, annual cash flows for 20 years, with inflation, with as 
much information as we can now, and we do it all in-house now” (Andrew, 
Gateshead). Again this emphasises the possibilities of alternative adaptive 
valuation practices that go against the overriding struggle over short-term 
financial value. Where there are the skills and expertise to develop use of 
devices such as whole life costing along with the willingness to incorporate 
this into business case decision making, new valuation practices can 
emerge. 
Shifting the business case focus: a programme of projects 
Other strategies involved taking the profile of a group of energy projects 
rather than focussing on individual business cases. Importantly, this removed 
the requirement for an individual energy project to cover its own costs. As 
discussed earlier, this ability for a project to cover costs restricted approval of 
some energy projects. Considering the overall programme of projects as a 
single business case allowed for cross-subsidisation of projects. 
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In Peterborough, the energy team was situated within the Finance 
Department, and the Finance Director was responsible for translating energy 
projects into income or saving opportunities. Here, Mark, the Financial 
Director, was instrumental in moving away from a focus on projects as 
individual assets, to instead consider whether a project brought in enough 
income or savings to cover costs within the wider energy programme. 
 
In a divergence from the guidelines, this meant paying greater attention to 
‘cash’. “For me, cash is king. People talk about discounted cash flows and 
IRRs [internal rate of returns] and that. Cash is king. If it makes cash, it 
makes cash.” (Mark, Peterborough). To consider energy project finances as 
a group, rather than individually Mark used a profit and loss statement which 
he viewed as a particularly helpful tool. He explained, “I’ve got a P&L [profit 
and loss statement] that I manage. But what I try to do to obviously hit the 
P&L, ideally beat it, as I need to have money so I can develop new products 
as well [… and also] afford to give more to the central [council budget].” By 
allowing cross-subsidy of energy projects within the programme, this model 
of economising energy services as new revenues had considerable 
advantages in creating forward momentum. It also, however, represents a 
financial liability, where the focus on clean energy per se and its wider social 
welfare and climate protection purposes could become submerged. In the 
conclusion, I will return to consider whether this form of economisation 
created a greater diversion in energy and carbon saving valuation than the 
other business case valuation practices being deployed. 
Political priorities, support and business case valuations 
The interactions between officers and councillors were critical to the success 
of an energy project’s progression through the business case framework. An 
essential task for officers (including in Bath, Birmingham, Enfield, Islington 
and Swansea) was to creatively position the energy project in relation to local 
political priorities.  
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Political support improved the business case of less financially attractive 
projects, but it was also significant to securing the support when political 
administration changed. This involved a degree of creative thinking on how to 
progress in such situations. It entailed ‘realignment’ to the political priorities 
of the administration. “Obviously when you get a new administration in 
there’s a lot of ‘out with the old, in with the new, do things differently’” 
(Hannah, Bath). Emily (Islington) summarised their process of reframing of 
the energy strategy to meet changing political priorities as “just which way 
around you order the words” when political control switched from the Liberal 
Democrats to Labour.  
 
in the case of changing administration from Liberal Democrat to 
Conservative, this sentiment was echoed by Hannah (Bath) as ultimately, “a 
matter of being quite nimble and seeing what way the wind blows and saying, 
‘OK, well, actually this is how our work aligns’”. With an incoming 
Conservative political control in Bath, a popular narrative concerning energy 
project business cases was based on the retention of money in the local 
economy rather than being handed over to the ‘Big 6’ energy providers. For 
the partnership with Bath & West Community Energy group however (where 
the council was co-investing in a solar farm), the most compelling argument 
surrounded how the project could provide income toward extending 
broadband cover in rural areas. 
 
Officers were thus adept at utilising the business case not just as a financial 
tool but to secure political commitment, particularly for benefits associated 
with projects that were perceived to be harder to capture. In terms of 
valuation practice, the business case could, if necessary, communicate 
narratives that introduced different actors. Officers positioned the business 
case to suit a particular moment in time, even to priorities like internet 
availability, which from the outside could appear an unrelated local non-
energy ‘co-benefit’. The valuation work associated with an energy project 
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business case therefore at times extended beyond the aspects of financial 
value which have dominated this chapter.  
8.5 Conclusion: the constraints of the Business 
Case 
This chapter problematised the business case ‘stage’ in energy project 
development and uncovered what happens to the negotiation of value within 
it. The analysis was based on the notion that as a valuation framework, the 
‘business case’ is an instance of what Callon terms ‘economics in the wild’. 
Not economic science per se, but the “calculations, optimisations, and the 
management of rare resources” (Callon, 2007, p. 338) that make the 
economisation of society possible. Using these insights, I considered 
business case valuations as active processes that had the potential to 
determine the assembly of value from an energy project. 
 
Government guidelines reviewed in Chapter 6, describe the business case 
as a standardised optional appraisal object (e.g. Scottish Futures Trust, 
2011; UK Treasury, 2011). Importantly, UK Treasury’s ‘five case model’ is 
the business case model par excellence in the guidelines. It includes use of 
methods which attempt to calculate and represent socio-economic value, and 
inform decision makers on the optimal approach in terms of net benefits to 
society. 
 
As a valuation practice, findings revealed that what actually constitutes 
assembling the energy project ‘business case’ is considerably more varied 
than is captured in guidelines. Far from a standardised valuation framework, 
there was a high level of user adaptation in both constructing and assessing 
the business case. Constructing the business case spanned formalised 
completion of a business case akin to the ‘five case model’, through to 
avoiding the formalities of the business case entirely. The energy project 
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business case is thus diverse and nuanced; it resists a single definition and 
stable form. 
 
Business case assessment was routinely co-opted by councils’ prioritisation 
of short-term financial value in response to austerity and cost saving. 
Although this took place with subtle differences, evolving codes of practice in 
councils enrolled financial devices into management strategies for 
responding to budget pressures. In this context, negotiating the value of an 
energy project was particularly open to mediation through the payback 
device calculation. Under this form of economisation, a project’s business 
case needed to be made commensurate with the confines of short-term 
financial value, as opposed to broader socio-economic value, carbon saving 
or public goods. Consequently, some long-term energy projects were de-
prioritised. Escaping this was difficult, but several instances of adaptation 
and resistance sought to reposition the boundaries of constructing and 
assessing the business case. In these cases, familiarity of working adaptively 
with the business case and the support of decision makers to consider 
alternatives were both essential. 
 
These findings provide considerable depth to understanding the 
economisation of energy projects in local government. First, findings tell us 
more about how individual devices in the business case are pulled into the 
wider struggle associated with the programme of governing of local authority 
finances. Financial devices such as the payback period were openly 
acknowledged as deficient in terms of their ability to represent multiple forms 
of value. Despite this, at least in the context of austerity, payback period 
exercised power regardless. There was some debate surrounding the extent 
to which economising trends were already occurring in local government. But 
data clearly emphasised an intensification in response to austerity in terms of 
short-term financial value and long-term curtailing of investments. 
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This form of economisation was consequently not pre-fixed, and under the 
right conditions could be changed. Budgetary pressures are therefore at least 
part of the explanation as to why business case valuations could be directed 
toward certain types of economisation. The influence of austerity on valuation 
practices illustrates that economisation is not set in stone. This indicates the 
need to know even more about the politicisation of valuations. Consequently, 
it is necessary to pay much greater attention to the wider programme 
governing local authority agency and autonomy along with its interactive 
relationship with business case valuation practices. 
 
Furthermore, findings provide evidence in support of the argument that 
‘financialisation’ is emerging as a compelling form of economisation 
(Chiapello, 2015). According to Chiapello, financial calculation and reasoning 
render objects as seen from the perspective of an investor, and this 
overshadows other forms of value. These findings show that, at least in the 
context of budget pressures, business case valuations were able to facilitate 
financialisation. An energy project could be deemed un-valuable if it did not 
conform to certain financial metrics be it a payback term or meeting some 
level of income generation or return. In support of this, 19 respondents in the 
LEUKES questionnaire also reported that the energy project either saved or 
generated money that released pressure on other budgets. Only 6 
respondents said that this did not happen45. 
 
Additionally, findings show that economising (or financialising) the energy 
project to economistic (or financial investor) value through the business case 
was highly varied and not done in any one way. Rather, when the business 
case device was brought into being it was considerably adapted. There was 
actually interpretative flexibility in abundance, and users exercised extreme 
finitist application of rules and judgements around its meaning. However, 
                                            
45 There were 34 responses and 9 were unsure. 
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these tended to ultimately revolve around economic or financial value, rather 
than energy or carbon saving. 
 
Finitism (Barnes, 1995) explains that such variation in valuation practices is 
due to rules governing a valuation framework being subject to continual user 
interpretation. Every instance of business case valuations requires 
judgement or ‘acts of classifying’ to establish meaning. Previous applications, 
including guidelines about the business case, do not themselves determine 
future application. Rather, variation in the business case depends on how 
people are using them. This helps to reinforce the findings of Doganova and 
Eyquem-Renault (2009) and Doganova and Muniesa (2015) who, though not 
focussed on local energy, emphasised that the business model emerges in a 
variety of different material forms. 
	
This chapter has explored what happens to the negotiation of value within 
the bounds of the business case framework. Opposed to broader socio-
economic value, business case valuation practices overwhelmingly reduced 
the energy project to a measure of short-term financial value. In particular, 
the value of the energy project had to be made commensurable within the 
confines of short-term financial planning. The valuation practices that 
progressed a project through the business case stage of development were 
not therefore those which consistently prioritised carbon saving or clean 
energy. This has also illustrated that only looking at the ‘ideal type’ of 
business case depicted in guidelines, has serious deficiencies in 
understanding actual energy project valuation practices. Taking this 
investigation forward, the next chapter explores the valuation practices 






9 Public Procurement and Valuation 




This chapter moves onto the direct focus on public procurement in local 
energy valuations. At the end of the previous chapter, I pointed out that 
guidelines provide only a partial account of energy project valuation 
practices. Also, in Chapter 7, we discovered that some officers interpreted 
that what constituted ‘best value’ in an energy project was the outcome of 
assessing suppliers under competitive public procurement. The conceptual 
model I use in this thesis argues that how things are valued matters 
(Muniesa, 2012), and that the current programme of governing (Miller & 
Rose, 2008) local authorities, is extended and contested through valuation 
frameworks. Thus, I consider local energy procurement as a set of valuation 
practices that impact energy systems development. 
 
In this chapter I extend my investigation into local energy value-making by 
analysing what happens in public procurement: the most complex rule 
governed and economised valuation framework studied in this thesis. My aim 
is to investigate the technocratic set of rules governing public procurement 
valuations and examine practices where energy projects are negotiated by 
multiple actors. This allows for considering how, as a valuation framework, 
public procurement shapes the value of energy. The rest of the introduction 
highlights key issues about public procurement for local energy valuations. 
The following qualitative analysis traces negotiating value as the energy 




In local authority energy projects, public procurement is considerably diverse. 
Depending on the project, procurement can be a time consuming, resource 
intensive and expensive aspect to its development. UK public procurement 
was reported as the most expensive across the single market, with an 
average of £40,000-50,000 to complete a tender for regulated procurement 
(not specific to energy) (House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Committee, 2014, p. 29). Research into district heating reported 
procurement costs were much higher. These ranged from £200,000-
£500,000 (Wiltshire et al., 2013, pp. 29-30), with higher costs associated with 
the competitive dialogue route (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). 
 
Local authorities also lack experience in procuring local energy projects (King 
2016b). Procurement emerges multiple times across project development, 
including procuring a wide variety of external expertise to assist in project 
development. This can range from external legal, planning, consulting 
engineers, project managers, finance and procurement energy specialists. 
Local authorities thus procure expertise that feed into procurement for a local 
energy project – procuring to procure. It also involves buying goods, such as 
individual components like solar PV panels, LED lights, invertors, CHP units, 
insulated pipes and so on. This extends to replacements when kit wears out, 
breaks or is damaged, along with various delivery partners and ongoing 
services for operational projects. These services differ depending on the 
project’s ownership and ongoing control. Services can range from standalone 
maintenance contracts, through to procuring a fully outsourced model for the 
energy project where the supplier designs, builds, finances, operates and 
maintains the energy project over the course of a long-term ‘concession 
contract’. These contracts can extend for periods of up to 80 years (such as 
the Cranbrook network near Exeter which is operated by E.ON). Combined, 
this means at multiple stages of project development, a considerable number 
of actors are involved in local energy procurement valuations.  
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Formal aspects of public procurement can therefore occur at every stage in a 
project’s lifespan, from initial conception where a feasibility study is procured, 
through to replacing a CHP unit, c.15 years into operation of a heat network. 
In Chapter 6, I argued that from the perspective of valuation practices, the 
rules structuring public procurement are significant because they govern 
these diverse buyer-supplier interactions and relationships. This includes 
promotion of competition as the ideal means through which to negotiate 
value and secure ‘optimal’ solutions from market actors for public sector 
clients (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). 
 
The remainder of the chapter analyses valuation practices configured in local 
energy procurement, and considers the consequences for the assembly of 
value. In section 9.2 I develop and analyse a typology of the ‘intelligent 
buyer’ configured to navigate local energy procurement valuations. First the 
typology is described, emphasising four distinct constellations of actor-
networks. Analysis of each configuration follows, focussing on how attempts 
to adapt procurement processes to capture locally determined value are 
contingent on expertise, trust and resources. Section 9.3 discusses how the 
findings relate to understanding how a programme of governing through 
valuation frameworks only partially achieves closure. 
9.2 Assembling the Intelligent Buyer in local 
energy procurement 
Navigating public procurement for local energy entailed configuring an actor-
network, characterised here as an ‘intelligent buyer’. I use the term ‘intelligent 
buyer’ to encompass the agency required to exert influence within the 
valuation practices of local energy procurement. Reviewing public 
procurement regulations in Chapter 6 illustrated the complexity of the 
procurement apparatus which local energy projects are exposed to. I argued 
that this spanned designing tender specifications, selecting which type of 
procurement to adopt (open, restricted, negotiated or competitive dialogue) 
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deciding whether to use an existing ‘framework agreement’ or establish a 
new one, and whether to apply an exemption for negating competitive 
procurement (known as Teckal), as though it was an ‘in-house’ award to the 
local authority itself. These are covered later in the chapter, and are 
described in Chapter 6, Section 6.4. All this while ensuring compliance with 
the regulations. 
 
Although this implies somewhat flexible valuation practices, exploiting this in-
built discretion for energy projects is likely to rely upon specialist energy and 
procurement expertise, establishing trust in suppliers, ‘back office’ 
procurement support resources and ‘know how’. Thus, I use the notion of the 
‘intelligent buyer’ to characterise the specialist knowledge and expertise in 
local energy provision and procurement for local energy, that equips councils’ 
agency in valuations. 
 
Local authorities developed a variety of strategies to configure the intelligent 
buyer. These ranged from in-house models for developing council-owned 
energy initiatives, to models which relied on some outsourcing of expertise 
for projects to local organisations and public sector intermediaries, and 
models which outsourced project ownership and operation to the private 
sector. Table 9.1 summarises the variety of approaches, structuring data 




Table 9.1. The intelligent buyer for local energy procurement 
 Projects required to apply public procurement rules 
Intelligent 





LA aimed to control procurement process (using 
open, restricted or negotiated devices), ongoing 
organisation & management of energy projects. 
External expertise regularly secured through 
procuring consultancy expertise to perform set 
intelligent buyer tasks. 
district energy (7); 
biomass boilers (1); LED 
streetlighting (1); CHP 
(1); solar PV (1); 







Local organisation delivered local energy project on 
behalf of LA, using ‘in-house’ award (Teckal device), 
or open procurement (use of tender specification 
device crucial; not guaranteed to be awarded 
contract); VEAT device; or service level agreements. 
Close Friend commonly has ongoing ownership &/or 
management role; complies with public 
procurement rules, sometimes with reliance on 
council procurement services. 
district energy (2); 
renewable electricity (4); 
white label local energy 
tariff (1); feasibility 







Closed list of pre-approved supplier(s) offering pre-
specified goods & services to pre-defined group of 
public sector bodies. Once established, use of 'mini-
competition' device negates openly competitive 
procurement for eligible projects. Established by LAs 
& public sector intermediaries. 
external framework: 
EPCs (8); domestic 
energy retrofit (1); 
district energy (1); 
biomass (1); hydropower 
(1); 
LA’s own framework: 





Competitive dialogue procurement device used to 
procure private sector energy company to finance, 
build, own & operate project under a long-term 
‘concession contract’ through establishing either a 
commercial-SPV or a JV. LA becomes paying 
customer. district energy (3) 




Below the threshold governed by public 
procurement regulations. 
district energy (1); 
Innovation Hub (1) 
Procurement 
not applicable 
Procurement was not relevant to the project for 
various reasons2. 
district energy (2); solar 
PV (1); heat pumps (1); 
smart grids (1) 
	
1 Scottish Cities Alliance (SCA) collective procurement for variety of LA energy projects and strategies. 
2 Project was at feasibility stage during data collection or was a demonstration or innovation project not 




Structural distrust of supply chain actors meant managing trust was a central 
function of the intelligent buyer. This emerged in procurement valuations in 
the following ways: first, the ability to secure high quality and trustworthy 
suppliers that have relevant expertise in the design, installation, operation 
and/or maintenance of projects. Suppliers’ reliability was questioned, with 
officers concerned about poor quality services across consultants, installers 
and operators. 
 
Second, incorporating high design standards and robust procurement 
specifications that enable procurement valuations to deliver the envisaged 
project. Officers had a shared perspective that lowest cost solutions often 
resulted in higher costs overall because cost-cutting can result in problems 
that need resolving within operation and maintenance budgets. However, 
officers also had suspicions that suppliers inflated prices of both goods and 
services, and wanted to avoid being overcharged. As exemplified by David’s 
(Newcastle) comments, in relation to the concession contract configuration, 
“the bidder’s own knowledge and approach to pricing is they’ll just try and 
develop a cost to see what they can get away with.” Benchmarking costs 
across all configurations aimed to test suppliers expertise and whether the 
prices submitted were reflective of costs. 
 
Third, participating in the contractual arrangements between the local 
authority (the ‘project sponsor’) and the contractor(s) delivering the works 
and services. Especially this entailed negotiating allocation of responsibility 
and risk in complex energy initiatives. Fourth, capacity to hold a variety of 
actors to account, including designers, contractors and operators, if, and 
when, issues arise. Each configuration took a specific approach to managing 
the trust in the buyer-seller relationship. 
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9.2.1 In-house Intelligent Buyer 
The in-house intelligent buyer had most overall control of local energy and 
was deployed for a wide variety of projects (see Table 9.1). This spanned 
more straightforward projects such as installing a new CHP unit in a leisure 
centre (Derry City and Strabane), through to larger scale district energy 
networks. Projects were funded from council borrowing, grants, housing 
revenue account, internal spend-to-save funds and maintenance budgets. 
 
In-house configurations aimed to control the procurement process and 
secure forms of value which were perceived to be more difficult under some 
other configurations. Councils particularly valued area-based integrated low 
carbon local energy provision (Leeds), and affordable heat under this 
configuration (Islington and Camden), but also capturing income streams 
from local energy (Exeter). A high degree of private sector involvement in 
project ownership, financing and/or setting prices associated with other 
procurement configurations, especially concession contacts (Section 9.2.4), 
were thought to be in conflict with these. Leeds and Camden provide 
illustrative case examples. 
 
In Leeds, the council wanted to maximise use of ‘waste’ heat from the 
Recycling and Energy Recovery Facility at Cross Green (operated by 
Veolia). A new district heating network was being built to connect to the 
energy from waste plant (procurement at time of data collection). The heat 
network was oversized for the number of customers already signed up 
(social housing and some public buildings) and was being developed 
prospectively. This kind of oversizing reflects the concept of ‘passive 
provision’ discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3). It is a concept encouraged in 
UK Treasury’s Green Book supplementary guidance (UK Treasury, 2015b) 
for evaluating infrastructure and building the business case. However, private 
finance priced risk too high to build out the network using passive provision. 
It proved unaffordable without enough customers to guarantee return on 
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investment from long-term heat sales. A different configuration, such as a 
concession contract, would therefore have required scaling down the project. 
 
Camden’s procurement of the Somers Town district heating network showed 
that affordable heat to residents was a particular area of contention with 
commercial operators. Phase one was primarily serving local residents. 
Phase two was procuring and installing a CHP engine to provide heat to the 
network, and sell electricity to the new Francis Crick Institute via a private 
wire46. Outsourcing ownership to the private sector was thought to be in 
conflict with the responsibility to ensure affordable heat to social housing 
customers.  
 
Concern over private sector gain from heat sales was reinforced in Camden, 
after running two ‘meet the buyer’ procurement events where around 14 
organisations showed initial interest. When the council confirmed that the 
scope of the phase one project was to design, build, operate and maintain 
the primary district heating network, but did not include secondary distribution 
system and customer base, the majority dropped out. Only three formally 
responded to the tender (of which two were compliant). 
[…With] the utility-led contractors, they’re interested in [the] customer base and 
having that control, so as soon as you take that away they’re like, ‘Oh no, it doesn’t 
fit with what we want to deliver.’ Then it leaves… contractors who are just getting 
their margins from the design, build O and M and not from… billing. 
Melissa, London Borough of Camden 
As Melissa’s words illustrate, different procurement configurations and 
valuation practices shaped the kind of local energy projects being created. In 
Camden it was a project which prioritised affordable heat, and integrated 
area-based infrastructure. 
                                            
46 Funding made available through the planning process for the Francis Crick Institute (Section 106 
funding) provided majority of the finance required. 
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Procuring consultancy expertise in project development: 
feasibility studies and business cases 
The in-house configuration demanded a range of energy and procurement 
expertise and resources throughout project development. Procuring design 
engineering consultancies for feasibility studies and business case 
development was common for both unfamiliar and more complex projects. As 
was procuring specific areas of legal and financial advice. Typically this was 
associated with district heating projects (such as Camden, Gateshead, 
Glasgow, Islington and Swansea47), but it also encompassed projects that 
involved setting up new organisational structures and contractual 
arrangements. 
 
Multiple external actors therefore fed into procurement valuations even in the 
in-house configuration. Success with use of external consultants to assemble 
value was dependant on securing high quality expertise. When procuring 
consultants, officers emphasised the need to prioritise quality when setting 
the price-to-quality ratio for tender evaluation. Andrew (Gateshead) reflected 
that high quality input to project design helped determine the tender 
specification for procuring the components, civils, and construction. This 
meant they could then prioritise price when assessing tenders for building the 
Gateshead energy centre and heat network (which was assessed under 
60:40 price:quality ratio, see Chapter 7, Section 7.2). 
 
Aligning consultants to the values defined by the council, defining the tender 
specification of consultancy works, and holding consultants delivery to 
account were all crucial valuation practices to the ‘success’ of the in-house 
intelligent buyer. There was some suggestion (Officer, LA_21) that 
consultants lacked understanding about the organisation, including corporate 
sustainability goals and internal decision making processes. The latter had 
                                            
47 The Swansea project was at the earliest stage, procuring consultancy feasibility studies and 
business case development. 
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led to a lack of coordination across relevant teams. Julia (Reading) added 
that it was difficult to get consultants to think outside of the conventions of the 
energy market. She stated, “assessing all the different options doesn’t 
necessarily happen… it’s how the energy market is structured really…. It’s 
very difficult to get third party views that are not really that biased in the 
market.” Defining the scope of consultancy work was thus crucial to 
successfully bringing external expertise into council-led valuations. The 
tender specification of consultancy work was an essential procurement 
device in this, but officers’ accounts also made broader comments about the 
role of active and hands on project management by the council.  
 
This meant having a clear idea about the role the consultant played within 
the council-led process. “If you then want a consultant to do it, then […] you 
have to […] really give them the boundaries” (Melissa, Camden). Previous 
experience had shown officers that without clear boundaries, consultancy 
reports tended to be “very generic” Julia (Reading). Sandra (Swansea) 
agreed, suggesting some studies for their heat network proposal had failed to 
make clear recommendations on adoption of a business structure, or about 
the heat source. She stated, “they’d fudged around the energy centres and 
[made] no specific recommendations about [the] heat source”. Sandra 
emphasised that heat networks consultants in particular, were sometimes 
hesitant to give firm “advice” and tended to include “caveats” in any 
recommendations. 
 
This contrasted with Swansea Community Energy, where a charity 
specialising in supporting community energy had provided the council a 
consultancy report identifying five options which were compared with the 
project’s objectives48. Sandra emphasised comparison of the different 
business structures made the council’s decision much clearer. In the 
                                            
48 Energy Saving Trust, which defines itself as a ‘profit for purpose’ organisation, also provided 
feasibility studies. 
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absence of recommendations, consultancy expertise was of limited use to 
configuring the in-house intelligent buyer. 
 
Procurement regulations did not themselves provide any particular solutions 
to these issues. Instead, stronger use of the tender specification and 
ensuring consultancy outputs delivered as agreed were largely improved 
through capacity building by learning from other councils, and support from 
public sector intermediaries. For example, officers in England and Wales 
noted the Heat Networks Delivery Unit (HNDU) gave them greater capability 
to ensure consultants delivered high quality outputs in heat network projects. 
 
HNDU provided funding toward project development costs (including toward 
consultancy fees for feasibility studies and business cases), and reviewed 
the scope and outputs of consultancy input. In Swansea, Sandra’s colleague 
was also seconded into HNDU to cover South West and Wales so they 
benefitted from exposure to procuring expertise for heat network projects in 
other councils49. The secondment, combined with Swansea’s reference point 
of the consultancy recommendations provided for Swansea Community 
Energy, ensured their subsequent specification for consultancy input on the 
heat network proposal was more suited to their goals. As Sandra explained, 
“[it’s] enabled us to become quite intelligent clients… our latest commission 
was very detailed, very specific about what we wanted.” HNDU then used 
Swansea’s tender as a best practice example, sharing it with other councils. 
 
Melissa (Camden) agreed, adding that the “backing” of HNDU helped put 
pressure on consultants to actually deliver against the scope of work, stating 
“[it’s] making sure you’re getting the best out of your consultant 
relationships”. More purposeful consultants expertise within the intelligent 
buyer was in turn thought to feed into improved procurement specification for 
                                            
49 Other local authority officers in Islington and Gateshead had also been seconded into these roles, 
covering other areas of the country. 
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design and build contracts. Melissa thought a likely outcome would be higher 
performance standards in heat networks. As illustrated, the apparatus of 
procurement itself was not sufficient to assemble the expertise and trust 
needed in the intelligent buyer to deliver the high standard heat networks 
councils were developing. Instead, it required the creation of new support 
functions to ensure tenders for procuring consultancy services were suitable, 
and to exert pressure on design engineers to improve the level of service 
provided to councils. 
Procuring to procure: consultancy expertise to conduct aspects of 
procurement valuations 
When it came to procuring the energy project components, civils and 
construction, external consultancy expertise was also brought into valuations, 
feeding into design specifications and evaluation of tenders. Especially for 
unfamiliar projects, namely district heating, technical design typically went 
beyond in-house expertise. Technical input was however, also sought for 
more ‘straightforward’ projects such as solar PV. 
 
For Gateshead district energy network, the tender needed to include a 
scheme design for bidders to respond to, but the energy team were 
unfamiliar with developing the model for CHP. “You have to spend a lot of 
time doing the specifications […] Particularly around the combined heat and 
power engines […] that’s a full model in itself… we had to work up as part of 
our procurement package” (Andrew, Gateshead). Similarly, in Camden, they 
did not have the technical expertise to assess whether bidders’ suggestions 
were a suitable design solution for the Somers Town Energy network. “We’re 
not designers… we’re not able to… go, ‘Actually… considering your 
expansion plans, this needs to be this diameter’” (Melissa, Camden). A large 
engineering and design consultancy were contracted to complete a technical 
review of submissions. This outsourcing of energy procurement expertise 
was thus in response to gaps in the technical expertise needed for procuring 
 234
energy projects that do not align with the traditional in-house expertise of 
councils. 
 
Officers noted that an overreliance on consultants led to “becom[ing] an 
uninformed buyer” (Melissa, Camden) which left the council exposed to 
unforeseen problems downstream. Andrew (Gateshead) also said that the 
use of consultancy support also added to project development costs. He 
stated, “external consultants… can only take you so far and a financial 
consultant can charge a thousand pounds a day and then hang on to the 
spreadsheet. So it’s in your interest to get that in-housed as much as you 
can.” Building the in-house Energy Services Team in Gateshead was 
therefore a priority. 
 
In particular, Andrew noted a benefit of bringing expertise in-house was 
deploying officers more flexibly to projects. The team’s expertise enabled 
them to provide “the full suite of energy services”. This covered things like 
metering, billing and monitoring systems through to capital investments in 
energy projects. The team managed the whole process from initial concept to 
ongoing management. Having recognised the additional expertise needed to 
expand the local energy programme, they were increasing internal expertise 
for the technical design, hence feeding into procurement specification. 
Broadening the in-house expertise was developed over time. 
 
Bristol City Council had similarly emphasised developing in-house expertise 
and had the biggest Energy Service with around 40 staff (in 2016). In 
addition, the council was delivering over £50 million investment in energy 
efficiency, renewable electricity and low carbon heat projects through an 
Elena ‘technical assistance’ grant of c.£2.5 million (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3). This grant allowed the council to recruit new staff to deliver the local 
project pipeline, but also provided a budget for contracting additional legal, 
financial and technical expertise. Importantly, when using consultants, they 
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focussed on upskilling officers in contract management and procurement at 
the same time. Subsequently, more of the design specification was 
completed in-house. The council had also managed to deploy their new in-
house expertise to set up a framework agreement (see Section 9.2.3) to run 
a solar PV programme. This illustrates that where funding is in place to 
develop in-house teams, their expertise can be deployed for a variety of local 
authority-led energy initiatives. 
The critical link in valuation practices: back office procurement 
support 
As described in Chapter 6, a whole regulatory system governs public 
procurement. Professional Services provided a critical internal link for 
procurement valuations, by providing the expertise and resources needed for 
running compliant procurement, as well as for finance, legal and contract 
negotiations. The Procurement Dept./team were responsible for coordinating 
the procedural aspects of tendering, making sure it was compliant. Both 
energy and procurement specialisms thus needed to work hand-in-hand. “We 
manage […the] technical specification… and then [the] procurement team 
take all that… and they run the procurement and make sure we’re not doing 
anything illegal [and] we stand up to audit” (Andrew, Gateshead).  
 
It was emphasised that as a Corporate Service, Procurement Departments 
were specialist in procurement regulations and the mechanics of conducting 
procurement valuations, but not energy. Andrew (Gateshead) described his 
team as being, “sort of like the client… they help us procure”. Procurement 
teams were thus unable to detail specifics in the tender specification, but 
could potentially provide input on how to structure questions about the quality 
of suppliers. “They [Procurement colleagues] would want us to sit down with 
them to decide those questions… as a precedent to what you are 
procuring… they’ve got to… help you make that decision” (John, Derby). 
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However, this ‘client’ type relationship was not always established. Two 
particular issues emerged. First, some interviewees reported a lack of 
problem solving within Procurement Depts./teams to guide them through 
procurement for projects. According to Daniel (Cardiff), lack of problem 
solving in Procurement Departments was because of their necessary focus 
on compliance, which meant by default, they were “not about delivery”. This 
was in conflict with the focus of project officers. In general, whilst 
interviewees routinely acknowledged there was a role for regulation and 
oversight, the sentiment echoed was that public procurement was expensive, 
complicated and bureaucratic. 
 
Second, the effect of cut backs to Professional Services including 
Procurement Depts./teams limited in-house capacity to run procurement and 
contracting for energy projects. For example, in Cardiff and Exeter, a greater 
level of responsibility for procurement remained with project officers. As 
project officers, they were not experts in the field of procurement, and found 
navigating the whole process complicated. Daniel (Cardiff) described 
muddling through procurement as best he could, relaying that, “I often fear 
that I’m a bit of an amateur procurement expert, and that’s a dangerous 
thing”. Concerns included ensuring compliance with competitive tendering so 
that the council was not exposed to the potential for legal challenge over 
award of a contract. Application of procurement regulations are a specialist 
field of knowledge. Withdrawing that knowledge in the council erodes the 
ability to develop local energy projects. 
 
In Exeter, Karen described procurement for their solar programme as a 
“painful process”, because both Procurement and Engineering Services had 
been hollowed out. With little experience in preparing tenders, Karen 
explained that, “it was dreadful writing out your own specifications and tender 
documents”. Like others, Exeter had engaged some external assistance for 
the procurement specification, which had included identifying what panel 
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rating to specify. Despite this, Karen was left feeling that ultimately they 
needed more in-house procurement expertise to support the solar 
programme. 
 
Whilst this was a challenging environment for delivering the solar 
programme, Karen stated that the council had since made initial steps to 
address the problems via a procurement review. Karen attributed problems 
to, “a legacy of cut backs and not understanding the effect that they could 
have”. It was Karen’s view that this was a widespread problem among local 
authorities, where the impact of cut backs on functions such as procurement 
had not been fully considered. 
 
Even relatively straightforward contracting was delayed as the result of 
downsizing Legal and Procurement teams for cost saving. In Haringey, for 
instance, there was a six-month delay to issuing a contract to consultants 
supporting the multi-party ‘dating agency’ Innovation Hub initiative. Ian 
attributed delays like this to austerity, stating, “it’s a wider function of the 
absolute mullering [beating] that local authority budgets have taken”. For Ian, 
the ability to participate in this kind of multi-party initiative as an intelligent 
buyer was directly undermined by the reduced in-house professional 
services.  
 
Particularly damaging was the fact that this collided with councils having 
fewer policy tools at their disposal,50 whilst being increasingly expected to 
engage with private sector developers. This was a point of deep frustration, 
with a sense of compounding inter-relating pressures limiting the council’s 
success in configuring the intelligent buyer.  
  
                                            
50 Particularly the code for sustainable homes, and zero carbon homes policy in England (see Webb 
et al., 2017). 
 238
there’s a really big issue there if… the world that we’re heading into is about really 
engaging the likes of private developers. [...] It’s really going to be increasingly 
reliant on really clever officers and politicians and having the back-up in-house to be 
able to argue the toss with the developer. And when it’s taken you six months to 
produce a simple contract, it really like gives the lie of the land basically. 
Ian, London Borough of Haringey 
The extent of legal contracting for projects was also sometimes 
underestimated. This occurred in Warrington’s programme to install rooftop 
solar on large distribution centre buildings. There was unclear building 
ownership and contractual relationships across large intuitional investors, 
leaseholders which were separate large multinational organisations, and 
managing agents. Ultimately, negotiating over leases was more difficult than 
expected and involved considerably more input from Corporate Services than 
originally intended. As Louise (Warrington) reflected, “If I could go back 12 
months, I would sit down the heads of all of the departments and put cards 
on the table, […] this is the implication for your team. […] Are you on board? 
Are you going to support your staff to help us?” Louise described relying on 
the good will of colleagues, which was running in short supply. Having 
recently shrunk Corporate Services because of budget cuts, configuring the 
intelligent buyer for the project was even more testing. 
	
These cases illustrate that procurement valuations needed a critical mass of 
officer expertise to feed into procurement specification and evaluation, 
backed-up with professional services to run compliant tendering and engage 
in contract negotiation. District heating projects typically went beyond in-
house energy expertise and demanded careful integration of high quality, 
trustworthy consultancy expertise to configure the intelligent buyer. Upskilling 
and expanding in-house teams was emphasised as crucial to developing a 
more substantial local energy programme. Cut backs to professional services 
also limited the capacity of the in-house intelligent buyer. Energy officers 
were left navigating procurement rules without the specialist expertise to do 
so. Limited capacity for legal contracting delayed multi-actor projects and 
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was perceived by officers as damaging to the credibility of the local authority 
as energy actor. 
 
Limitations were not however a simple matter of expertise. Although no one 
person could perform valuations, assembling the in-house intelligent buyer 
was reliant on having enough human power to undertake the work. In some 
councils, austerity budgets meant there weren’t enough people for value-
making from local energy to expand beyond the projects already struggling 
through public procurement. 
9.2.2 Close friend performs the Intelligent Buyer function 
The valuation practices in close friend configurations took specific 
approaches to assemble the expertise in local energy which fed into 
procurement. These entailed developing trusted supplier relationships, and 
securing the procurement resources required for valuations. Combined, 
these allowed this intelligent buyer to deliver procurement within a shorter 
timeframe than in-house and concession contract configurations. 
 
In each instance, the close friend was a public or third sector organisation 
related to the council, albeit under different arrangements. Stirling was 
involved in collaborative procurement led by Glasgow, as part of a Scottish 
Cities Alliance initiative. Derby expected to contract Robin Hood Energy, a 
licensed energy company owned by Nottingham City Council, for a local 
energy tariff. For district heating projects in Aberdeen and Enfield, and 
renewable electricity in Swansea, Plymouth and Oxford, each council was 
involved in establishing an independent local energy enterprise. Councils 
considered these organisations best placed to create value from local 
energy. In particular specific goals concerning ameliorating fuel poverty, 
carbon reduction, and community ownership and engagement. Glasgow 
used its existing arm’s length management organisation (ALMO) for its 
schools solar PV programme.  
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A distinct arrangement within this configuration materialised through a 
collaborative cross-council workstream in Scottish Cities Alliance51. Stirling 
was party to collective procurement of a single contract for feasibility studies 
assessing potential for urban turbines in six local authorities52. The idea of 
collaborative procurement was to reduce overall costs, avoid duplication and 
secure a high quality consultant. Hazel (Stirling), described that it helped to, 
“share the pain, risk and benefit” of public procurement. 
 
As a valuation practice, procurement was led by Glasgow City Council. Each 
participating council input their chosen site(s) for assessment and fed into the 
procurement specification. An officer from another council, Hazel from 
Stirling, conducted the tender evaluation jointly with Glasgow. She stated, 
“It’s a joint procurement […] Everybody gets together with the questions and 
methods and statements… and everyone agrees it. And then [one] council 
leads.” As lead council, Glasgow set the weighting with the agreement of 
other councils. 
Appointing preferred partners and dealing with competition  
Procurement rules usually prohibit directly appointing any organisation 
without a competitive process. Consequently, diverse valuation practices 
were configured in the areas of discretion within the regulations. This 
involved using either the Teckal device, open competition, sub-contracting 
through a VEAT device, or service level agreements. In each of these, 
responsibility to comply with public procurement rules transferred to the close 
friend, who was then responsible for procurement and other elements of the 
project53. In Aberdeen and Glasgow, close friends ran their own procurement 
                                            
51 Scottish Cities Alliance is a partnership of Scottish cities and Scottish Government and is hosted at 
the Scottish Council for Development and Industry (a non-profit cross-sector economic development 
membership network in Scotland). 
52 This fed into wider co-working around other areas such as planning guidance for connecting to 
district heating (led by Aberdeen); and development of the Non-Domestic Energy Efficiency 
Framework, a procurement framework agreement for EPCs developed for Scottish public bodies (led 
by Edinburgh). 
53 This varied in each case. For example, Aberdeen Heat and Power also owned the district heating 
networks, whilst City Building in Glasgow was used for sourcing and installing the solar PV panels but 
 241 
without direct input from the council. In Enfield, Swansea and Plymouth, new 
organisations did not initially employ staff, and the council offered access to 
procurement services through service level agreements. Thus, councils had 
differing levels of ongoing involvement in procurement. 
Valuations applying the Teckal device 
Aberdeen, Enfield and Glasgow utilised Teckal, a procurement device which 
classifies appointing the close friend (City Building Ltd (Glasgow), Aberdeen 
Heat and Power Ltd, Energetik Ltd (Enfield)), as though it were an ‘in-house 
award’ (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). Teckal therefore provides a regulated 
exemption meaning there was no procurement award per se. Consequently, 
the standard competitive process for appointing these organisations was 
circumnavigated. 
 
Procurement regulations only allowed a Teckal Exemption where 80% of 
business operations are provided to the local authority. The Teckal device is 
typically used for contracting with ALMOs that are the outcome of transferring 
an in-house council service to a separate body (such as housing stock, 
leisure services, catering, building management or waste). This included 
Glasgow’s Building Services which was transferred in 2006 to create City 
Building Ltd. A more diverse group of organisations than traditional ALMOs 
like City Building fell within the definition of Teckal. Aberdeen Heat and 
Power Ltd (AHP, est. 2002) and Energetik Ltd (est. 2015) are both 
independent companies wholly owned by Aberdeen and Enfield Councils. 
They were established with the specific remit of owning and operating district 
energy. They are hence much smaller organisations than ALMOs and did not 
emerge from the transfer of council operations to an external body. 
Nevertheless, meeting Teckal definitions they were directly appointed to 
procure, own and operate district energy networks.  
 
                                            
the council retained ownership of the project. 
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Having made the direct ‘in-house’ award, the Teckal device transferred 
responsibility to comply with public procurement rules to the close friend, who 
was then responsible for delivering set elements of project on behalf of the 
council. “They [Aberdeen Heat and Power] go and do the public procurement 
compliant tender parts for the district heating system, so we don’t have to” 
(Martin, Aberdeen). Thus, these organisations are brought into the value-
making process and have direct responsibility on the councils’ behalf.  
 
Glasgow’s direct appointment of City Building via Teckal procured and 
installed solar PV across school buildings. Reductions to the feed-in tariff 
required moving quickly with accrediting buildings, and sourcing and 
installing PV panels. Open procurement with multiple bidders, and 
establishing a new relationship with a selected contractor, would have taken 
too long. Crucially, the council would miss out on securing the higher rate of 
subsidy. “If we were to bring in a company external to this, that we’d never 
worked with before […] that would have cost us too much time” (Stephen, 
Glasgow). The existing relationship gave confidence in what the Council was 
buying. “We’ve worked with City Building before, they’ve successfully 
deployed for us, we knew what they could do” (Stephen, Glasgow). The 
Teckal device was thus a mechanism within procurement regulations, that 
allowed circumnavigating the requirement for open competition. It appointed 
a trusted supplier and reduced procurement timelines. In turn, quickly 
assembling the intelligent buyer with City Building enabled Glasgow to meet 
their goals of securing a long-term income stream from the feed-in tariff, 
emissions reduction and engage local people in sustainable energy. 
 
The ability to avoid open procurement was seen as “easier” (Martin, 
Aberdeen) compared to the complexity of competitive procurement routes. 
According to Martin, competitive procurement for the heat networks would 
take longer because the council would need to procure external expertise for 
the scheme design. This would compile the procurement specification for the 
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energy centres and heat networks. Internal decision making procedures to 
approve this, plus the time to appoint a consultant, complete the work, and 
run the actual procurement for building the network, would mean that the 
whole project would take longer to deliver. 
 
By contrast, working with AHP resolved issues of expertise, trust and time. 
Their specialist expertise and experience in district energy was particularly 
significant because responsibility for design and operation fed into their 
capacity to ensure high quality procurement for the networks. “Procurement 
is part of their [AHP’s] job and that expertise is crucial […] A fail seems to be 
down to corner cutting or a poor procurement, a poor design. […] you want 
someone who specialises,” (Martin, Aberdeen). Thus, working with the close 
friend resolved some of the issues which in-house configurations had been 
challenged with resolving. 
Valuations via the tender specification in open competition 
Where the Teckal device could not be invoked, alternative valuation practices 
relied on running a standard open competitive procurement process. In these 
instances, officers needed to make full use of the interpretative flexibility 
afforded within defining the tender specification. By exploiting this area of 
discretion, it was possible to steer the process so that the preferred 
contractor, here the close friend, was most likely (but not guaranteed) to be 
awarded the contract. 
 
Derby expected to adopt this approach to procure Robin Hood Energy 
(owned by Nottingham City Council) to provide the back-office services for 
Ram Energy, a local energy tariff in Derby. Similarly, Swansea awarded 
Swansea Community Energy (SCE) – a community benefit society set-up by 
the council – the contract for installing, owning and operating solar PV across 
council-owned buildings. They needed to balance avoiding too much 
competition that might lessen SCE’s ability to provide the best bid, with 
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ensuring they would not be challenged by another supplier for offering 
preferential treatment to SCE.  
obviously we want the local company to get that contract… to make sure we don’t 
break laws associated with procurement, […] how we advertise… ha[s] to be careful 
[…] we make sure there’s some element of competition [… but] we’re fairly confident 
that it only becomes one company. 
Sandra, City & County of Swansea 
Detailing the community benefit and income to the cooperative’s members 
within the tender specification and scoring was crucial to meeting the test of 
open competition. It also helped limit the chances of another organisation 
winning the contract. Although this didn’t eliminate the risk of SCE not 
legitimately winning the contract, Sandra thought it was unlikely to be a major 
problem. Updated procurement regulations have since attempted to make it 
easier for local authorities to promote awarding contracts to SME and mutual 
organisations. 
 
However, there was no guarantee open competition worked for appointing a 
close friend across all energy-related procurement. In 2018 for example, 
Bristol Energy (owned by Bristol City Council), failed to win the council’s gas 
and electricity supply contract by a slim margin, which was awarded to a 
major energy utility (Bristol Energy, 2018). Thus, the requirement for open 
competition means that reliance on tightly defining the tender specification 
was not always a fully reliable route to securing preferred contractors. 
Valuations applying the VEAT Notice device for direct 
appointments  
Working on a local programme of projects with community owned local 
energy enterprises required further adaptation beyond reliance on either 
Teckal or open competition. In Oxford, the city council identified the Low 
Carbon Hub (LCH), a local energy enterprise it has supported establishing, 
as the organisation with the, “drive, ideas and experience that related to 
community owned energy and how that could be scaled up” (Fiona, Oxford). 
However, IEE funding rules prevented LCH from applying to lead the 
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Mobilising Local Energy Investment project (2012-2016) which created a 
pipeline of low carbon projects. Oxford City Council therefore applied for, and 
held, the IEE grant award, meaning the council was formally responsible for 
delivering the project pipeline54. 
 
LCH was directly appointed via a device called a VEAT (Voluntary Ex ante 
Transparency) notice. This is permissible in instances when the local 
authority determines there is only one suitable supplier. This supplier (here, 
LCH) is directly awarded the contract and a VEAT notice is issued giving 
other suppliers ten days to contest the award. Using a VEAT notice, LCH 
went on to deliver renewable energy projects across public and commercially 
owned buildings and land throughout Oxfordshire. LCH could also access 
‘technical assistance’ funding provided by the IEE grant (held by the 
council55) to support project development. This included establishing 
community ownership, running share offers, coordinating with building 
owners, and procuring installers and maintenance contracts. 
 
The responsibility for compliance with public procurement rules also applied 
to LCH. With responsibility for public procurement delegated to the Hub, the 
council had then not been directly involved in procurement for the project 
pipeline. For example, the LCH had established a procurement framework 
agreement (see Section 9.2.3) for delivering the solar PV projects and the 
council had not directly fed into setting the evaluation criteria for selecting 
suppliers. Thus, once responsibility for procurement passed over to the close 
friend, the council does not automatically retain an ongoing role in 
procurement. 
Procurement valuation practices change over time 
Conversely, in Plymouth the council had initially provided procurement 
services for Plymouth Energy Community (PEC). PEC was established in 
                                            
54 The county council was also a formal project partner. 
55 The council also provided short-term construction finance loans to the Hub. 
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2013 where local political priorities promoted a cooperative council model for 
delivering local benefits56. A service level agreement paid for council officer 
time for day-to-day management as initially PEC didn’t employ its own staff.57 
For the solar projects PEC made use of the council’s procurement services. 
 
However, PEC was keen to, “maximise local benefit and… work with 
reputable, reliable, local installers” (Tim, Plymouth) and in practice found 
council-led procurement unable to deliver this. Council eligibility criteria 
around a suppliers’ financial position excluded some smaller local contractors 
from tendering. Some local suppliers also said the costs of engaging in public 
procurement were too high because of the warranties expected for 
workmanship and the indemnity insurances needed. Reflecting the same 
issue as Glasgow (using the Teckal device), PEC also found Council-led 
procurement took too long when the subsidy regime for renewable electricity 
which they were trying to secure was rapidly changing. 
 
In response, as an independent organisation, PEC took the decision to run 
its own procurement, rather than continue to rely on the council service. 
[Plymouth Energy Community] piggy-backed onto the council procurements before, 
now we’ve put that to one side, [its] too expensive and we’re [PEC] able to get 
cheaper prices and use more local contractors who have a good track record and a 
good financial [position]… obviously we [PEC] looked into credit record and all the 
rest of it.  
Tim, Plymouth City Council 
Although working with the council-led procurement was initially convenient, it 
had drawbacks to PEC in terms of assembling value through a local supply 
chain, as well as lowering costs by accessing more affordable contractors. 
Being an independent organisation it was able to reconfigure the intelligent 
                                            
56 The 2012 Plymouth Labour Party manifesto included a cooperative council model for delivering 
local benefits and was integrated into the council’s corporate plan following local elections. 
57 Loans and a start-up grant to establish the organisation were also provided by the Council. 
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buyer again, away from the council model configured around public 
procurement regulations. 
 
Across these cases, expertise, trust and procurement timescales were all 
reasons for working with close friends. In some cases they were already a 
trusted delivery partner which the council had worked with previously. For 
newer relationships, a trusted partnership was built through councils’ 
involvement in their establishment, which had solidified shared goals. Close 
friend configurations also provided specific expertise in local energy, hence 
overcoming some of the issues discussed with the in-house intelligent buyer. 
This was especially true for district energy in Aberdeen and Enfield, and 
community-owned renewable electricity in Oxford and Plymouth. 
 
Although use of the Teckal device, VEAT notice, and tender specification 
were successful, all are open to challenge. Concerning open competition, as 
seen in Bristol, there is also no guarantee that another organisation won’t 
submit a response that scores higher than the close friend. 
9.2.3 Framework agreement devices in the Intelligent Buyer 
Framework agreements intend to reduce the complexity of multiple 
dimensions of public procurement. As explained in Chapter 6, a framework 
agreement can be established for any kind of procurement. Procurement 
frameworks targeted four types of energy project in the sample. Primarily, 
upgrades to council estates through EPCs; but also, renewable electricity, 
retrofit to social housing and district energy. 
 
Framework agreements were costly and time consuming to establish but, 
once in place, offered an OJEU compliant route to standardised common 
procurement by setting out the types of works, services and contract 
structures available. This was supposed to smooth navigating procurement 
rules as project owner. Critically, this configuration was expected save time 
and money by avoiding open competitive procurement for individual projects 
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(Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015; Local Partnerships, 2016). 
Instead, local authorities ‘call-off’ the framework agreement, rather than the 
open market, through issuing a ‘mini-competition’. This mini-competition 
device is intended to simplify valuations by restricting access only to the pre-
approved supplier list. The pre-approved supplier list was expected to weed 
out poor quality suppliers, ensure minimum levels of energy expertise 
needed for projects, and determine whether suppliers offered value for 
money. In principle, the procurement framework should assist in establishing 
trust in the buyer-seller relationship. 
 
This configuration, however, was reliant on the suitability of a framework 
agreement for the individual energy project. Local authorities can and did 
establish framework agreements themselves (e.g. Warrington, Bristol, 
Peterborough), but as noted above they are resource intensive to set-up. 
They can also access an existing framework agreement that they are eligible 
for (e.g. Greenwich, Manchester, Cardiff, Hull, Cambridgeshire, Edinburgh, 
Leicestershire, Leicester), but this proved more complicated in practice. 
The adaptability of the framework agreement device 
Despite the relative ease in accessing existing framework agreements, in 
practice some projects were unable to fit within the scope of an individual 
framework agreement. For example, in both Greenwich and Manchester, 
Elizabeth and Ben reflected that because of the difficulties of moulding the 
framework agreement to the energy project, they would not use the chosen 
framework agreements again. In Greenwich, RE:NEW, available to local 
authorities and social housing providers in London, was used for the 
Barnfield housing estate renovation (577 homes across 30 blocks). In 
Manchester, the Carbon and Energy Fund, primarily for NHS bodies, was 
used for the Civic Quarter heat network. 
 
In Greenwich, the council were tackling energy retrofit and housing upgrades 
at the same time, attempting to more systematically incorporate energy into 
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whole house renovation (see Chapter 5). However, when they encountered 
procurement it became more difficult to deliver this multifaceted project within 
the framework agreement. RE:NEW was designed around energy retrofit of 
social housing. However, as a whole house renovation that incorporated 
energy retrofit as one component, the project went beyond the scope of the 
framework agreement. Squeezing the non-energy elements into the contract 
was particularly challenging, as Elizabeth explained, “from a procurement 
and legal perspective it’s been horribly complicated just because of the kind 
of large scale nature of the works and the fact that we are kind of shoe-
horning it into our procurement arrangement”. 
 
Furthermore, framework agreements are time limited and involve re-
tendering through open competition every few years. RE:NEW was close to 
its expiry date as Greenwich issued the mini-competition. As the council was 
attempting to resolve these issues tension emerged over division of 
responsibility. This involved GLA who had initiated the framework agreement, 
Capita who had been contracted by GLA to act as the managing agent and 
provide technical support, and Greenwich as ‘project sponsor’. Elizabeth’s 
account noted that there was a lack of willingness from both GLA and Capita 
to take a hands-on problem solving role to assist the council. 
 
Thus, whilst framework agreements intend to smooth procurement, both the 
scope of the project and the sets of actors involved made it more challenging 
for the council to actually configure itself as the intelligent buyer. Existing 
framework agreements have already set some of the parameters for 
determining value in a project, which are not always aligned to how a project 
unfolds. This configuration of the intelligent buyer was therefore unable to 
sufficiently incorporate the project in some instances. 
 
Utilising the ability to set up their own framework agreements, some local 
authorities took on the additional resource burden of establishing them 
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themselves. Peterborough designed its own framework, Peterborough EnPC, 
for energy performance contracting (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). 
Peterborough EnPC was a single-supplier framework that lasted eight years 
and was made available to other local authorities (discussed later in section). 
Bristol and Warrington also established their own framework agreements to 
speed up procurement for their solar PV programmes. Angela (Bristol), and 
Tony and Louise (Warrington) reflected that, compared to open procurement 
for an individual solar PV project the framework agreement was hard to set-
up. However, once established, they made subsequent procurement quicker 
and easier than open competition. 
 
In Bristol, set-up costs and resources had also been covered by its in-house 
team (discussed in Section 9.2.1), which was supported with EIB Elena 
funding. According to Angela, because they could go straight to issuing a 
mini-competition, it reduced the internal approval required for procurement. 
Thus, for their own solar programme the framework agreement provided 
more consistency in procurement.  
 
Angela explained how this allowed them to operate more like a business and 
sidestep internal bureaucracy for approval. However, reductions to the feed-
in tariff for renewable electricity had stopped their use of the framework 
agreement. This was because they could not secure prices that made the 
business cases affordable, and some suppliers on their own framework went 
out of business. At the time of our interview, Angela reflected that this might 
only be temporary issue. If costs came down they might be able to re-
establish the framework agreement with supplier and run further solar PV 
projects in the future. As this shows, the high level of user discretion and 
adaptability of the framework agreement device is not detached from the 
energy project. Once the subsidy regime changed, the device and the 
valuation practices in this configuration became unusable in this case. 
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Securing trusted, high quality, suppliers with energy expertise 
For EPC projects, the contractor’s technical expertise and commitment to a 
long-term partnership with the council were perceived as key. “Buying into 
that knowledge and that partnership with somebody was really important to 
us” (Sophie, Leicestershire). A lack of in-house expertise and capacity in 
energy management were reasons driving a focus on contractor expertise 
(including in Cambridge, Leicester and Leicestershire). This was partly 
because of difficulties in recruiting engineering expertise on public sector 
salaries, but also because of cut backs from austerity budgets which reduced 
in-house resource. 
 
The fact that EPC projects targeted the corporate estate and hence fell within 
the council’s direct responsibility was significant to securing a long-term 
partnership with high quality solutions. “We are going to be looking after 
these [buildings] for a number of years” (Rob, Calderdale). The framework 
agreement device itself should in principle mitigate the issue of structural 
distrust of suppliers because quality assessment took place at the set-up 
stage. For EPCs, the contract guarantee should provide another layer of 
security. Thus, with minimum standards to get onto a supplier list and a 
guaranteed contact, Rob (Calderdale) pointed out that, “in theory the quality 
is in some way guaranteed”. 
 
Despite this, councils were unsure whether, in practice, enough quality 
checks had been completed in the pre-approval process for framework 
agreements. Ed (Fife) for example, said one supplier bidding on a mini-
competition issued via the Scottish Government biomass framework did not 
meet the minimum financial standards the council itself set. 
 
Officers also remained concerned about suppliers’ expertise. Lowest cost 
evaluation was thought to open up potential for poorer project outcomes. In 
part this was attributed as the result of low standards within the contracting 
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and supply chain. As Trudy (Edinburgh) explained, “with many contractors… 
the experience isn’t quite there”. To manage this, Trudy (Edinburgh), Rob 
(Calderdale) and Sharon (Cambridgeshire) all emphasised that it was better 
to pay more in upfront costs for a better long-term solution from high quality 
suppliers. As Trudy said, “If you skew it so it’s more about price… You’re 
leaving yourself open to having something that’s really cheap, [and…] you 
have no real sense of their delivery, approach, technology”. 
 
As explained in Chapter 7, local authorities made use of the interpretative 
flexibility in setting the price-to-quality ratio to manage this. Nevertheless, the 
price-to-quality ratio was a theoretical valuation and officers devised 
valuation practices to test whether claims made by suppliers were genuine. 
This included the relatively simple action of cross-checking component costs 
and challenging those which seemed inflated. Councils also explored the 
supplier list in more detail. Edinburgh took the important step of inviting 
bidders in for an interview to explore their experience and expertise. 
 
Equally, confidence to proceed was gained from speaking to other councils 
that had recently completed an EPC project using the same framework 
agreement. For example, officers in Hull spoke to counterparts in Leeds 
about their experience of using the national RE:FIT framework agreement to 
find out more from a trusted local authority perspective. Councils also sought 
input from the managing agents, which provided varying levels of 
consultancy services to councils. Application of the framework agreement, at 
least for EPC projects, thus went beyond drawing on formal guidance. It was 
shaped by the experience of other councils, managing agents who mediated 
how to apply the device, as well as localised valuations practices such as 
informal interviewing. In turn, these shaped how an individual project was 
assembled. 
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Negotiating competition within the procurement framework 
device 
Avoiding full open competition is one of the ways framework agreements 
intended to reduce procurement timelines. However, this assumes that the 
pre-approved competitive suppliers are available, willing and interested to 
compete for the work when the ‘mini-competition’ tender is issued. As 
explained above, some suppliers went out of business. But it went beyond 
this; availability and interest in bidding for the contract also shaped how 
useable this configuration was in practice.  
 
Cardiff initially ran a mini-competition for constructing and installing its 
hydropower plant at Radyr Weir through the Water and Environment 
Management Framework (WEM) run by the Environment Agency. Following 
lack of responses, (this was around the time of the Somerset floods during 
2013-14 and all contractors were already busy), they subsequently re-ran it 
under open procurement. This extended the costs and timeline of 
procurement which delayed the project, and also meant the council had to 
evaluate tenders from suppliers that had not been pre-approved. Daniel 
explained that contractual issues over delivery ensued. 
 
The entire Radyr Weir project also hinged on being registered for the higher 
rate of feed-in tariff subsidy, as this paid toward the costs of the project. 
Following significant delays of almost a year, the project was registered in 
the final days left to register before the subsidy rate dropped. As Daniel 
explained, it was clear that the whole process had added pressure and stress 
to getting the project operational. The extent to which the framework 
agreement device provides a procurement ‘solution’ is hence dependent on 
suppliers being available. An unrelated flooding event in South West England 
destabilised the ability for the council to use this device. To compensate they 
had to develop alternative valuation practices configured under open 
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competition. This caused delays, and increased costs and resource 
requirements. 
The role of competition in demonstrating ‘best value’ 
Competition was considered important because it was invoked as key to 
demonstrating ‘best value’ to council decision makers. These were an 
audience concerned with value for money and documenting accountable 
decisions (see Chapter 7). Framework agreements usually include multiple 
pre-approved suppliers which enables competitive valuations. However, 
public procurement regulations allow framework agreements to be structured 
around a single supplier. 
 
Councils interpreted the significance of how competition was organised 
differently between single and multiple-supplier framework agreements for 
EPC projects. Peterborough Council used the interpretative flexibility within 
procurement to establish Peterborough EnPC in 2013 through ‘competitive 
dialogue’ (one of the OJEU compliant types of procurement). It was an eight 
year single-supplier EPC framework available to all local authorities. Mark – 
who’d been instrumental in establishing Peterborough EnPC – was satisfied 
the process for appointing the single supplier was a competitive process of 
market testing. This included outline interest from around 13 potential 
suppliers. Six bidders engaged up to outline solution stage and two bidders 
engaged up to full evaluation where different solutions were discussed with 
the council. Consequently, there was no use of the mini-competition device, 
scoring or evaluation in procurement valuations for an individual councils’ 
‘call-off’ from Peterborough EnPC.  
 
Conversely, RE:FIT – initially established by the GLA for London public 
sector organisations, but since extended across the UK58 – operated as a 
multiple-supplier framework agreement (refreshed every three years). As 
                                            
58 RE:FIT was also the template for establishing a Scottish specific framework the Non-Domestic 
Energy Efficiency Framework (NDEEF), with Edinburgh the lead council for Scottish Cities Alliance. 
 255 
individual councils’ ‘call-off’, valuations from RE:FIT involved the mini-
competition device, and bidders were evaluated with scoring and a price-to-
quality ratio.  
 
Mark (Peterborough) thought the mini-competition device added 
unnecessary time and costs to project development, and Peterborough 
EnPC was specifically designed to negate this step. According to Mark, when 
establishing the framework agreement, the process of market testing meant 
they’d appointed the best partner available from the market for all users of 
the framework agreement. Further competitive procurement between 
suppliers for individual local authority contracts simply duplicated work. Mark 
reported that Peterborough EnPC was being taken up by Basingstoke, 
Durham and Luton, amongst others. Chris in Leicester also said they were in 
the process of signing-up.  
 
However, both Sharon (Cambridgeshire) and Rob (Calderdale) were unsure 
about their own council’s ability to demonstrate that the supplier offered ‘best 
value’ without multiple bidders competing. 
Peterborough [EnPC] was just one contract to [the single supplier] and they said, 
“We’ve decided that’s best value.” But I couldn’t see where we could really 
demonstrate it. We needed a framework [agreement] of companies to do that. 
Rob, Calderdale Council 
In these cases, competition at the point of selecting a supplier was 
considered crucial to achieving ‘best value’. The simplicity of the single-
supplier framework did not easily translate into existing ways of working 
across all councils. From this point of view, the single-supplier framework 
appeared both more complicated and less transparent. “I didn’t feel like 
[Peterborough EnPC] really understood how councils look at things, which 
was kind of odd” (Rob, Calderdale). In particular, the structure of 
Peterborough EnPC – which involved a refundable access fee to the single 
supplier – was seen as less “defendable” (Sharon, Cambridgeshire) than 
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running a fully documented mini-competition which provided the paper trail of 
a council-led valuation.  
 
However, in practice not all suppliers on a multi-supplier framework 
responded to a mini-competition. In Cambridgeshire they had three 
responses (of which only two were compliant). The non-compliant bidder had 
a strong bid, which Sharon reflected would have introduced too much 
competition between the top two tenders. Thus, negotiating value through 
competition was nuanced. A single supplier did not provide enough 
competition (irrespective of upstream competition with many), whilst in this 
instance, three suppliers were too many to feasibly manage procurement 
valuations. 
 
Furthermore, Cambridgeshire’s RE:FIT project had used the interpretative 
flexibility in the tender specification device to structure the remit of the EPC 
to include the city and district councils in the area. This meant these other 
councils could directly contract the county’s selected EPC supplier on their 
own local EPC projects. In effect this operated as a localised version of the 
single-supplier valuations because this too negated the need to run 
subsequent mini-competitions to the whole supplier list. However, what 
differed was that these participating councils input into Cambridgeshire-led 
valuation and appointment of the supplier, and had the documentation to 
evidence it. As an outcome, the same debate over the role of competitive 
award of contracts in valuations practices was not raised. 
9.2.4 Concession contracts and the Intelligent Buyer 
problem 
Long-term concession contracts involved procuring a private sector company 
to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the energy initiative for the 
contract duration of between 25 and 40 years. In this sample it was used for 
district energy in Birmingham, Leicester and Newcastle. During the contract, 
the concession holder had exclusive rights over the permitted development, 
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and the local authority was the paying customer. This configuration therefore 
represented the highest degree of outsourcing for delivering projects. 
 
The ‘competitive dialogue’ procurement device was used when procuring 
long-term concession contracts. This was the most complicated, drawn out 
and expensive of the four procurement types. Competitive dialogue was only 
permissible when the council was unable to determine the technical 
specification, and/or legal and financing of the project prior to procurement 
(see Chapter 6, Section 6.4). Long-term concession contracts for district 
energy fitted this definition because the private company was responsible for 
designing the networks (i.e. the specification) and for the majority of the 
financing. Although, some public finance contribution was made in each 
case. 
 
Importantly, this meant that potential suppliers were heavily involved in 
defining the parameters of value of the energy project, spanning its scale, 
scope and customer base of projects, legal structure and financing. 
Procuring the concession contract 
At the time of data collection, procurement was underway in Newcastle59 and 
had already become more complicated, expensive and time consuming than 
the council originally envisioned. Overall, procurement took over three years 
to complete (June 2015 – August 2018) with several further months until 
conclusion of negotiations allowed public announcement of the JV. A year 
into the process, David already reflected it was, “interminably long, far too 
long as far as we’re concerned”. Procuring the concession contract was 
estimated to cost around £800,000 which had been supported with a grant, 
and Phase 1 capex. costs were estimated at £15 million (costs may have 
gone up since). 
                                            
59 In December 2018 the 40-year concession holder was announced as Engie Ltd under the JV 




Although procurement was led by the city council it also included Newcastle 
University, and Legal and General through a new development called 
Science Central, as well as health bodies in the area. Overall, David noted 
there was a lack of coherence and clear decisions from the public sector 
partners which introduced new risk factors within procurement itself. “Getting 
anybody to say definitely what they want to do and are going to do is two 
different things. And that has given uncertainty to the bidders” (David, 
Newcastle).  
 
The lengthy procurement process intersected with the wider programme of 
governing local authority funding. During procurement, the council was 
offered time limited capital grant funding of c.£3 million60 to contribute to the 
Helix Energy Centre and district heating network serving Science Central, 
including the procurement costs noted above. Originally the Helix network 
was intended for a later phase of district energy development. However, the 
grant funding presented an opportunity for the council to minimise its direct 
financial contribution into the scheme and was perceived to represent better 
value for money.  
 
Due to the heavy involvement of suppliers in designing the energy projects, 
in the dialogue stages the two bidders in Newcastle were tasked with 
designing and costing up development. This had already been structured 
around the Civic Quarter network (identified as the first project to be 
developed under the contract) when the grant funding was offered for the 
Helix network. Procurement rules heavily promote the fair treatment of 
suppliers. This meant modifying the scope of the tender to the Helix network, 
as the first scheme to develop presented a considerable challenge. 
Procurement was already live and had proceeded to the point where two final 
                                            
60 From the Local Growth Fund, administered through the North East Local Enterprise Partnership. 
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bidders were designing against Civic Quarter. Newcastle had also already 
invested time and effort in its own work on the benchmarking for Civic 
Quarter. It had mocked up its own capital costs, connection charges and 
tariffs for the scheme which they gave to the two bidders to respond with 
their own designs and costings. 
 
The time limit condition stipulated in the grant funding, which had set in 
motion the entire modification, was then relaxed; compounding frustrations 
over how convoluted the procurement process had become. David surmised 
that, had the grant funding time limit been more flexible from the outset, they 
may have avoided making modifications within procurement of the 
concession contract and navigated the process more smoothly. 
Value-making under the concession contract 
Although procuring the concession contract was particularly challenging, 
once in place, it was expected to provide a number of specific solutions to 
the council. For instance, a single long-term relationship with a district energy 
specialist was expected to secure continuity in the local delivery approach for 
district energy. According to David (Newcastle), this was crucial to their 
ambitious goals. He explained, “It was very much related to the ambition to 
have a city-wide network, not to just build one off schemes and have to keep 
procuring them with a different partner each time”. One time procurement to 
create a JV in Newcastle was thus preferable to multiple different delivery 
partners procured for each new phase of network development. 
 
Experiences in Birmingham and Leicester, however, where the concession 
contract was already operational, illustrated that this was much more 
challenging to secure. In particular, requirements about private sector return 
on financial risk for network expansion had been underestimated. 
Consequently, although network expansion had been written into the 
contracts, practical routes for enforcing this were minimal. 
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One of the stipulations is to grow the strategic ambition of BDEC [Birmingham 
District Energy Company]. […] It’s quite clear though […] they’re very focused on 
their bottom line on this and won’t do anything [with] financial risk… We can talk 
about the grand visions of Birmingham City Council to decarbonise the city centre, 
but ultimately if we are just relying on Engie through BDEC […] that’s not going to 
happen. 
Simon, Birmingham City Council 
Beyond the initial phase written into each contract, without guaranteed 
customers signed up to long term supply contracts, the concession holder 
had little incentive to proceed with network expansion. 
 
Especially difficult was growing area-based networks that extended into 
social housing. These were perceived as less profitable. In both Birmingham 
and Leicester the only domestic customers connected were those specified 
in the original phase of the contract. 
 
Despite an “original aspiration” being to serve those in fuel poverty, 
connections to adjacent social housing in Birmingham were unachievable. 
This led Simon (Birmingham) to conclude the aspiration to address fuel 
poverty through the concession contract was “slightly misguided”. 
Birmingham was considering whether the concession holder would extend to 
the nearby tower blocks if they accessed a grant or directly made a financial 
contribution. However, Simon was doubtful, stating, “I think fuel poverty is 
going to have to be delivered through another means outside of BDEC”. 
 
In an attempt to mitigate this, during procurement in Newcastle, they 
attempted to ensure that connection charges and tariffs would be affordable 
to developers, building owners and customers they wanted to serve under 
the 40-year JV, including domestic customers. As the council also has an 
ownership stake in the JV, this could open up a route to developing more 
coherent area-based networks than the SPV concession contract model. 
 261 
9.3 Conclusion: the limits to Public Procurement 
for local energy 
This chapter investigated public procurement in local energy projects and 
revealed diverse valuation practices configured to navigate its complex rules. 
Analysis was based on the argument that as a valuation framework, public 
procurement is one component of the ‘programme of governing’. Miller and 
Rose (2008, p. 21) explain that understanding a programme of governing 
involves turning attention to the “forms of calculation [and] ways of 
categorising” that attempt to fix the terms of representation. Applied to local 
authority energy, I treated public procurement as a set of norms and 
standards that attempted to fix the terms of valuation practices. 
 
Public procurement regulations outlined in Chapter 6, detail a variety of 
different possible routes and options for structuring buyer-supplier 
relationships. Crucially, these were all built around political-economic beliefs 
concerning the promotion of competition as the most efficient means through 
which to assemble value. For instance, individual procurement devices such 
as framework agreements created specific rules for how to organise 
competitive valuations in terms of negotiating value, eligibility to compete, 
and resource and time intensiveness. 
 
As sets of valuation practices, findings uncovered that local authority agency 
to adapt procurement to deliver the envisaged project was dependent on 
configuring multiple forms of expertise, trust and resources. ‘Competition’ as 
the ideal means through which to create value was contested. Councils had 
different interpretations and strategies concerning their obligation to make 
use of and/or demonstrate that value had been mediated through 
competition. 
 
The ‘competitive markets’ did not themselves automatically produce high 
quality suppliers, or provide agency for local authorities to hold contractors to 
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account. Instead, I characterised that the calculative agency required to 
navigate the complex web of procurement rules and assemble value was 
dependent on configurating an ‘intelligent buyer’ in local energy. Each 
configuration was shown to assemble differential capacity to negotiate value 
within procurement. They involved different buyer-seller relationships 
including the in-sourcing and out-sourcing of forms of energy and 
procurement knowledge and expertise, and recruitment of specific 
procurement devices to coordinate valuations. 
 
In turn, the agency of the four intelligent buyers had material consequences 
on the kinds of actors involved in development, procurement, and ongoing 
operation and ownership of local energy projects. Procurement, therefore, 
was not detached from the assembly of value, but rather a constituent 
element shaping the associated forms of value, which could be created from 
energy projects under each configuration. 
 
These findings provide new knowledge in understanding how the programme 
of governing through valuation frameworks shapes energy projects. With 
limited resources at local authorities’ disposal, configuring all intelligent buyer 
configurations within the boundaries of formal public procurement valuation 
systems was highly demanding. Officers had a shared perspective that 
energy project procurement was time consuming, resource intensive and 
complicated. In support of this, 21 respondents in the LEUKES questionnaire 
also reported that public procurement rules were constraining local energy 
projects. Only five said it was either enabling or motivating. This indicates the 
need to further examine the effects of ‘austerity localism’ (e.g. Morris et al., 
2017) in local authority energy. In particular, the contradiction between the in 
principle autonomy over how to procure local energy, compared with the 
reality of constrained resources and unfamiliar territory of procuring often 
novel energy projects. 
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Findings also provide evidence in support of the argument that expertise is 
significant to a host of different forms of valuations (Lamont, 2012). These 
findings show that expertise was critical to configuring the intelligent buyer 
and making use of the areas of interpretative flexibility within local energy 
procurement. The tender specification for instance was one key area where 
the local authority could mould procurement. But exerting control was 
dependent on having the combined energy and procurement expertise to do 
so. This reinforces findings that the in-house composition of expertise 
influences how local authorities proceed with ownership and operation of 
local energy infrastructure (Hannon & Bolton, 2015; Roelich et al., 2018; 
Rutherford & Jaglin, 2015; Webb, 2015). 
 
Additionally, findings provide new evidence about the significance of trust in 
valuation practices, which appears to have been underexamined. For 
example, Lamont’s (2012) review, argues for greater attention to be paid to 
the role of human judgement, but there is less around the role of the building 
trust within valuations. Similarly, trust itself makes no clear appearance in the 
articles published in Valuation Studies (2013–2020). These findings, 
however, show that trust was central across sets of valuations practices in all 
configurations. For example, although the pre-approval of suppliers into 
framework agreement configurations was expected to only permit trusted 
suppliers and therein streamline the buyer-seller relationship, councils 
developed additional valuation practices to supplement this. Hence, trust was 
a central rather than peripheral element of these valuation practices. This 
indicates the need for further investigation into the significance of trust in 
valuations, particularly where energy projects involve multiple actors across 
project development, procurement, ownership and ongoing operation. 
 
This chapter has considered the ways in which the value of local energy was 
mediated through public procurement. The current programme governing 
local authorities stipulates that competitive valuations are the optimum route 
 264
to securing ‘best value’ solutions for the public sector. The ability to navigate 
an energy project through these complex processes that attempt to create 
‘markets’ and ‘market actors’ and conduct the demanding work of 
procurement valuations, was reliant on expertise, establishing trust and 
sufficient resources. The next chapter brings the thesis together into a final 





10 Conclusions: Struggles Over the Value of 
Local Energy 
 
10.1 Research problem revisited 
UK Local Authorities are a critical institutional civic actor for UK 2050 net 
zero climate goals. However, literature (see Chapter 2) emphasises current 
investment in local energy and carbon saving projects is fragmented, and not 
at the pace or scale needed. Evidence from qualitative analysis of 40 local 
authority case studies was used to analyse the intersecting dimensions of 
valuation practices in local energy projects. Findings reveal that the value of 
energy projects is not pre-determined, but is shaped by processes of ‘value-
in-the-making’. 
 
Local authorities are required to negotiate formal valuation frameworks at key 
junctures throughout project development. Three of these are the Best Value 
Framework, the business case model and public procurement. The 
application of these tools and decision making procedures represent the 
contemporary programme of neo-liberal governing which attempts to improve 
public sector efficiency through market organising techniques. 
 
In these terms, these valuation frameworks represent “the complex of 
mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents 
and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to 
governmental ambitions” (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 273). Governments across 
the UK advise these valuation frameworks are able to balance and ‘optimally’ 
represent economic, social and environmental value in evaluation of local 
investment options. However, evidence from the case studies demonstrate 
that this balancing did not routinely happen in practice. 
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Instead, it was largely short-term financial value that was optimised during 
the application of these devices in energy project development. The impact 
was that, for the most part, only those projects which could be framed within 
confines of short-term financial affordability were developed. Long-term 
project investments were largely disincentivised. Many projects were either 
delayed or scaled down, whilst others did not get beyond the negotiation of 
these valuation frameworks and were abandoned, or shelved until a new 
window of opportunity presented itself. 
 
Neither carbon saving nor social benefit were compelling enough forms of 
value to justify proceeding with project development through to operational 
stages. Instead, these forms of value were marginalised in this process. 
Financial value in its multiple guises, could not easily be escaped. 
 
Where projects went ahead, they required considerable ingenuity to establish 
alternative decision making – or valuation – practices. But overall, energy 
projects that emerged remain smaller scale than demanded by climate 
protection goals. For example, almost every UK building needs to be net zero 
carbon to meet 2050 policy goals (CCC, 2019), yet even net zero carbon 
local authority estates cannot be created via these tools and procedures. 
From the perspective of municipal scale energy and carbon reduction, in their 
current applications, these valuation frameworks do not serve the goals 
society needs them to. 
 
The conceptual model applied in this thesis bridges economic sociology of 
valuation and programmes of governing. According to the sociological 
concept of valuation (Muniesa, 2012), the value of something is not fixed but 
malleable; its value is not the same before and after it has been valued. The 
implication of this conjecture is that the value of an energy project is 




Economisation, Çalışkan and Callon (2009) tell us, is one of the most 
ubiquitous forms of valuation in contemporary advanced capitalist societies. 
The value of an energy project is hence likely to be assembled in 
economistic terms. Insights from programmes of governing (Miller, 2008), 
explain that it is through rules, guidelines and instruments of valuation, that 
governmental agendas exert political power in an attempt to control the 
actions and agency of local authorities. This re-inserts the political agenda 
being pursued by promotion of particular forms of calculation, such as 
economisation. Governmental agendas are thus implicated in the 
economisation of society, and vice versa; rather than detached processes, 
they are intertwined and self-reinforcing. Applying this combined perspective 
to local energy revealed a major gap in sociological understanding about how 
valuation practices take place within project development, why, and what 
happens as a result. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I discuss each of these in turn. How 
‘programmes of economisation’ unfold in local authority valuations is first 
outlined, before discussing the causes of this. This is particularly important 
for considering how some longer term projects were nevertheless brought 
forward. The resulting implications for energy projects are explored. In 
particular considering how exclusionary economisation was in practice, and 
how this influenced potential for assembling energy, carbon saving and other 
forms of value. I also discuss limitations and further research arising from the 
findings. The chapter closes with discussion of the contribution this thesis 
makes to social studies of energy. 
How did economisation unfold? 
This thesis has revealed diverse processes of economisation operating on 
energy projects across all three valuation frameworks investigated. In the 
applications of the Best Value Framework, some officers represented the 
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council’s interpretation of ‘best value’ in an energy project as financial 
affordability, namely whether the project would cover its borrowing costs, 
mediated through a marketplace structured by public procurement rules. In 
assembly of the business case a strong process of economisation prioritised 
short-term financial value. Austerity and budgetary pressures exacerbated 
this, as budget cuts simultaneously intensified both short-term cost saving 
and the need for income generation. Whilst some projects could conform to 
this model of economisation, long-term carbon saving projects were not 
routinely prioritised. Public procurement economised interactions with 
suppliers, with ideas of ‘best value’ to the council brought about through 
suppliers’ (i.e. market actors) responses to tenders. 
 
Then was the considerable time spent doing the ‘administrative’ valuation 
work of translating the project into an accountable form across each 
framework. Energy project valuations needed to withstand not only audit 
tests of (best) value for money, but also compliance with procurement rules 
and principles of competition. A critical step in valuation practices was to 
translate the energy project into an object which Finance and Legal teams, in 
particular, could sign up to. Since these teams were generally unfamiliar with 
energy projects, this required translation work to redefine the energy project 
as a financial object, at least temporarily. I return to the impact of this below. 
 
This research shows, therefore, that the economising of local energy projects 
is not one dimensional, but emerges in diverse ways. Multiple forms of 
economised valuations continuously emerged in relation to the three 
valuation frameworks, at multiple stages of project development, over a 
variety of projects and across multiple local authority cases. Analysis of this 
larger number of cases, encompassing different project types, has thus 
contributed to knowledge about the extensive reach of this programme of 
economisation in municipal energy. 
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Devices in energy project valuations 
Attentive to the influence of formal tools in decision making, this thesis 
contributes the following interconnected explanations to the economising of 
local energy project valuations. Termed ‘devices’ in social studies of markets 
(Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Muniesa et al., 2007), the valuation frameworks I 
examined intervened in energy project development. Capturing and 
structuring valuation practices, these devices were able to organise the 
human activity in energy project development, at times to the frustration of 
project officers. 
 
They became the lens through which officers saw and spoke about the 
project, and interacted with others across the council. They were the devices 
that funding proposals were dependent upon, and through which decisions 
were made, and audit trails were created. The work that people carried out in 
securing contractors, buying solar panels, and purchasing expertise was 
assembled and administered through public procurement rules, 
specifications, timeframes, evaluation criteria, notice websites, and contracts. 
The future of the project relied on procurement valuations being correctly 
conducted, in terms of compliance, but also being designed in such a way 
that they created the outcomes needed.  
 
This mundane work of filling out reports, securing approval of the business 
case, and advertising procurement tenders, added up to considerable 
mediation of value. These valuation frameworks were thus integral elements 
of the energy project valuations and economisation processes observed, 
intervening across multiple stages of project development. They were, in this 
sense, devices that were hard to escape. 
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A series of economised processes: making the energy 
project governable 
These were not however, omnipotent singular devices demanding attention 
from their ‘users’ in any one specified way. These devices did not create a 
one-stop-shop of economisation through which every energy project 
emerged rendered as a specific type of ‘economic object’. Much of the work 
required by these devices involved a series of processes which made the 
energy project, as an extension of the local authority, governable according 
to pernicious notions of ‘(best) value for money’, ‘competition’ and ‘efficiency’ 
in public spending. For example, energy projects were made governable 
through public procurement, which attempts to create a competitive 
marketplace for societal solutions, here climate protection. These devices are 
hence integral components in economising society and the extension of 
markets into public services. 
 
Findings therefore contribute new evidence that analysis of the application of 
concepts of ‘economisation’ and its ‘devices’ in local government context 
needs to pay attention to ‘programmes of governing’. The concept of 
‘programmes of economising’ goes some way to incorporating the 
combination of concepts required to capture the dynamics observed. 
However as Chapters 7 and 9 showed, valuation practices were not always 
directly about economic or financial valuations, but about documenting due 
attention to satisfy set measures and procedures. This emerged both in 
relation to attempts to standardise the negotiation of value, but also the 
concurrent fluid valuation practices that were simultaneously navigating 
these complex frameworks. Escaping, sidestepping or reorienting formal 
valuations that attempt to extend the contemporary programme of neo-liberal 
governing in local government institutions was continually at stake. 
 
Moreover, if decisions to proceed with an energy project tend to be reduced 
to financial affordability, there is a need to query the value of the work done 
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to demonstrate wider notions of ‘value for money’, and ‘best value’. What 
purpose is served by committing all the human, financial and time resources 
to building the wider case? Here I invoke Power’s (2010 [1997]) notion of the 
‘audit explosion’ as an authorised ritual of trust that seeks to provide comfort 
to society through ‘risk processing’. Organisational governance it not about 
pure economics, but about systems of control which rely upon audit and 
management processes of documenting, recording, ordering and checking. 
Valuation studies therefore could develop its general agnosticism to 
economic valuation (Doganova et al., 2018) by engaging further in the way 
political agendas attempt to exercise power and control through myriad forms 
of valuing61. 
 
As such, I avoided significant use of the concept of ‘financialisation’, which 
Chiapello (2015) argues is a prevalent form of economisation in public policy. 
Instead I opted to apply ‘economisation’ (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009), taking it 
as the higher order, or more generalised concept. Chiapello argues that 
financialisation is a form of exclusionary valuation based on calculations that 
squeezes out public goods by transforming the object, here an energy 
project, into something viewed from an investor’s perspective. Even though 
financial metrics and some form of financial value (for example short-term 
cost saving) were often being prioritised in valuations, I saw the emergence 
of this process as more nuanced and multifaceted. Not always was it a metric 
such as net present value that was transforming the terms of valuations. Any 
number of procurement valuations across an energy project were under 
negotiation, with ratios, evaluation criteria, testing of suppliers and 
benchmarking. 
 
                                            
61 For a short summary of valuation studies’ perspective on valuation and politics, see Helgesson et 
al.’s (2017) reflections on a stream covering the topic at the 2017 European Group of Organisation 
Studies (EGOS) conference. 
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The concept has however been helpfully adapted in other studies, such as 
Webb’s (2019) analysis of ‘financialised governance’ in Glasgow’s energy 
strategy, suggesting scope to further application in empirical studies of local 
energy. Economic sociologists have also acknowledged the tendency for silo 
thinking and a lack of overarching or unifying concepts (Fligstein & Dauter, 
2007; Lamont, 2012; Mackenzie, 2019). By retaining the focus on bridging 
the concepts of economisation, valuation and programmes of governing, I 
have generated conclusions which may be of wider relevance and interest to 
economic sociology. 
The political-economic context: politicising energy project 
valuations 
Furthermore, the political-economic context matters to valuation practices. 
This was not a study of a particular market, such as financial trading and its 
‘market devices’ (Mackenzie, 2019), but a study of ‘economics in the wild’ 
(Callon, 2007). This is where forms of valuation have been transposed from 
one (economic) situ, into another; here, public organisations and energy 
projects. The valuation practices I studied were in a specific context of local 
government, which over the last 40 years has seen an extension of market 
governing techniques, but also in a specific period of major budget 
reductions and organisational change. 
 
Austerity budgets, as emphasised in Chapter 8, pushed short-term planning 
to the forefront, as pressures demanded cost saving and income generation 
opportunities. Short-term financial planning is part of what makes metrics, 
such as payback, potent representations of the value of an energy project. 
Valuations based on payback had a certain appeal in this context, being 
amenable to wider organisational pressures. These austerity measures are 
not the outcome of ‘economics’ per se, but political decisions about 
addressing national debt through reductions to public funding. Specific forms 
of economic knowledge are (perhaps) part of that political decision, but 
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political decisions are not reducible to economics alone. Consequently, the 
economising of local energy projects cannot be untangled from the highly 
political context of austerity. The rendering of a local authority energy project 
through economic or financial valuation is thus as much about power and 
control as economics (or finance). There is therefore a need for sensitivity 
about the (new) context within which devices are used, and new, or at least 
modified, valuation practices develop. 
 
Considering devices and their environment has revealed an inherent 
politicisation of local authority energy valuations. This helps to explain why, 
although government advise each valuation framework can provide a 
balanced evaluation of local investment options, this did not routinely 
materialise. This adds weight to the argument about ‘austerity localism’ 
(Hastings et al., 2015; Morris et al., 2017), where although local authorities, 
in principle, have discretion to prioritise multiple forms of local value, their 
agency to go beyond narrow bounds of financial value is tightly constrained. 
As emphasised in Chapters 7 and 9, austerity localism has further eroded the 
already limited internal resources that provide local authorities with 
confidence they can manage larger scale and/or multi-actor projects. I 
conclude that the programme of governing through these valuation 
frameworks, combined with austerity, created the ideal conditions for 
intensifying the economising of local energy. 
 
Further evidence in support of the sensitivity of valuations to the political-
economic context concerns the changing incentives, grant programmes and 
subsidies for small scale renewables, retrofit and district heating (e.g. the 
feed-in tariff, Energy Company Obligation, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment and Green Deal). Considerable change to energy policy 
provides little continuity in energy project valuations. The energy project 
business case in particular was subject to continual reform and arduous 
problem solving, as officers scrambled to secure contributions to 
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development or capital funding costs. In turn, procurement processes were 
undermined as projects had to meet revised deadlines, or revise the scope of 
tenders to accommodate almost erratic grant funding support. In some 
cases, entire procurement framework agreements that councils had 
established to enable solar projects to come forward swiftly were abandoned. 
 
This destabilised the already tenuous setting for energy projects, which fall 
outside the ‘mainstream business’ of local services. More broadly, this 
worked against creating a municipal energy actor that could adeptly navigate 
the valuation frameworks, and secure commitment from the council for a 
long-term energy programme. Instead, ad hoc funding opportunities were 
pursued by councils, often at the expense of consistently assembling local 
value from energy projects. 
 
As such, opportunities to secure multiple forms of value were not readily 
available in this political-economic context, and no set of guidelines 
fundamentally changed that. For example, although the Best Value 
Framework was intended to open up valuations beyond lowest cost, it was 
not effective at creating change on its own, beyond niche areas such as the 
price-to-quality ratio in procurement. 
The interpretative and adaptive capacity of users 
Mindful to the necessary interpretation of valuation frameworks, this thesis 
provides new insight into the remarkable, endless inventiveness which 
‘users’ of valuation frameworks bring to bear, despite the marginality of local 
energy. Using the notion of boundary objects which are open to interpretation 
and multiple uses (Star, 2010) and the concept of finitism (Barnes, 1995), 
each valuation framework was shown to be open to a degree of malleability. 
The meaning of rules were interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis, 
with officers from across councils having different interpretations of how to 
negotiate each valuation framework. 
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In the business case for example, this ranged from not needing to construct a 
business case for certain projects, through to using extensive business case 
development techniques. As discussed above, in many instances individual 
financial devices in the business case were used as a crude measure to 
prioritise only certain projects. Interestingly however, the ‘business case’ was 
sometimes used as a tool for incorporating the energy project further into the 
mainstream business of the council. This included incorporating energy into 
the capital investment programme, recruiting local politicians of different 
parties, and linking energy to different corporate agendas. The ongoing 
negotiation and constant re-interpretation of devices thus provides evidence 
countering the path dependency, and highlights the limits, of such 
programmes of economising.  
 
Users therefore have adaptive capacity and are not passive agents in 
economising local energy. Based on the evidence from these case studies, I 
conclude that the ‘finitist user’ was largely what opened up spaces for larger 
scale longer term energy projects. However, the creative spaces and sites 
within valuations available to exploit by the finitist user, depended on 
willingness and expertise. 
 
In particular, energy projects depended on Finance, Legal and Procurement 
depts./teams breaking the conventional rules and stepping outside of the 
zone of core statutory services to engage in non-core business. Capital 
financing and VAT were also raised important to local energy projects, but 
sometimes less familiar to some Finance depts. (compared to revenue 
accounting). Unfamiliar procurement and contracting routes for unfamiliar 
energy projects, also created to at least a feeling of unwillingness for inter-
departmental collaboration in some cases. Beyond these specific areas of 
expertise, limited resources in corporate services continually emerged as 
limiting the adaptive capacity of local authorities to repurpose valuations to 
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secure carbon saving and public goods from investment in energy. How 
these negotiations unfolded ultimately shaped the success, scale and scope 
of energy initiatives. 
Implications for local energy policy and practice in the 
context of net zero carbon targets 
As discussed above in practice, each valuation framework marginalised 
some dimensions of local value in energy projects. Notably, projects which 
could not meet short-term borrowing restrictions were downgraded. 
Uncertainty over the future of the public estate also caused delays even to 
relatively short-term energy retrofit projects. Councils’ nuanced 
interpretations of ‘best value for money’ also fed into concerns about whether 
they could manage large-scale complex project development, with limited 
human resources and technical expertise across energy, legal and financing. 
 
Where energy projects could be incorporated into the commercialisation 
strategies of councils, these primarily focussed on delivering cost saving or 
income generation for central council budgets. As such they were likely to 
preclude more marginal initiatives: carbon saving or clean energy was 
sometimes no more than a ‘bonus’. Indeed, projects that saved carbon, but 
did not cover borrowing costs, either needed to fill the funding gap, or were 
shelved. Based on the evidence considered in this thesis, carbon reduction 
projects are unable to operate as ‘financial loss making’ initiatives, 
irrespective of their contribution to climate protection and societal welfare. 
 
There was also considerable re-work in many cases, as energy projects 
recycled through the development process. Whilst some level of iteration in 
project development is to be expected, most local authorities in this study 
were searching around for routes to create local energy value, but not really 
getting there. Where local authorities made headway, the valuation 
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frameworks did not themselves create significant routes to local value 
creation. 
 
Instead, officers and councillors created and exploited pockets of creativity 
beyond the bounds of available valuation frameworks. These valuation 
frameworks do not redefine the marginal status of local energy in any 
significant way. The potential for energy and carbon saving does not, in any 
material sense, influence what happens in the organisation. Despite a few 
individual examples, project officers across various departments struggled to 
shape councils ‘non-energy’ activities. Thus, within this programme of 
governing local authority valuations, there is no central legitimacy of energy. 
 
A counterargument could be posed that these valuation frameworks 
represent the least worst option for governing local spending decisions and 
putting in place the kind of checks and balances needed to safeguard the 
finite use of public resources, whether human, financial and/or time (cf. 
Power, 2010[1997]). Local authority officers are used to navigating the 
complex organisational settings they work in. One could say the local 
authority has been normalised to working within, with, and against these 
valuation frameworks. Officers have pushed at the margins to get energy 
projects from initial conception into some form of operational reality; maybe 
there is nothing better to be had. But thinking critically about the resources 
which go into negotiating the demands of the valuation frameworks, I 
conclude that problems could be eased and tensions lessened, by a 
modified, if not outright alternative, approach. 
 
Furthermore, such reliance on individuals’ ability and willingness to negotiate 
valuation frameworks that do not prioritise energy and carbon saving is 
unsustainable for building the integrated local clean energy systems now 
envisaged by policies (CCC, 2019; Scottish Government, 2018a; UK 
Government, 2017; Welsh Government, 2019). Achieving such policy goals 
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will rely on altering current approaches to valuing local energy. Based on 
findings, policies geared to creating the investment for the necessary step 
change in local net zero carbon strategy and implementation need to pay 
attention to the following three interconnected issues. Each of these is 
extended through discussion of further research in the next section. 
Establishing central legitimacy for net zero carbon planning and 
investment as core to local government services 
Under current institutional structures, the most immediately obvious route to 
overcoming struggles in assembling value is to incorporate local energy into 
the statutory responsibilities of local government and provide commensurate 
resourcing. This has the benefit of creating a clear local problem owner with 
both responsibility, resourcing and therefore capacity to act (Hawkey & 
Webb, 2014; Tingey & Webb, 2020a; Webb & Hawkey, 2016). Therefore, 
any such statutory responsibilities need accompanying resources across 
capital financing, technical energy and engineering expertise, legal, 
contracting and procurement. Establishing local energy teams within local 
authorities with a remit to develop area-based net zero carbon plans and 
implementation programmes would be a first step (Tingey & Webb, 2020b). 
The goal would not be to create an additional ‘box ticking’ exercise, but 
instead build new service provision based on the meaningful contribution that 
local areas can make to UK carbon reduction targets. Without an adequately 
resourced local institutional actor, finding suggest this will not materialise. 
Reform valuation frameworks to align with a net zero carbon 
trajectory 
Securing ‘best value’ to the council needs to align business case and 
procurement strategies with net zero carbon investment priorities. This 
requires supporting local authorities to incorporate whole life energy and 
carbon saving into business case and procurement evaluation. Specialist 
energy/net zero procurement services could provide one element of a 
support package. For example, during the course of data collection a 
proposal to create a non-profit local authority-owned District Energy 
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Procurement Agency (DEPA) for district heating procurement was proposed 
(King, 2016a). This intended to resolve issues concerning expertise, 
resources and trust raised in Chapter 9. However, despite an initial 
government grant, the proposal failed to gain momentum and the widespread 
support of local authorities who needed to seize and take ownership of the 
opportunity. In the context of revising valuation frameworks to scale up local 
net zero carbon investment, a proposal such as DEPA could be revisited. 
Create straightforward and accessible low cost long-term funding 
for local net zero carbon investment programmes 
Local authorities need access to low cost long-term funding. In principle there 
are multiple sources of available finance (Tingey & Webb, 2020b), but to 
reduce perceptions of risk and unfamiliarity, straightforward government 
backed lending schemes need to provide an easy and affordable route to 
funding net zero carbon programmes. This needs to reduce the overheads of 
securing funding for individual project business cases and allow cross-
subsidising of local projects. Multiple sources of finance could be brought 
together (see e.g. London Sustainable Development Commission, 2020), 
such as government and institutional investors co-funding a Local Net Zero 
Fund. For example, analysis for the whole city of Edinburgh estimates that 
around £4 billion would be required to reduce emissions by about 56% from 
2019 levels (Williamson et al., 2019). Reducing development costs and 
timelines through access to affordable finance would in turn generate ‘better 
value’ for public money. 
10.2 Limitations and further research 
Conclusions emphasised the recurrent themes of the marginalising of energy 
and carbon saving and public goods; and the types of negotiation, 
collaboration and expertise involved in negotiating each valuation framework. 
As a qualitative analysis of how valuation frameworks were drawn into the 
value-making practices shaping the UK local authority energy projects 
examined, these conclusions are suited to analytical generalisations 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2018).  
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Given the timing and locations of this study, generalisability of these broad 
conclusions is restricted to the struggles involved in assembling value in UK 
local authority energy projects around the mid-2010s. Local authority energy 
now is not exactly the same as when I collected data. As case study 
research, this investigation was also restricted to a sub-set of UK local 
authorities. Talking to officers in different councils might reveal other 
dimensions not fully captured here. Much would however be similar enough 
to lead to the same or relatable conclusions. There has been no fundamental 
change to local authority energy since my data were collected.  
 
However, a series of governance changes are in process, which could 
potentially change the future of local energy. This study therefore lays the 
foundation for further comparative work in the context of the following live 
developments occurring since my data collection period: 
Comparative analysis on valuation frameworks 
Each valuation framework has seen some modification since my data were 
gathered62. For example, new procurement handbooks were issued in 
association with the latest iteration of public procurement rules. These 
included encouraging incorporation of carbon and energy saving into the 
evaluation of tenders and promoting the role of whole life costing. Studies 
could therefore examine whether this leads to any material effect on 
procurement valuations. Breaking procurement into smaller lots to enable 
SMEs to bid for contracts also features. It would be helpful to establish 
whether local authorities are able to make use of this, as it increases the 
number of tender specifications, evaluations and contract awards. Thus, this 
could increase resource demands on Procurement and Legal depts./teams. 
                                            
62 Concerning the business case, in 2018 extended guidance was issued on use of the five case model 
of business case development, including access to training and accreditation. Concerning the Best 
Value Framework, in 2020 Scottish Government issued new statutory guidance on securing Best 
Value, with an increased expectation on partnership working.  
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New provisions also enable limiting eligibility of certain contracts to mutuals, 
defined as bodies with public service goals, and mutual ownership and profit 
sharing structures. These could make it more straightforward for local 
authorities to procure third sector organisations in delivering energy projects, 
but it needs investigating. There may also be changes to public procurement 
rules following the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. How this will 
unfold for local energy is unknown at this stage, but this research lays the 
foundations for comparative analysis. 
The legitimacy of local energy in the context of Climate 
Emergencies and net zero carbon targets  
Since 2018 almost three quarters of local authorities have made a Climate 
Emergency Declaration (Tingey & Webb, 2020b), committing to reducing 
emissions on their own estates by a set date (usually around 2030) and 
extending this outward to create net zero carbon across the local area. 
Having declared a Climate Emergency, local authorities are expected to 
develop an implementation plan and report on progress. Climate 
Emergencies may result in a greater prioritisation of energy in local 
government. Research could examine whether such local political 
commitments shape how valuation frameworks are actually used. Potentially 
they could stimulate new impetus to change valuation practices and prioritise 
energy and carbon saving, but these phenomena need investigating. 
Previous local political commitments alone have had limited effect. 
 
Beyond Climate Emergencies, there is also scope for research into the role 
of valuation frameworks for implementing local planning for heat and energy 
efficiency. For example, since data were collected, proposals have 
developed for formal statutory powers for Scottish local authorities to develop 
Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies (LHEES). Within the evolving 
Energy Efficient Scotland policy, local authorities are envisaged as key local 
actors, expected to develop an area-based LHEES for upgrading every 
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building (Scottish Government, 2018b). Feasibly these could shape heat and 
energy efficiency investment evaluation in Scottish local authorities, and 
potentially there could be new public procurement models associated with 
this programme. How resourcing will unfold is not yet known but will likely to 
shape the extent to which LHEES gains legitimacy within the local authority 
organisation. Evaluation of a pilot programme showed there was insufficient 
existing in-house resource to deliver on the ambitions of LHEES (Wade, 
Webb, & Creamer, 2019). Further analysis could explore the use of more 
formal statutory powers to drive change in local energy valuation practices. 
This could also provide learning for the rest of the UK. 
Scaling up methods 
Finally, this was not a statistically representative study that aimed to draw 
inferences about the impacts of valuation frameworks on the whole 
population of local authorities. Further research could work on scaling up 
methods to capture evidence from a wider pool of local authorities, drawing 
on a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. In the short term, given 
extensive homeworking is likely to continue following the coronavirus 2020 
pandemic, this would likely need to rely on innovation in online data 
gathering. This presents both opportunities (i.e. reducing time and costs of 
travel etc), and challenges (suitability and reliability of online tools such as 
conference calling), but could fruitfully be a route to data gathering with more 
local authorities, and their partners. 
10.3 Contributions to social studies of energy 
Until very recently, there have been so few sociological studies of energy that 
they have had a negligible impact on energy research as a whole (Sovacool, 
2014). At the core of the sociological perspective is a concern with how 
society works and critical analysis of societal structures and agency. Tom 
Burns (1965), who established Sociology at Edinburgh University, explained 
it succinctly when he argued: 
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The practice of sociology is criticism. It exists to criticise claims about the value of 
achievement and to question assumptions about the meaning of conduct. It is the 
business of sociologists to conduct a critical debate with the public about its 
equipment of social institutions. 
Burns, 1965, p. 12 
Taking this forward into a study of local authority energy projects has 
provided new evidence about the socio-technical and governance challenges 
of municipal energy. In their simplest form, findings show that across multiple 
different technologies, councils experienced difficulties in bringing forward 
energy projects. The energy technology itself was not the central issue at 
stake, or the ‘cause’ of failed project development. Rather, the issue was 
more often an uneasy combination of where responsibility for local energy 
sat (nowhere), how decisions were made (ultimately not based on energy or 
carbon), who had the expertise needed to bring a project forward (a mix of 
technical, legal, financial, contracting and procurement expertise not routinely 
located within the council), and an erosion of local authority autonomy and 
agency, as acutely borne out in relation to austerity budgets of the last 
decade. This contribution hence illustrates the limitations of focussing solely 
on engineering and economic analyses. It emphasises the need to focus on 
institutional processes, decision making routines, and expertise: these are 
societal processes. 
 
Despite the potential contribution for city-scale investment to meet climate 
protection goals (Gouldson et al., 2015; Sudmant et al., 2016), there is no 
significant UK municipal energy sector. In particular this thesis provides 
enough comparative evidence to build knowledge about the overarching 
patterns in UK local authority decision making for local energy, and the 
common difficulties that local authorities face across a breadth of energy 
projects. A focus on the application of tools and procedures has illustrated 
how practices often diverge, quite considerably, from original intentions. 
Valuations are much more nuanced than alluded to in the ‘ideal type’ 
depicted in guidelines. This has revealed the deficiencies of decision making 
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tools and procedures for local energy, helping to explain why certain energy 
projects came forward, but others do not. Consequently, this provides a more 
nuanced understanding of the local authority as an energy actor and the 
different capacities it can bring to bear on local energy. 
 
Therefore, this thesis has demonstrated the strength of using qualitative in-
depth methods to prise open the technocratic processes of local government 
project development. Findings emphasise the importance of primary 
research that examines how tools are used. This highlights the limitations of 
a sole, or over reliance, on secondary forms of policy and documentary 
analysis. Social studies of energy could therefore be strengthened by further 
research on valuation practices, which shape decisions about the scale and 
scope of energy initiatives and local systems development. 
 
This thesis has provided a rich account of the struggles local authorities 
encounter as they attempt to bring forward energy projects. Social studies of 
energy need to engage governments, businesses, civil society and citizens in 
a critical debate about the limitations of current institutional relationships and 
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Appendix I Overview of UK Local 
Government Structure 
 
Local Authority statutory responsibilities and the UK local 
government structure 
 
Main responsibilities: The main UK local government functions are: council 
tax, economic development, education, environmental health, housing, 
leisure and recreation, libraries, planning applications, social care, strategic 
planning, transport and waste management. 
 




All main service areas. 56 
Metropolitan 
district borough 
All main services areas. Use of Special Purpose 
Authorities for strategic areas like transport 
and waste. 
36 
County council Upper 
Education, environmental health, leisure and 
recreation, libraries, social care, strategic 






Housing, economic development, council tax, 






Strategic role across London in transport, 
spatial planning, housing, economic 
development, environment (including climate 
change, energy and waste), culture, public 
health, policing and fire services. 
 
London 
borough  Lower 
All services except Greater London Authority 
strategic functions. Waste is coordinated 
through five joint waste authorities. 
32 
City of London 
Corporation Lower 
Same as London boroughs plus policing, as port 
health authority, promotion of financial 







Environmental health, leisure and recreation, 






All main services areas plus community 
planning approach and four Strategic 
Development Planning Authorities for cross-
authority services in the city-region areas. 
32 
Wales All main service areas. 22 
Source: Adapted from Tingey and Webb (2020a). 
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Local authorities operate under either an Executive, Committee or Hybrid 
model. 
Executive Model: Leader (or Mayor) and Cabinet 
Council elects leader and leader appoints cabinet with cabinet members 
holding portfolio positions. These portfolio positions vary, depending on the 
council, but typically cover housing, education, economic development etc.  
 
Where a Mayor is directly elected (such as in Bristol), the Mayor appoints the 
Cabinet. 
Committee System 
The responsibilities of the Leader are enacted across a structure of multiple 
committees rather than a single Cabinet. 
Hybrid model 
A mix of the executive and committee structure. 
Full Council 
All elected representatives. Full Council approves the budget and sets the 
overarching framework that the Executive, Committee or Hybrid works to. 
Overview and scrutiny 
In all instances, overview and scrutiny committees are in place to scrutinise 
decisions, ensure democratic oversight and accountable decision making. 
Overview and scrutiny committees tend to align to the main directorates. For 
example, Manchester has six of these committees aligned to children and 
young people, communities and equalities, neighbourhoods and 
environment, economy, health, resources and governance; conversely, 
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Bristol has five: resources, communities, people, growth and regeneration, 
and overview and scrutiny management. 
Senior Management 
The senior management represents the Chief Executive (Head of Paid 
Services) and Directors of each service area in the Council. Specified service 
areas depend on both local authority responsibilities (i.e. whether responsible 
for housing, social care or education etc.), but also how services are 
organised, for example, whether services are grouped. 
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Appendix III Target Case Study Sample 
 
 
Case Study Local Authorities 
LA Name Region Country Authority Type 
Bath & N E Somerset South West 
England 
Unitary 
Birmingham West Midlands Met District 
Bristol South West Unitary 
Calderdale Yorkshire & Humber Met District 
Cambridge East of England District Borough 
Cambridgeshire  East of England County Council 
Camden Greater London London Borough 
Derby East Midlands Unitary  
Enfield Greater London London Borough 
Exeter South West District Borough 
Gateshead North East Met District 
Greater Manchester North West Combined Authority 
Greenwich Greater London London Borough 
Haringey Greater London London Borough 
Hull Yorkshire & Humber Unitary 
Islington Greater London London Borough 
Leeds Yorkshire & Humber Met District 
Leicester East Midlands Unitary 
Leicestershire  East Midlands County Council 
Manchester North West Met District 
Newcastle North East Met District 
Oxford South East District Borough 
Peterborough East of England Unitary 
Plymouth South West Unitary 
Reading South East Unitary 
Sutton Greater London London Borough 
Warrington North West Unitary 
West Yorkshire Yorkshire & Humber Combined Authority 
Wolverhampton West Midlands Met District 
















Included in initial target long list, but unable or unwilling to contribute 
Cornwall South West 
England 
Unitary 
Croydon Greater London London Borough 
Devon South West County Council 
Eastleigh South East District Borough 
Hampshire  South East County Council 
Kirklees Yorkshire & Humber Met District 
Sheffield Yorkshire & Humber Met District 
Southampton South East Unitary 
Woking South East District Borough 
Belfast  Northern Ireland Unitary 
Midlothian  Scotland Unitary 
Included in initial target long list, but 40 case studies recruited (i.e. not contacted) 
Barking & Dagenham Greater London 
England 
London Borough 
Brent Greater London London Borough 
East Sussex South East County Council 
Kensington & Chelsea Greater London London Borough 
North Yorkshire Yorkshire & Humber County Council 
Nottingham East Midlands Unitary 
Poole South West Unitary 
Southwark Greater London London Borough 
Stoke-on-Trent West Midlands Unitary 
Suffolk East of England County Council 
Wigan North West Met District 





Appendix IV Interview Schedule 
 
This is the main data collection instrument that was extended for my data 
collection. 
 
Research on Local Authority Energy and Carbon 
Plans and Projects 
Interview Note <LA NAME> 
About the interview 
The interview will be conducted by <telephone/in person>. It is likely to last 
between 45 minutes and 1 hour. We would like you to be as open and honest 
as possible during the interview. This will help improve our understanding of: 
the reality of local authority work to develop energy projects; the local 
approach to energy and carbon management; the successes you have had; 
the challenges faced and the lessons that can be learned. You will not be 
personally identifiable unless otherwise agreed with you. 
  
To ensure that we accurately capture your views we would like to make an 
audio recording of the interview. The recording and transcript of the interview 
will be stored securely, in accordance with the Data Protection Act, and the 
data use and storage information outlined in the Detailed Information 
document already provided to you. 
Discussion topics 
1. Overview of your role at the Council and background in local 
government, energy and energy efficiency. 
2. The objectives relating to the council’s approach to local energy and 
carbon management. 
3. How the council defines and measures the benefits of any local 
energy initiative. The approach to achieving ‘Best Value’, value for 
money and other assessment criteria in justifying council activities. 
4. Where the project is located within Council structures, the internal 
support for the project and any particular reporting in place about the 
project. 
5. The outcomes and achievements of the project, any changes to 
objectives over the course of project lifetime, and challenges 
experienced. 
6. Project ownership, business model and financing the project. 
7. Policy changes that might support your local authority in delivering a 
local strategic approach to energy. 
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Appendix V Questions drawn from the 
LEUKES questionnaire 
 




m Indicates a closed single option response 
q Indicates a multiple choice response 
Where neither is used, indicates an open text box 
 
Question wording 
What is the project's name and location? 
Name of project 
Location (e.g. city, town, district) Provide full address if applicable 
Post code if applicable 
 
What stage is the project at? Select one option. 





m Build or construction 
m Operational 
m Other (please specify) 
 
What are the main Council objectives driving the project? Select all options that apply. 
q Carbon reduction 
q Energy demand reduction 
q Energy resilience and/or security of supply 
q Affordable warmth including fuel poverty 
q Local population health improvement 
q European/international profile 
q Local skills development  
q Job creation  
q Local economic development 
q Income generation for council 
q Financial saving for council 
q Attracting inward investment 
q Compliance with central/devolved government policies 
q Compliance with EU directives 
q Other (please specify) 
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What are the main technologies used, or to be used, in the project? Select all that apply. 
Where appropriate, please tell us the principal fuel source in the box at the bottom. 
q Anaerobic digestion 
q Building control energy management system 
q Combined Heat and Power- CHP 
q Micro CHP 
q District heating (and cooling) 
q Thermal storage 
q Electric vehicles 
q Energy from waste plant 
q Heat pumps 
q Insulation measures 
q LED street lighting 
q Onshore wind 
q Solar PV 
q Solar Thermal 
q Smart metering 
q Voltage optimisation 
q Other, please specify: ____________________ 
q Not applicable 
 
Who are the users or customers of this project and how many are there?  
Provide the number and type of user in the relevant boxes (e.g. 2 organisations, 25 
buildings, 100 householders, 1,250 individuals) 
If the project is operational include existing users only. 
If the project is not yet operational include expected, target and/or guaranteed users. 
Approximate if you are unsure. 
Council estate inc. leisure 







Other, specify in box 
 
Which Council departments or services have been involved in developing the project? 
Please name the departments (services, internal groups etc.) important to the project. 
Initiated project 
Delivery lead within Council 
Other relevant internal departments or groups 
Internal governance group/board relevant to the project 
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Is the project structured as a separate legal entity? 
m Yes 
m No 
m Not sure 
m Decision has not yet been made 
 
What is the legal structure? 
m Community Interest Company 
m Community Benefit Society 
m Company Limited by Guarantee 
m Company Limited by Shares 
m Cooperative Society 
m Limited Liability Partnership 
m Other (please specify) 
 
What is the total (known or expected) capital cost of the project? If you are unsure please 
estimate. 
Total capital cost in £ 
 
How are the capital costs financed (or how will they be financed)? Select all that apply. 
q Council budget (capital or revenue) 
q Council borrowing (e.g. PWLB) 
q Grant funding (various sources) 
q Commercial partner project contribution 
q Third party debt finance underwritten by council 
q Third party debt finance not underwritten by council 
q Third party equity finance 
q Other, please specify ____________________ 




Please give us the following details about the finance.  If you are unsure about any individual 
breakdown please estimate. 










of years, if 
applicable 
 
Name of finance 










































    m  
Other:     m  
 
Does the project save money or generate money that releases pressure on other budgets 
(or expect to once operational)? 
m Yes 
m No 




Which user groups does the approach to energy prioritise? 







Council corporate estate m  m  m  m  
Commercial businesses m  m  m  m  
Industrial 
processing/industry m  m  m  m  
Other public sector 
buildings/services m  m  m  m  
Private sector housing m  m  m  m  
Social housing m  m  m  m  
Transport passengers m  m  m  m  
Other, please specify: m  m  m  m  
 
Which areas of the Council's work are significant in shaping the approach to energy? Select 
all that apply. 
q Corporate estate energy and/or carbon management 
q Area/borough-wide energy and/or carbon plan 
q Climate change 
q Economic development 
q Environmental services 
q Fuel poverty 
q Spatial planning 
q Waste management 
q Other (please specify) 
 
What impact have any of the following had on the approach to energy?  You can select 
multiple types of impact. 







Statutory responsibilities and powers q  q  q  q  
Spatial planning and building control q  q  q  q  
Best Value framework q  q  q  q  
Procurement rules q  q  q  q  
Local authority budgets q  q  q  q  
Reorganisation/restructure within 
council q  q  q  q  
Joining commitments on energy and 
climate change (such as the 
Nottingham Declaration) 
q  q  q  q  
Other, please specify: q  q  q  q  
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In recent years have any energy projects been temporarily stalled or permanently 
abandoned? Select all that apply. 
q Energy projects have been temporarily stalled 
q Energy projects have been permanently abandoned 
q Not applicable 
 
What is the main reason that projects have temporarily stalled? 
 


















Research on Local Authority  






This research examines the current and future contribution of local authorities to a 
low carbon, affordable and secure UK energy system. We are asking 40 local 
authorities from across the UK about their engagement with sustainable energy.  
 
We know from our preliminary survey that over 80% of the UK’s local authorities are 
acting on energy. Progress with the more ambitious energy efficiency and local 
generation and supply initiatives is however uneven, with around 40% managing to 
assemble funding for projects. 
 
We are now trying to build a better understanding of the progress being made by a 
number of local authorities, and to identify policy changes which would support 
progress across all local authorities. We are an independent team of Edinburgh 
University researchers, with funding from UK Government Research Councils and 
the UK Energy Technologies Institute.  
 
We would very much like to include your local authority in the research. This 
involves completing an online questionnaire about a specific energy project the 
Council is involved in and about the Council’s broad approach to local energy. In 
discussion with you, we will agree which project to cover. We have used feedback 
from local officials to make the questions as straightforward as possible. The 
questionnaire will take around 30 minutes to complete, and will be followed up with 
a telephone interview, at a time to suit you, for a more in-depth discussion. Where 
feasible, and if you prefer, we can visit you in person. The interview will last for 
between 45 minutes and 1 hour. 
 
Reasons to Participate 
In the short term, we hope that you will gain a new perspective on the Council’s 
energy-related activities. In the medium term, the survey findings will help you to 
understand your Council’s activities in relation to the bigger picture across the UK.  
 
In addition, your contribution will inform UK policy by identifying the policy measures 
needed to support a step change in local energy and carbon management. 
 
Specifically, the findings will give you: 
• More informed and detailed insight into the pattern of local authority activity 
across the UK 
• Knowledge about the effectiveness of interaction between local authorities 
and devolved governments in different parts of the UK 
• Better understanding of the regional and inter-city patterns of activity, 
including knowledge sharing about activity in the Core Cities 
• Potential for information sharing with other local authorities (where 
confidentiality permits) 
 
In the longer term, the findings will shape policy and practice through interaction 
with: 
• UK Government Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) Heat 
Network Delivery Unit (HNDU), Heat Strategy and Energy Efficiency teams 
• Scottish Government Heat Networks Partnership  
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• UK Energy Research Centre and the Energy Technologies Institute: 
modelling the contribution of demand reduction and decentralised energy to 
future energy systems  
• APSE Local Authority Energy Collaboration 
• UK Local Authority District Energy Vanguards Network  
 
Lead investigator Professor Jan Webb is a member of the Scottish Government 
Expert Commission on District Heating and Regulation, UK Nominated Expert to the 
International Energy Agency Programme on District Heating and Cooling, Trustee of 
environmental charity, SNIFFER, and member of NHS Scotland network for 
Sustainability and Health. 
 
We have a strong track record of researching local sustainable energy and our 
findings have influenced UK and Scottish Governments’ policies. For example, we 
have contributed to: 
• UK Government DECC 2013 strategy The Future of Heating and subsequent 
creation of the Heat Networks Delivery Unit 
• Scottish Government Heat Policy Statement 
• Royal Society of Edinburgh inquiry Facing Up To Climate Change (published 
2011) 
• Oral evidence before the UK Parliament Energy and Climate Change 
Committee’s evidence gathering on heat (September 2013) 
• Scottish Futures Trust Guidance on District Heating Delivery Structures  
 
Confidentiality and participation 
Participation in the research is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime 
or to refuse to participate. When we report the research we will name the Local 
Authorities taking part, but no individuals will be identified unless otherwise agreed 
with you. We will report summary data from our analysis such as regional variation 
in activity and generalizable themes from the sample of local authorities. Summary 
data will not identify individual local authorities. Where we report specific initiatives 
as ‘case studies’ we will include basic information such as the technology type or 
total investment value. We will not report on any commercially or otherwise sensitive 
information which you provide to us in confidence. Before publishing the findings we 
will ask you for your feedback, and if you prefer we will not include your Council as a 
highlighted ‘case study’. We will provide a copy of our research report to everyone 
who participates. 
 
Access to data and questions about the research 
The following people will have access to the data: 
 
Research team: 
• Professor Jan Webb, Principal Investigator, University of Edinburgh (0131 
650 3987 jan.webb@ed.ac.uk) 
• Dr Dave Hawkey, Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh (0131 650 2841 
dave.hawkey@ed.ac.uk) 
• Ms Mags Tingey, Research Officer, University of Edinburgh (0131 650 8093 
margaret.tingey@ed.ac.uk) 
In addition, the following sponsors:  
 317 
• Professor Keith Bell, Strathclyde University, UK Energy Research Centre 
representative 
• Dr Mike Colechin, UK Energy Technologies Institute representative 
 














Research on Local Authority  
Energy and Carbon Plans and Projects 







Firstly thank you very much for agreeing to assist us. Information about the data 
gathering process for the research is detailed below.  
 
Information about the online questionnaire 
The questionnaire asks for detailed information about a single energy project. We 
believe this is the best way to get in-depth evidence about specific changes taking 
place in local energy and energy efficiency. We know that most authorities have 
ambitious plans, and we know how hard it can be to get plans implemented. We 
therefore want to find out more about the specific opportunities, drivers and 
challenges faced by projects that are implemented, how these are being managed 
and funded, and what these mean for the future. We can use these findings to 
identify the key policy changes needed to reduce the obstacles to progress and to 
create a step change in action. The subsequent interview is an opportunity to 
discuss in more depth both project development and the Council’s priorities and 
ambitions for local sustainable energy. 
 
The online questionnaire is split into two sections; the first section asks about the  
<PROJECT NAME> and the second section is about your council’s broad approach 
to energy and carbon management. After completion of the questionnaire we will 
follow up on < date >, for a more in-depth discussion.  
 
Completion of the online questionnaire 
Where information has been provided in advance some of the responses will be pre-
populated for you to review and amend. You can save your answers at any point 
and return to complete the questionnaire later. It will take around 30 minutes to 
complete depending on the specific project. There may be occasions when the 
particular project you are telling us about is more complicated than the 
questionnaire allows for. Please provide answers to the best of your ability and note 
anything additional you would like to discuss during the interview. For some 
questions you can respond directly or indicate you would prefer to provide a 
document detailing the information requested. 
 
It will help you to complete the questionnaire if you have relevant information and 
documents to hand. 
 
For the project, questions will ask about: 
• Location and development stage 
• Any technologies used, annual heat and electricity output, energy and/or 
carbon savings 
• Customers or users of the energy project 
• The development process (objectives and opportunities shaping project, 
council teams, any external support) 
• Ownership arrangements and financing 
• Any key performance indicators and other impacts 
• As applicable, any feasibility study, business case, project initiation 
document and organogram detailing the governance structure for the energy 
project 
 
For the council’s broad approach to energy and carbon management questions will 
ask about: 
• Areas of the Council’s work that shape the approach to energy 
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• Role of council teams and external support 
• Outcomes the Council prioritises when engaging with sustainable energy 
• What enables and constrains the Council’s approach to sustainable energy 
• Documents relevant to the Council's approach (e.g. any sustainable energy 
strategy; fuel poverty strategy; carbon management plans etc) 
 
Confidentiality and participation 
Participation in the research is voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime 
or to refuse to participate. When we report the research we will name the Local 
Authorities taking part, but no individuals will be identified unless otherwise agreed 
with you. We will report summary data from our analysis such as regional variation 
in activity and generalizable themes from the sample of local authorities. Summary 
data will not identify individual local authorities. Where we report specific initiatives 
as ‘case studies’ we will include basic information such as the technology type or 
total investment value. We will not report on any commercially or otherwise sensitive 
information which you provide to us in confidence. Before we publishing the findings 
we will ask you for your feedback, and if you prefer we will not include your Council 
as a highlighted ‘case study’. We will provide a copy of our research report to 
everyone who participates. 
 
Access to data 
The following people will have access to the questionnaire and interview data: 
Research team: 
• Professor Jan Webb, Principal Investigator, University of Edinburgh  
• Dr Dave Hawkey, Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh  
• Ms Mags Tingey, Research Officer, University of Edinburgh  
In addition, the following sponsors:  
• Professor Keith Bell, Strathclyde University, UK Energy Research Centre 
representative 
• Dr Mike Colechin, UK Energy Technologies Institute representative 
 
Data use and storage 
All data gathered will be protected and processed under the terms of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. In addition the University policies for data handling and 
protection will be followed. The online questionnaire responses and any documents 
you upload will be stored on the Qualtrics-secure database 
(http://www.qualtrics.com/security-statement/) for a period of approximately 12 
months, after which they will be stored in a password protected secure database at 
the University of Edinburgh along with audio recordings of interviews and any 
documents provided by you. Further information about data protection at the 
University of Edinburgh can be found at: http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-
departments/records-management-section/data-protection. The University 
information security policy can be found at: http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-
departments/information-services/about/policies-and-regulations/security-
policies/security-policy. After the project has ended, and not before 2018, we may 
be asked to provide data to the UKERC Data Archive for other academic 
researchers to conduct secondary data analysis. In such an event we would exclude 
any commercially or otherwise sensitive information that you provide. Before we 
provide data to any research archive we will consult you and give you the 




Link to online questionnaire 
The link below will take you to a web based questionnaire. The link is specific to 
your local authority and the < PROJECT NAME > 
 
Local Authority Energy Survey – < COUNCIL NAME > 
< LINK > 
 
If you have any questions about the completion of the questionnaire or about the 
follow-up interview please contact Mags Tingey by telephone or email (0131 650 
8093 or margaret.tingey@ed.ac.uk). You are also able to contact Jan Webb (0131 
650 3987 or jan.webb@ed.ac.uk) or Dave Hawkey (0131 650 2841 or 
dave.hawkey@ed.ac.uk) who are members of the research team with any questions 




Appendix VIII Data Use and Storage 
Statement 
 
Data use and storage statement provided to participants 
All data gathered will be protected and processed under the terms of the 
Data Protection Act 1998. In addition the University policies for data handling 
and protection will be followed. The online questionnaire responses and any 
documents you upload will be stored on the Qualtrics-secure database 
(http://www.qualtrics.com/security-statement/) for a period of approximately 
12 months, after which they will be stored in a password protected secure 
database at the University of Edinburgh along with audio recordings of 
interviews and any documents provided by you. 
 
Further information about data protection at the University of Edinburgh can 
be found at: http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/records-management-
section/data-protection. 




After the project has ended, and not before 2018, we may be asked to 
provide data to the UKERC Data Archive for other academic researchers to 
conduct secondary data analysis. In such an event we would exclude any 
commercially or otherwise sensitive information that you provide. Before we 
provide data to any research archive we will consult you and give you the 
opportunity to review the material and to opt-out. 
